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ABSTRACT  
This book explores how American legal scholarship treats the corporation by 
providing a history of American corporate legal theory, a history of corporate (social) 
responsibility from the perspective of the Berle–Dodd debate, an analysis of how 
legal scholars understand corporate lawmaking in America, and an initial inquiry into 
how the prevailing opinions about the corporation are realized in the context of a 
critical assessment of whether or not this resulting corporate governance holds the 
potential to compliment the efforts of new governance regulators. 
 
This book consists of four essays about American corporate governance. 
Three essays trace how three particular presumptions about the corporation came to 
become part of the dominant narrative about the corporation within the American 
academic context. The first presumption is that the American contractarian theory of 
the corporation most accurately frames an understanding of the corporation. This 
presumption underpins much of Delaware’s corporate law. Second is the notion that 
shareholder value maximization provides the necessary precondition for effective 
corporate governance. The modern incarnation of this presumption was inadvertently 
inspired by the early 20th Century work of Adolf A. Berle. Third is the idea that there 
is market competition for incorporations between states, and this competition creates 
a “race to the top.” Such presumptions help shape the dominant narrative about the 
American corporation. In the final chapter, the elements of these presumptions, and 
the narratives they weave, are reconsidered within the context of new governance, 
which encourages private actors, like corporations, to play larger roles within the 
administrative functions of governments. It is explained how new governance thought 
presumes that corporations are becoming more imbued with a sense of public 
spiritedness. This presumption is closely examined and then ultimately rejected as 
dangerously optimistic considering the narratives that dominate corporate legal 
thinking—at least in the American context.  
 
Each of the four chapters has been published in U.S. law reviews, creating a 
portfolio of essays regarding the American corporation and its place in society. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I. PRELIMINARY NOTE TO DISSERTATION: KNOWLEDGE-POWER, NARRATIVE, AND 
THE CORPORATION 
The introduction to this dissertation starts by offering a perspective upon the 
role of narrative and its impact on corporate law. The chapters of this book focus 
upon some of the grand legal narratives and theories of the American corporation. 
Chapter 2, in particular, discusses how these grand narratives/theories are 
indeterminate, shifting over time. It is suggested that they bend to accommodate the 
political preferences of the moment, helping to legitimate the manner in which market 
activities are organized. In others words, although corporate legal narratives may 
appear authoritative, it is suggested that, most times, such legal narratives do not 
dictate social activities, but merely rationalize the endorsement of one political 
preference over another ex post facto. That does not diminish the significance of such 
study though, since tracing the history of such shifts in corporate narratives provides 
one with a useful roadmap to the history of the rationalization of economic power 
within the American context. 
Much of this thinking is aligned with a somewhat recent symposium on 
corporate narrative entitled Business Law and Narrative Symposium. 1  This 
                                                      
1 This Symposium was held at Michigan State University College of Law on 
September 10, 2009. For more on the Symposium, see Michigan State University 
College of Law, News Release, “Michigan State Law Review to Host Business Law 
  2 
symposium generally suggested that corporate academic scholarship does not play a 
significant role in how the corporation is viewed and functions in American society.2 
For instance, the introducers to the Business Law and Narrative Symposium suggest 
that corporate legal scholars are deluding themselves if they think they are writing 
“the signification of the corporation,” which basically means that such scholars do not 
play a major role in manufacturing of how Americans view the corporation.3 This 
may be true, but there is also a danger in discounting the academic contribution too 
deeply for reasons that will be explored in the following comment on the 
interrelationships between narrative, knowledge, and power. 
In one of the articles from this symposium, Larry Backer provides a model of 
knowledge-power, which elucidates how corporate knowledge is produced. 4 
However, this model, although highly insightful, fails to draw a clear distinction 
between Nietzsche’s notion of the operation of knowledge and power and Foucault’s 
notion of knowledge-power. 5  The result is that Backer overemphasizes the 
                                                                                                                                                          
and Narrative Symposium” (10 Sep 2009) online: 
<http://www.law.msu.edu/news/2009/releases/business-narrative.html>. 
2  See e.g. Mae Kuykendall & David Westbrook, “Introduction: Unsettling 
Questions, Disquieting Stories” (2009) 2009 Mich St L Rev 817 at 827.  
3 Ibid at 827. 
4 See generally, Larry Cata Backer, “The Drama of Corporate Law: Narrator 
Between Citizen, State, and Corporation” (2009) 2009 Mich St L Rev 1111. 
5 See generally Frederick Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, revised 
student ed, Keith Ansell-Pearson ed, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) [Nietzsche, On The Genealogy]; Friedrich 
  3 
importance of the narrator, if he is adopting a Foucaudian perspective.6 While 
Nietzsche, like Backer, would have primarily focused on the privileged producers of 
knowledge, assuming they are the controllers of knowledge,7 Foucault would not do 
so. Foucault would focus on knowledge, assuming that knowledge is the controller of 
those who produce knowledge.8 This will be explained, but first, Backer’s reasoning 
will be traced. 
Again, to be fair, Backer’s description of the social construction of corporate 
knowledge is otherwise excellent. He emphasizes that to understand this social 
production of corporate legal knowledge and its significance, one must understand the 
history of how particular knowledge became privileged and the process by which this 
occurred, including the way that this information was conveyed to others and how 
                                                                                                                                                          
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, translated by RJ Hollingdale (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1990) [Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil]; Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, Colin 
Gordon ed, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) 
[Foucault, Power/Knowledge]; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison, Vintage Books 2d ed, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995) [Foucault, Discipline and Punish]; Michel Foucault, Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, Lawrence D 
Kritzman ed, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Routledge, 1988) [Foucault, 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture]; Michel Foucault, Power, James D Faubion ed, 
translated by Robert Hurley et al (New York: New Press, 2000) [Foucault, Power].  
6 See Backer, supra note 4. 
7 See generally Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5. 
8 See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5; Foucault, Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5; Foucault, Power, supra note 5.  
  4 
others internalized this privileged knowledge.9  Backer continues that law, as a 
doctrinal force, “serves as a critical component” for normalizing corporate 
knowledge.10 Backer explains: 
Power over the management of the knowledge-reality on which law is 
founded (and which founds law) is a central aspect of social control. 
But it is also the central element in the allocation of social power, 
prestige, and the ordering of human hierarchies. And thus one moves 
from knowledge-reality (at the heart of narrative) to the ordering 
element of the narrator—that is, to power-knowledge. And thus we 
come to an understanding of ourselves [as corporate legal academics], 
of our function within the academy.11 
In the above quotation, Backer cites Foucault for the notion of power-
knowledge, but as he continues, a tension develops between his use of power-
knowledge and Foucault’s notion.12 Backer casts legal experts as the controllers of 
their narratives, as if they exist as agents somewhat independent of the knowledge 
that shapes their understandings.13 From this perspective, the narrator can be the 
master of the narrative/knowledge that he or she creates, and thus is the master of 
power-knowledge. 14 Backer comes close to acknowledging the power of 
narrative/knowledge over the narrator, but falls sort of the Foucauldian notion: 
                                                      
9 Backer, supra note 4 at 1115. 
10 See ibid at 1116-17. 
11 Ibid at 1116-17. 
12 Ibid at 1117. 
13 See Ibid at 1118–20, 1165. 
14 See Ibid at 1118. 
  5 
Yet narrative also serves to situate the narrator at that core, and indeed, 
to define that core in ways that perpetuate the narrator control of both 
story and its disciplinary consequences. Like Nietzsche’s notions of 
the power-knowledge framework of religious narrative, the narrator 
serves as a critical element of narration.15 
It is at this point that Backer conflates Nietzsche’s notion of the operation of 
knowledge and power with that of Foucault’s knowledge-power. For Foucault, the 
individual actor/narrator is much less significant, because he or she is faced with the 
untamable tyranny of knowledge, which all narrators feed in subjugation, arguably 
without the potential for emancipation. In other words, although Foucault, both in his 
writing and way of life, was constantly challenging the oppressive nature of the 
imposition of the normal upon the individual, his theory of knowledge-power 
suggests the paradox of such self-critical challenging, exposing the presumption of 
free will as problematic.16 
To understand this final point, a short history of the development of 
Foucault’s notion is justified, starting with a quick review of Nietzsche’s position. In 
On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche identified the understanding of “the good” 
                                                      
15 Ibid at 1124.  
16 For more on Foucault’s theory, see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 
5 at 27, 184-85; Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews, Donald F Bouchard, ed, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1977) at 207 [Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice]; Foucault, 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5 at 43; see also Alan Sheridan, Michel 
Foucault: The Will to Truth (New York: Tavistock, 1980) at 131 (quoting Foucault’s 
Théories et Institutions Pénales (Penal Theories and Institutions)). For more on his 
lifestyle, see David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995).  
  6 
that contemporary thinkers of his time regarded to be truth. 17  Nietzsche then 
conducted a historical examination of how individuals at different points in time and 
from different social traditions held different conceptions of “the good.”18 Thus, his 
comparative historical analysis relativized contrasting conceptions of “the good.”19 
This exercise exposed how truths were mere culturally conditioned preferences.20 
Nietzsche concluded that blind adherence to a concept of “the good” was socially 
manufactured and could serve as a coercive tool for subjugation.21 Nietzsche’s 
contribution was to point out that individuals often simply internalize a predetermined 
normative order, which imposes arbitrary social preferences and amounts to a form of 
self-imprisonment.22  
                                                      
17 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 10-34. 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Human, All Too Human”, Volume I, Section 45, in 
Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 123-24; see also Nietzsche, On The 
Genealogy, supra note 5 at 10-34. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid at 11. 
21 Ibid at 11-12. 
22 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, supra note 5 at 47-49; see also Maudemarie 
Clark & David Dudrick, “Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 19” in Ken 
Gemes & Simon May eds, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 247 at 263.  
  7 
Until Nietzsche, such critical theorists, such as Karl Marx, 23  critiqued 
consciousness, arguing that the particular beliefs did not reflect reality, creating a 
“false consciousness.”24 However, they were willing to introduce an alternative 
version of reality, which they believed was not a “false consciousness.”25 This is 
where Nietzsche was radical and different. He refused to manufacture an ideal to 
replace or improve on “the good” that he criticized, because he believed any social 
                                                      
23 Emmet Kennedy, a leading American history of France and French, wrote: 
“Marx inherited the word ‘ideology’ not from Hegel, who used the word once in 
reference to the French Ideologists and therefore cannot be, strictly speaking, credited 
with an explicit theory of ideology, but only from the cumulative usages current in 
the 1830s and 1840s and specifically from Destutt de Tracy.” Emmet Kennedy, 
“‘Ideology’ from Destutt de Tracy to Marx” (1979) 40 J Hist Ideas 353 at 366. 
24 Marx and Engels linked ideology to “false consciousness.” False consciousness 
is a term sometimes attributed to Marx, but it was actually coined by Engels in the 
following passage from a letter he wrote to Franz Mehring: “Ideology is a 
process…[of] false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown 
to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines 
false or apparent motives…[and] works with mere thought…which he accepts 
without examination…for a more remote process independent of thought…” Letter 
from Friedrich Engels to Franz Mehring, (14 July 1893) in Karl Marx & Friedrich 
Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1846-1895, translated by Dona Torr (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1975) 510 at 511. 
25  In The German Ideology’s Preface, Marx and Engels, in their mocking 
declaration, observed that men have constantly created false self-concepts, “products 
of their brains,” which have imprisoned and oppressed them. They wrote: “Let us 
teach men, says one, how to exchange these imaginations for thoughts which 
correspond to the essence of man; says another, how to take up a critical attitude to 
them; says the third, how to knock them out of their heads; and existing reality will 
collapse.” Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, 3d ed (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1976) at 29. 
  8 
construction of “the good” would subjugate others to his own biased perspective.26 As 
Nietzsche wrote, “But what am I saying? Enough! Enough! At this point just one 
thing is proper, silence: otherwise I shall be misappropriating something that belongs 
to another, younger man…”27 
Weber studied the operation of power, domination, and legitimacy.28 In one 
sense, Weber explored the relationship between power and subjugation more 
systematically than Nietzsche did.29 Weber detailed the processes in which the 
                                                      
26 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy, supra note 5 at 66-67. 
27 Ibid at 67. 
28  Weber defines power as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. Max Weber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds, 
(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) vol 1 at 53. Domination is defined as “the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given 
group of persons.” Ibid. Weber viewed legitimacy as an essential element of 
domination. Ibid at 212-15. 
29 Nietzsche’s thoughts on power and subjugation can be summed up in the 
ending line of The Will to Power, in which he wrote: “This world is the will to 
power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and 
nothing besides!” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann, ed, 
translated by Walter Kaufmann & RJ Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) 
at 550 [Nietzsche, The Will to Power]. Weber believed that power and domination 
were intimately tied together, and as such there would always be a ruling class. He 
wrote: “Any thought…of removing the rule of men over men through the most 
sophisticated forms of ‘democracy’ is utopian.” W Mommsen, Max Weber and 
German Politics, 1890–1920, translated by Michael S Steinberg (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984) at 394 (quoting Weber).  
  9 
individual internalized the legitimate order being imposed.30 He drew a distinction 
between power and domination. Power was the ability of an individual to act in 
accordance with his or her will, regardless of what resistance he or she might face.31 
On the other hand, domination was the ability to transform that will into a command, 
which others would obey.32 
Weber’s notion of the process of rationalization of action is complex, and the 
secondary literature has broadly explored its implications.33 For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to say that he argued that there exists the interplay of four types of 
rationality: purposive (rational), value (moral), affectual (emotive), and traditional 
(habitual).34 These rationalities persuade the subjugated to submit.35 Weber argued 
                                                      
30 Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 31-36, 313-15, 323, vol 3 at 954. For more on 
Weber’s position on this matter, see David M Trubek, “Max Weber on Law and the 
Rise of Capitalism” (1972) 1972 Wis L Rev 720 at 725-27. 
31 Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 53. 
32 Ibid.  
33 See generally Jürgen Habermas, “Law and Morality” (The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, delivered at Harvard University, 1-2 October 1986), translated by 
Kenneth Baynes, online: 
<http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/habermas88.pdf>; Guenther Roth 
& Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber’s Vision of History: Ethics and Methods 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of 
Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History, translated by Guenther 
Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press 1981).  
34 Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 24-26. 
35 Specifically, Weber argued that rational grounds are one of the grounds on 
which legitimacy may be based. Ibid at 215. 
  10 
that legitimacy was tied closely to the notion of rationality.36 Legitimacy was a tool 
used to secure voluntary compliance of others, i.e., to secure domination.37 Thus, 
Weber thought that privileged groups exercised their power by using rationalities that 
legitimated their commands and secured domination over the weaker.38 As Weber 
wrote:  
Every highly privileged group develops a myth of its…superiority. 
Under the conditions of stable distribution of power that myth is 
accepted by the negatively privileged strata.39  
In other words, the poor and the weak subjected themselves to domination because of 
a subjective knowledge about reality, which coerces them into believing that acting in 
the interests of the highly privileged group is in fact acting in their own self-interest.40 
The powerless internalize the rationalities, or reasons, for their subjugation to 
power.41 
Foucault used the thought of each of these authors to inform his own 
understanding of the operation of knowledge and power in society. From Nietzsche, 
                                                      
36 For Weber, the idea of legitimate order was based on the idea that “social 
action…may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order.” Ibid at 31.  
37 Weber believed that rulers used domination in such a way that it appeared “as if 
the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its 
very own sake.” Weber, supra note 28 at vol 3 at 946.  
38 See ibid at 954.  
39 See ibid at 953.  
40 See Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 212, vol 3 at 952-54.  
41 See Weber, supra note 28 at vol 1 at 212-13, vol 3 at 952-54. 
  11 
and Marx and Engel’s limited “false consciousness,”42 he took the understanding that 
there is only historically and socially contingent constructions of reality.43 From 
Weber, he developed the understanding that rationalities are primary for legitimating 
domination within society.44 Foucault then opined that power is not something people 
wield, but is something that knowledge wields. 45  Knowledge is power when 
rationalities legitimated particular actions within a society. 46  Such rationalities 
encourage members to embrace acting in particular ways (normal) and to avoid acting 
in other ways (abnormal).47 Such rationalities also impose the normal upon not only 
the weak, but also the strong. Knowledge dominates, not people. 
                                                      
42 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
43 The genealogy approach that Foucault used in Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Person was used to bring to mind Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals. See 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 5 at 53 (“If I wanted to be pretentious, I 
would use the ‘genealogy of the morals’ as the general title of what I am doing.”); 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 29; see also generally Michael 
Mahon, Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1992). 
44 For an excellent analysis of this, see Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: 
An Introduction” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller, eds, The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991) 1. 
45 See Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, supra note 16 at 207; 
Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5 at 43; Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish, supra note 5 at 27, 184-85. 
46 See Sheridan, supra note 16 at 131 (quoting Foucault’s Théories et Institutions 
Pénales (Penal Theories and Institutions)). 
47 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 184. 
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The social construction of reality suggests that society exists by defining, 
institutionalizing and imposing the normal.48 There must be such distinctions, which 
define what is normal, for order to exist, and thus, there must be the normal and the 
abnormal.49 From another vantage point, deviance is the challenging of order, and 
must be discouraged to protect order.50 Therefore power, or what Weber might 
consider domination, exists as long as there are distinctions that define order.51 
Foucault engaged in a historical study of epistemology, which focuses upon 
the operation of the verification theory of knowledge.52 This verification theory 
operated throughout history to exclude the deviant from the normal.53 Foucault 
                                                      
48 See Peter L Berger & Tomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) at 54-58, 
62, 72-73. 
49 See ibid at 54-55, 72. 
50 See ibid at 168-69. 
51 See ibid at 55, 61-62, 168-69. 
52 See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5; see also Joseph 
Rouse, “Power/Knowledge” in Gary Gutting, ed, The Cambridge Companion To 
Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 95. 
53 During the Enlightenment, there were thinkers who imagined finding a method 
to view society that could draw a distinction between socially constructed values and 
true knowledge. It was from such pursuits that the quest to find the Archimedean 
point was reinvigorated. The Archimedean point is the presumed observation point 
from where an observer can remove him/herself from subjective bias and see 
objectively the subject of inquiry. This quest for objectivity became the foundation 
for the school of thought in the social sciences called, positivism, within which its 
students attempt to discover authentic knowledge through methodologies which 
mirror the methods of the natural sciences in order to verify social observations. See 
e.g. Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism, translated by JH Bridges 
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argued that this process is central to the connection between knowledge and power.54 
This process of legitimating the normal excludes people who do not conform to the 
legitimated normative standards.55 This is similar to Nietzsche’s understanding of 
“the good” and how those that did not conform to this understanding of “the good” 
could be subject to sanction. 56 
Foucault’s historical narratives illustrate this principle in operation, 
documenting how those who failed to conform to normative standards were 
disqualified, excluded, rehabilitated, punished, or some combination of each.57 The 
marginalization of these populations provides evidence of how power (excluding, 
punishing, and/or reforming) was the condition and effect of knowledge 
(normalizing), and how normalizing was the condition and effect of excluding, 
punishing, and/or reforming.58 In other words, he demonstrated how systems of 
knowledge and power were mutually reinforcing, how they needed each other. One 
                                                                                                                                                          
(London: Trübner & Co, 1844); Francis Bacon, “The Great Instauration of Lord 
Bacon” in Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England, 
vol 3 (London: Longman, 1859) at 329, 347. 
54 See Colin Gordon, “Introduction” in Foucault, Power, supra note 5 at xi, xviii-
xix. 
55 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 184. 
56 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.  
57 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5 at 182-83. 
58 See ibid at 182-84. 
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shaped the other. One sustained the other. Both coevolved. And, both co-dependently 
shaped the behavior of individuals and, thus, society.59  
Foucault’s study of epistemology deconstructed the processes of knowledge 
and power, revealing how manufactured assumptions construct identities of 
individuals and societies.60 Again, at the center of this process is the distinction 
between what is normal and deviant.61 In other words, to think in Weber’s terms, 
rationalities legitimate domination. 62  However, for Foucault, domination is not 
something that resided primarily with the individual, although the individual is certain 
the vessel through which knowledge has social impact.63 Rather, power/domination 
resides primarily in the system of thought itself.64 In order words, a social order needs 
rules, which are legitimated as normal, and thus require a catalogue of normal and not 
normal (like the mad, the sick, and the criminal) against which the social order can 
define itself.  
                                                      
59 See ibid at 27. 
60 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; see also e.g. Michel Foucault, 
The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1982). 
61 See e.g. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 5; see also Rouse, supra 
note 52.  
62 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.  
63 See Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, supra note 5 at 102-07; Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, supra note 5 at 327, 331, 34, 342-43. 
64 See ibid.  
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Returning to Backer, from Foucault’s perspective, a focus upon the privileged 
producers of knowledge might blind an observer to the subtleties of a particular 
genealogy of knowledge. Thus, the presumption that narrators control the production 
of corporate thought leads to a presumption that the production of knowledge has 
occurred in a particular way. This might prove to be problematic. As Backer astutely 
suggested, we must identify privileged knowledge, the process by which this 
knowledge became privileged, the way that it was conveyed, and how others 
internalized it65 — but he should have stop at this point.  
Ultimately, an overemphasis upon the narrators may lead to less than useful 
presumptions about the nature of knowledge production. The power of the 
Foucauldian insight is that it can trace how knowledge was produced and how this 
lead to a particular exercise of power, contributing to an understanding of the present, 
but it cannot predict how knowledge-power will manifest, and which actors will play 
leading roles in such future manifestations. 
At times, this book tacitly assumes that corporate legal scholarship does in 
fact play a role in the process of defining the corporation and how corporate 
governance plays out in everyday situations. Admittedly, such assertions are not 
defended. No attempt is made to establish how, or if, such academic knowledge 
migrates from the obscurity of the ivory tower to inform and shape the dominant 
business narratives. Such cause and effect is left open to the contestation of others. 
                                                      
65 Backer, supra note 4 at 1115. 
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Thus, in part, this book leans upon the uncertainty of how a particular narrative comes 
to shape the dominant knowledge, relying on the notion that the source of an idea will 
not be determinative as to what impact the idea may have upon the world view of a 
particular society, since whether an idea influences the dominate narrative may have 
less to do with the source of the idea and more to do with how that idea captures the 
pre-existing spirit of the moment.  
II. THESIS AND OBJECTIVES 
From the outset, it is important to take a moment to reflect upon the 
commonality between each of the four essays about American corporate governance. 
Three essays trace how three particular presumptions about the corporation came to 
become part of the dominant narrative about the corporation within the American 
academic context. The first presumption is that the American contractarian theory of 
the corporation most accurately frames an understanding of the corporation.66 This 
presumption underpins much of Delaware’s corporate law. Second is the notion that 
shareholder value maximization provides the necessary precondition for effective 
corporate governance. 67 The modern incarnation of this presumption was 
                                                      
66 For instance, Delaware law prefers to regard the inability of an oppressed 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to exit as the product of bad 
bargaining, not inequity, and, therefore, refuses to offer an equitable remedy. Another 
example is how weak shareholder rights in publicly traded corporations are justified 
by the consensual nature of purchasing shares and the ability to exit. 
67 See e.g. Jordan A Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an 
American Era (New York, London, UK: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1987) at 60-
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inadvertently inspired by the early 20th Century work of Adolf A. Berle.68 Third is the 
idea that there is market competition for incorporations between states, and this 
competition creates a “race to the top.”69 Such presumptions help shape the dominant 
narrative about the American corporation. In the final chapter, the elements of these 
presumptions, and the narratives they weave, are reconsidered within the context of 
new governance, which encourages private actors, like corporations, to play larger 
roles within the administrative functions of governments.70 It is explained how new 
governance thought presumes that corporations are becoming more imbued with a 
sense of public spiritedness. This presumption is closely examined and then 
ultimately rejected as dangerously optimistic considering the narratives that dominate 
corporate legal thinking—at least in the American context. Each of the four chapters 
                                                                                                                                                          
66; see also Henry G Manne, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay 
in Honor of Adolf A. Berle” (1964) 64 Colum L Rev 1427 [Manne, “Some 
Theoretical Aspects”]; Henry G Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’ of the Modern 
Corporation” (1962) 62 Colum L Rev 399 [Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’”]. 
68 See e.g. Schwarz, supra note 67 at 60-66; see also Manne, “Some Theoretical 
Aspects”, supra note 67; Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’”, supra note 67. 
69 See generally Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation” (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 251. 
70 See e.g. John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for 
Making it Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008); Colin 
Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State” 
in Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and 
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2005) 145; Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of 
Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current 
Probs 103. 
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has been published in U.S. law reviews,71 creating a portfolio of essays regarding the 
American corporation and its place in society. 
III. A ROADMAP OF THE BOOK’S CHAPTERS 
Again, this book visits four specific examples of how America has legally 
treated the corporation: a history of American corporate legal theory, a history of 
corporate (social) responsibility from the perspective of the Berle–Dodd debate,72 an 
analysis of how legal scholars understand corporate lawmaking in America, and an 
initial inquiry into how the prevailing opinions about the corporation are realized in 
corporate governance and whether or not this resulting corporate governance holds 
the potential to compliment the efforts of new governance regulators. 
Chapter 2 is entitled “Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a Wholesome 
Corporate Law.” It explores three theories of the corporation: the concession, entity, 
                                                      
71 Fenner L Stewart, Jr, “The Economizing Corporation and its Place in the 
Wilderness of New Governance” (Osgoode Hall L Sch Comp Res in L & Pol Econ 
Res Paper Series, Paper No 31/2012, 2012) [forthcoming in Ind J Global Legal Stud, 
Spring/Summer 2014]; Fenner L Stewart, Jr, “Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a 
Wholesome Corporate Law” (2012) 9 Rutgers Bus L Rev 81; Fenner L Stewart, Jr, 
“Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective For 
Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance” (2011) 34 Seattle UL Rev 1457; Fenner 
L Stewart, Jr, “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society” (2010) 23 
Loyola Con L Rev 147. 
72 See AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harv L 
Rev 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”]; E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1145; AA Berle, Jr, “For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1365 
[Berle, “A Note”]. 
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and contractarian theories. Each of these theories is essential to an understanding of 
the corporation.73 Each is essential in the sense that every corporation is created 
through an incorporation process (concession theory), which creates its status as a 
legal person (entity theory), and provides the complex social and legal contexts for 
corporate governance (contractarian theory). They are also inherently indeterminate 
in the sense that it is the normative presumptions that attach to each of these theories 
(for instance, contracts are consensual and efficient74), which determines which 
policy outcomes the theory will endorse. A potentiality arises here that most 
advocates of the prevailing contractarian theory do not acknowledge. Although the 
contractarian theory’s position in American corporate legal thought is solidified,75 the 
normative presumptions that attach to it, namely that contracts are necessarily 
consensual and efficient, are not as concrete. If these normative presumptions shift, 
this could trigger a shift within contractarian thinking, resulting in the promotion of 
different policy outcomes than is presently advocated. 
                                                      
73 See e.g. Thomas W Joo, “Theories and Models of Corporate Governance” in H 
Kent Baker & Ronald Anderson, eds, Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 157; John Dewey, 
“The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale LJ 655. 
74  Joo, supra note 73 at 170 (arguing that “incorporating efficient-market 
assumptions, contractarianism makes two claims: that governance is consensual and 
that it is efficient”). 
75  See Ian Ayres, “Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of 
Easterbrook and Fischel” (1992) 59 U Chicago L Rev 1391. 
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Chapter 2 asserts that all of these essential theories of the corporation ought to 
be considered. Taking seriously all of these factors will encourage legal discourse on 
corporate governance, which will reveal the underlying normative preferences that 
give rise to favoring one policy outcome over another. If this level of engagement 
were to occur, there would be more opportunities for candid debates centering upon 
that which is at stake within corporate governance. 
In particular, Chapter 2 traces through the histories of the concession, entity, 
and contractarian theories to the present. It explains how the concession and entity 
theories today are dismissed as largely irrelevant and how the prevailing contractarian 
theory enjoys more or less full reign over steering corporate legal thinking. The 
chapter predicts that, in the near future, there is a greater likelihood of a policy shift 
within the contractarian model than any shift away from it. That said, Chapter 2 
concludes with the recommendation that it endorsed at the outset: Scholars need to be 
self-critical of their roles in the manufacturing of corporate knowledge and, in part, be 
leery of accepting a priori knowledge as fact. This critical approach should lead to a 
more wholesome corporate law, whatever that law might look like. 
Chapter 3 is entitled “Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A 
Forgotten Perspective for Reconsideration during the Rise of Finance.” It traces how 
the shareholder primacy theory developed from the rise of the modern corporation 
through to present day. Adolf A Berle Jr developed this theory in the 1920s and 1930s 
based on his belief that managerial opportunism was running rampant on Wall Street 
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in the 1920s, threatening the whole of the American economy.76 He believed that the 
only tool that the law had to police this dangerous opportunism was to ensure that 
managers had only one master: shareholders.77 Chapter 3 explores his theory through 
the Berle–Dodd debate, which is regarded as the seminal American corporate social 
responsibility debate within legal scholarship.78 
Until Charles O’Kelly’s important promotion of the work of Berle with his 
annual Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Symposium on Corporations, Law and Society at the 
University of Seattle,79 commenters footnoting Berle’s contribution to corporate legal 
literature were becoming forgetful of Berle’s position, suggesting in passing 
references that Berle was the forefather of the modern shareholder primacy 
movement,80 without mention of the fact that Berle would be opposed to its present 
incarnation.  
                                                      
76 Adolf A Berle, Navigating the Rapids 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. 
Berle, Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973) at 19 [Berle, Navigating the Rapids]. 
77 Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 72 at 1049. 
78  CA Harwell Wells, “The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century” (2002) 51 U Kan L Rev 77 at 
81-99. 
79 For more on the symposium, see Seattle University School of Law, “The Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society”, online: 
<http://www.law.seattleu.edu/x1865.xml>.  
80 See e.g. Lawrence E Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest 
Export (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 
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Chapter 3 explains Berle’s relationship to today’s shareholder primacy 
argument within its historical context, including with it a further explanation of how 
Henry Manne “flipped”81 his arguments.82 Berle used shareholder primacy to endorse 
corporate power directly serving the wider polity, while Manne reframed Berle’s 
shareholder primacy in order to limit the ability of corporate power to directly serve 
the wider polity. Manne detached Berle’s underlying normative preference from the 
shareholder primacy argument and attached his own, retooling it for his own 
purposes.  
As with the essentialist theories explained in Chapter 2, until the shareholder 
primacy argument is combined with additional normative claims, the policy outcome 
that it legitimatizes is indeterminate. Berle constructed “the shareholder” as 
representing the general public, and thus presumed that the shareholder would lend its 
proxy to initiatives supporting the interests of the polity. Manne constructed “the 
shareholder” as representing the residual claim of the corporation, and thus presumed 
                                                      
81 A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like 
Berle advocating shareholder primacy to open the corporation to public-interest 
concerns) and then that same language is used to endorse the opposed reform (like 
Manne advocating shareholder primacy to close the corporation to public-interest 
concerns). For more on how arguments can be flipped, see Duncan Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication: Fin de siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); 
see also Kerry Rittich, “Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in 
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates” (2005) 55 UTLJ 853 at 857. 
82  See generally Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control” (1965) 73 J Pol Econ 110 [Manne, “Corporate Control”]; Manne, “Some 
Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 67; Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’”, supra note 
67.  
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that it would lend its proxy to sustainable maximization of the corporation’s residual. 
As such, Berle’s use of shareholder primacy was to direct managers to focus on a 
more Keynesian and political management of the economy, while Manne’s was to 
direct managers to narrow their focus squarely upon economic efficiency of their 
organizations.  
Therefore, while Berle is considered the grandfather of modern shareholder 
primacy theory, up to very recently the literature on this topic often glossed over this 
shift in the modern shareholder primacy argument from Berle’s conception to 
Manne’s conception. Thus, the article focuses on Berle, but also on the indeterminate 
nature of shareholder primacy. The interest of shareholders as a collective can never 
be truly determined, however “the shareholder,” as an empty signifier, can be filled 
with a variety of contrasting meanings, thereby becoming a point of contention.83 As 
with the prevailing contractarian theory of the corporation, a revolution in corporate 
function could occur without undermining the dominance of shareholder primacy 
thinking today, thereby representing a potentiality if the appropriate circumstances 
were to arise.  
Chapter 3 ends with a discussion of the rise of finance. It suggests that 
investors are now less connected to the social consequences of their investment 
choices and that this blindness negatively influences society. Those in the world of 
                                                      
83 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti, ed 
(London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) at 197-98. 
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investing and finance think in terms of decoupling value from risk and are 
disconnected from the social consequences such financialized choices have in the real 
world.  
As a result, the chapter concludes that Berle would not favor today’s 
incarnation of shareholder primacy. It ends with suggesting that a strong look should 
be taken at the pros and cons of the rise of finance and the role of shareholder 
primacy within it. It further suggests that there exists a potentiality in Berle’s 
application of the shareholder primacy, demonstrating how managers can be 
encouraged to serve a more enlightened and socially conscious construction of the 
shareholder. 
Chapter 4 is entitled “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American 
Society.” It takes a critical look at the market for attracting incorporations, known as 
the charter market, and Delaware’s place within it. Specifically, the article looks at 
how legal thinking has been captured by the idea that competition, not politics, drives 
corporate legal development and how this framing of legal development influences 
how corporate governance mechanisms are conceived as being non-politically 
constitutionalized.  
After a brief history of incorporation in America, Chapter 4 introduces the 
Cary–Winter debate84 that arose concerning how to deal with the charter market. On 
                                                      
84 William L Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware” 
(1974) 83 Yale LJ 663; Winter, supra note 69. 
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the one hand, William Cary claimed that charter competition was producing a race-to-
the-bottom in the manufacturing of corporate law. He believed that states were 
watering down corporate law in order to attract state revenue from incorporation fees 
and franchise tax.85 On the other hand, Ralph Winter claimed that this competition 
actually created a race-to-the-top, because corporate managers would choose the state 
that had the most beneficial default rules that promote debt and equity capitalization, 
and as such, state competition was fostering rules that would make the corporation an 
efficient economizing device.86  
These two positions would shape the debate from the 1970s to the present. 
While Cary supporters favor anti-managerialism, federal governmental intervention, 
and centralized planning,87 Winter supporters call for managerialism, unlimited state 
competition, and decentralized markets.88 Over the years, legal scholars used event 
studies to support Winter’s position, while Cary supporters fired back, claiming that 
                                                      
85 See Cary, supra note 84 at 663-64. 
86 See Winter, supra note 69. 
87 See e.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” 
(2005) 118 Harv L Rev 833; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, “Vigorous 
Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters” 
(2002) 112 Yale LJ 553; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, “Federalism and 
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers” (1999) 99 Colum L 
Rev 1168. 
88  See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1993); Stephen M Bainbridge, “The Creeping 
Federalization of Corporate Law” (2003) 26 Regulation 26 [Bainbridge, “Creeping 
Federalization”]. 
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the event studies that were used were not sophisticated enough, and simply could not 
account for the complexities of the American charter market.89  
The Enron scandal was a circumstance that provided an opening to Cary 
supporters, and their race-to-the-bottom argument garnered greater attention. The 
federal government seemed to agree, resulting in the passing of Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act. 90  After observing such federal intervention, Mark Roe turned the state 
competition debate on its head by arguing that Delaware, the de facto national 
corporate law, was never in competition with other states for incorporations.91 Thus, 
Delaware enjoys no competitors unless it triggers circumstances in which a 
reactionary public demands that the federal government intervenes – as had occurred 
with the Enron scandal and to a lesser degree with the Credit Crisis. Using Roe’s 
insight, Chapter 4 then continues to explain how Delaware is in fact a private caucus 
of managers and, to a lesser extent, shareholders who set corporate policy for 
themselves with the awareness that if they go too far, the federal government will step 
in.  
                                                      
89 See e.g. Melvin A Eisenberg, “The Structure of Corporation Law” (1989) 89 
Colum L Rev 1461 at 1508. 
90 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, (codified at 
15 USC § 7201 et seq). 
91 Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Politics” (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 2491 at 2494-45, 
2498; Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117 Harv L Rev 588 at 592-93. 
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In the end, the result is similar – Delaware favors managerialism within 
American corporate governance. Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy theory is 
used as the reflecting Delaware policy. 92  Bainbridge argues that the rise of 
independent directors has led boards to stop merely serving as rubber stamps for 
CEOs.93 Chapter 4 explores how Bainbridge argues there is no need to empower 
shareholders further, as directors ensure corporate governance takes the shareholder 
maximization norm into consideration. His opponents, in particular Lucian Bebchuk, 
demand a greater shareholder voice in Delaware lawmaking. Bebchuk commits to 
advocating for more federal intervention, threatening Delaware’s primacy in the 
hopes that it will concede to his policy demands.94  
A potentiality in this situation is that even though Bebchuk 
welcomes/threatens federalization of corporate law in his writing,95 and Bainbridge 
fiercely attacks federal intervention,96 neither appears willing to acknowledge the 
                                                      
92 Brett H McDonnell, “Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A 
Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice” (2009) 34 Del J 
Corp L 139 at 150-153. 
93  Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 1-2 [Bainbridge, New 
Corporate Governance]. 
94 Bebchuk, supra note 87 at 874. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Bainbridge, “Creeping Federalization”, supra note 88. 
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significance of Roe’s insight, which exposes the frailty of Delaware’s privilege to a 
degree that neither is comfortable with acknowledging.  
Chapter 5 is entitled “The Corporation, New Governance, and The Power of 
Narrative.” It takes a critical look at the idea of publicization and how it plays out 
within new governance. Publicization is a vague, but popular, notion that the 
delegation of public power to for-profit agents—what John Braithwaite calls the 
“privatization of the public”97—will lead to such agents exercising this power as 
idealized public servants—what Braithwaite calls the “publicization of the private.”98 
This chapter argues that publicization of the private is a dangerous metaphor which 
offers a romanticized picture of functionally efficient decentered actors99 acting with 
the integrity of public servants. It is suggested that publicization of the private is an 
empty promise, which will lead the faithful to be less critical of privatization. 
Accordingly, Chapter 5 suggests that new governance initiatives may be leading to 
the privatization of the public—without the publicization of the private.  
                                                      
97 Braithwaite, supra note 70 at 8. 
98 Braithwaite, supra note 70 at 8. 
99 See e.g. Julia Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002) 27 Austl J Leg 
Phil 1; see also Friedrich A Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945) 35 
Am Econ Rev 519. 
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New governance is an umbrella term for theories of governance that marry the 
best of both the public and private orderings.100 It celebrates a “blurring” of public 
and private functions.101 It is a noble venture that attempts to construct a governance 
alternative, which encourages economic growth,102 while balancing it with the need to 
generate sustainable and balanced policy options that protect human dignity and 
ensure a habitable natural environment for future generations. Part 2 of Chapter 5 
introduces readers to some of the literatures that inform the current development of 
the new governance literature. 
The hopefulness of the new governance literature, with its suggestion that 
society is on a course toward the “reassertion of the public interest” within 
governance103 is contrasted with the normative presumption of mainstream corporate 
law. In Part 3 of Chapter 5, many of the central notions, which anchor how corporate 
legal experts understand the corporation and the law that regulates it, are reviewed. 
                                                      
100 See generally David Trubek & Louise Trubek, “The World Turned Upside 
Down: Reflections on New Governance and the Transformation of Law” (2010) 2010 
Wis L Rev 719; William H Simon, “New Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan 
Response” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 727; Lisa T Alexander, “Reflections on Success 
and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the Lawyer” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 
738. 
101  See generally Jason M Solomon, “New Governance, Preemptive Self-
Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice” 
(2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 591. 
102 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 70 at vii-x. 
103 See generally David Levi-Faur, “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of 
the Public Interest” (2009) 27 Pol’y & Soc’y 181. 
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This provides a snapshot of the mindset that dominates American corporate legal 
culture and the commonsense position in the business world. This section offers a 
concise summary of much of what can be gleaned about American corporate legal 
culture from Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The main message of this section is that regulators 
would face serious resistance if they attempted to publicize corporate governance, and 
that any presumption to the contrary needs more sober revaluation.   
Part 4 of Chapter 5 explores the idea of technocratic narratives, its dominance 
within public and private governance, and its tendency to discourage publicization. 
To understand the nature of technocratic narratives, Chapter 5 draws a distinction 
between humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives. It defines humanistic 
narratives as storylines that package information in a manner that mirrors life 
experience. Technocratic narratives consist of the spectrum of scientific language, but 
most predominately economic ones, employed in order to attempt to resolve 
governance issues in a more abstract manner.  
Technical experts, who guide much of governance today, embrace 
technocratic narratives, while ignoring humanistic narratives. The use of technocratic 
narratives may appear depoliticized, but Chapter 5 argues that it limits choices within 
the “regulatory calculus” to those that embrace “efficiency, expertise, and cost-
containment.”104 It plays out so that humanistic narratives are regarded as unsuitable, 
and are thus marginalized within decision-making. By divorcing governance 
                                                      
104 Rittich, supra note 81 at 867. 
  31 
decisions from humanistic narratives, social conflicts can be abstractified, practically 
concealing the connection between particular choices and their violent consequences.  
This section challenges the notion of publicization from a different 
perspective: if it is assumed that there will be the “percolation”105 of values from 
public governance to private governance, what if there needs to be a publicization of 
the public as well? This discussion of technocratic narratives suggests that this is 
quite likely the case.  
Chapter 5 ends with the suggestion that the blurring of public and private in 
governance today will probably not lead to the publicization of corporations in some 
spontaneous way, and that the notion of publicization may not be capable of leading 
to the noble ends to which new governance aspires. And if this is the case, then new 
governance, and its call for a further blurring of public and private functions, may 
merit a critical re-evaluation. 
Chapter 6 then concludes with some reflections on the book and some insights 
into the potential for further study of the relationships between corporate governance 
and society. 
                                                      
105 John Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism, Strategic Privatization and Crises” 
(2013) [unpublished, archived at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249544] at 4. 
 
 
 
 32 
CHAPTER 2: INDETERMINACY AND BALANCE: A PATH TO A 
WHOLESOME CORPORATE LAW  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are central players in the mediation of tensions between markets 
and society.1 Thus, it stands to reason that we as corporate legal scholars ought to 
invite a robust debate that encourages broad discussions about the role of the 
corporation in society in order to help in finding and re-finding the “appropriate”2 
balance. To achieve this end, we must be constantly challenging and reassessing our 
assumptions about how the law ought to mediate corporate conflicts.3  Put differently, 
                                                      
1 Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothee Baumann, “Global Rules 
and Private Actors - Towards a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global 
Governance” (2006) 16 Bus Ethics Q 505; Neva Goodwin, “The Social Impacts of 
Multinational Corporations: An Outline of the Issues with a Focus on Workers” 
in Alfred D Chandler, Jr & Bruce Mazlish, eds, Leviathans: Multinational 
Corporations and the New Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 135; Dennis A Rondinelli, “Transnational Corporations: International Citizens 
or New Sovereigns?” (2002) 107 Bus & Soc’y Rev 391. 
2 This term (and others) is in quotations because this chapter sets aside the 
questions of whether evaluations such as “better” are possible in this context. In other 
words, this chapter is mindful, and wary, of drawing distinctions between 
good/legitimate forms of governance and bad/illegitimate ones, leaving such attempts 
at “objective” measure to others.  
3 William W Bratton, Jr, “The ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal” (1988) 74 Cornell L Rev 407 at 464-65 [Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”]. 
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we need to be aware of how the processes of socialization impact our norms, 
preferences, and politics as academics.4   
Today, the corporation is generally held to be a nexus-of-contracts.5 It is also 
assumed that the contracts that bind corporate constituents are both consensual and 
efficient. 6  Such efficiencies occur because legal requirements upon corporate 
governance have been relaxed, and relaxed legal requirements allow market forces to 
inspire corporate constituents to use their ingenuity to negotiate contracts in their own 
best interest.7 What follows from this is that corporate law ought to be permissive in 
nature, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally suboptimal.8  
                                                      
4 Peter L Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) at 74, 
177. 
5 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 458 (arguing that “the nexus of 
contracts concept places the corporation on a foundation of contractual consent”). For 
an example of a “real adherent,” see Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate 
Governance in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 
30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain Methodology”) 
[Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance]. 
6 Thomas W Joo, “Theories and Models of Corporate Governance” in H Kent 
Baker & Ronald Anderson, eds, Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 157 at 170 (arguing 
that “incorporating efficient-market assumptions, contractarianism makes two claims: 
that governance is consensual and that it is efficient”) [Joo, “Theories and Models”]. 
7 Thomas W Joo, “Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations 
Law” (2002) 35 UC Davis L Rev 779 (arguing that the contractarian vision of 
contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that “economic 
relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the 
law respects them for this reason”) [Joo, “Contract, Property”]. For an excellent 
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Recent corporate and financial scandals appear to challenge the prudence of 
these assumptions,9 yet they prevail over corporate legal thinking.10 To be fair, they 
may still be the best option available, and conceding this, this chapter ought not to be 
construed as an attack on these prevailing presumptions. Rather, this chapter merely 
suggests that more self-reflexive debates about the “right” way to mediate corporate 
conflicts will improve the ways we think about and discuss the corporation and thus, 
it is assumed, will improve our understanding of corporate governance. In other 
words, if we accept the tenuous nature of the choices we make, we can be more open-
minded to a broader spectrum of considerations. With a more open-minded 
understanding, we ought to make “better” choices about how corporate governance 
ought to be regulated.11 Such a critical mindset is important, as our assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                          
example of an adherent to this theory, see Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, 
supra note 5 at 30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain 
Methodology”). 
8 Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 171. 
9 For examples and analysis, see Nancy B Rapoport, Jeffery D Van Niel & Bala G 
Dharan, eds, Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader, 2d 
ed (New York: Foundation Press, 2009). However, also consider the wider literature 
on the Credit Crisis of 2008. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The 
Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon Books, 
2010); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street 
and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (New York: 
Viking, 2009). 
10 Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170. 
11 Ibid.  
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frame how corporate governance is conceptualized, influencing the way that 
participants within corporate governance calculate and respond to problems.12 
Specifically, to improve the processes of understanding how to mediate 
corporate conflicts,13 this chapter recommends focusing upon the indeterminacy of 
corporate legal theories. In doing so, corporate legal thinking “habitualizes” being 
critical and mindful of such indeterminacies,14 resulting in greater pluralism, since no 
corporate legal theory would become “heavily privileged” over any other, allowing 
each to make contributions within legal thinking.15 When such a balance between 
theories exists, a robust debate can occur where no ideas are raised to the status of 
“truth” while other theories are off the table before the debate begins.16 This would 
lead to fewer consensuses, 17  but more complexity than presently exists within 
                                                      
12 For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine, and policy, see 
Ron Harris, “The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big 
Business” (2006) 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 1421. For challenges to Harris’s position, 
see Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and 
Economic Development: Comment on The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on 
Corporate Personality Theories” (2006) 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 1489 [Mitchell, “The 
Relevance of Corporate”]. 
13 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65. 
14 Berger & Luckmann, supra note 4 at 74, 177. 
15 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid at 465. 
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corporate legal discourse, helping to immunize the law from the sort of 
oversimplifications that might offer “ease of comprehension” at the risk of “positive 
error.”18 This chapter argues that adding such complexity and balance to corporate 
legal discourse would be “wholesome” for corporate law.19 
To be clear, this chapter does not reject the argument that relaxed legal 
requirements lead to optimal corporate governance results over time.20 Rather, it 
argues that the assumptions that underpin this argument are too fragile to assert that 
relaxed legal requirements will produce the assumed outcome in all circumstances.21 
Thus, such fragile a priori knowledge22 of the corporation must be recursively subject 
to careful scrutiny in today’s fast-changing society. If this is true, then no single 
theory or model ought to be treated as authoritative.  
                                                      
18 Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170. 
19 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 465. 
20 Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 35 [Easterbrook & Fischel, The 
Economic Structure].  
21 For arguments supporting this anti-essentialist notion of corporate law, see 
William W Bratton, “Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law” (2005) 2 
Berkeley Bus LJ 59 at 70 [Bratton, “Welfare”]; Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra 
note 3. 
22  A priori knowledge is “knowledge that rests on a priori justification. A 
priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, 
independent of experience.” Bruce Russell, “A Priori Justification and Knowledge” in 
Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), online: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/>.  
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If an idea “works,” then that is the best we can hope for, and if circumstances 
change and what worked stops working, then we had better figure out how to adapt so 
that theory reflects practice as quickly as possible.23 As Fred Block suggests, “market 
societies”24 are patchworks of regulations which do not necessarily fit together easily, 
generating social systems that have an “always under construction” nature.25 Within 
this context, it is suggested that embracing the indeterminacy of corporate theory will 
necessarily generate a more responsive and critical discourse that, over time, will 
improve corporate function within an ever-changing global marketplace. 
                                                      
23  William James wrote of pragmatism: “Rationalism sticks to 
logic. . . . Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take 
anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most 
personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical 
consequences. . . . Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of 
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of 
experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.” William James, Pragmatism: A Series 
of Lectures by William James, 1906–1907 (Rockville, Md: Arc Manor, 2008) at 40. 
24 Fred Block uses the term “market society,” which he attributes to Karl Polanyi. 
Block describes “market society” as Polanyi’s conception of a society that is 
constituted by two opposing movements: “the laissez-fair movement to expand the 
scope of markets, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist . . . the 
impossible pressures of a self-regulating market system.” Fred Block, “Introduction” 
in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time, 2d ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) xviii at xxviii. 
25  Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Markets and Society: The Life and 
Thought of Karl Polanyi, Part 5: The Legacy” (webcast) (Posted 8 August 2006, 9:53 
pm) (interviewing Fred Block), online: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://www.insidethecbc.com/ideas-series-markets-and-society-available-for-
download/>.  
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Part 2 of this chapter introduces three essentialist theories of the corporation:  
the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory. These 
three theories have always been relevant variables when considering the modern 
corporation. 26  Put differently, since the rise of the modern publicly traded 
corporation,27 the corporation has always been a group of aggregate constituents28 
connected through contract,29 while at the same time being an entity with personhood 
that only exists because of a concession made by the state.30 It is argued that each of 
these three theories is indeterminate.31 Indeterminate, in this context, means that these 
                                                      
26 David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 1990 Duke LJ 201 at 204, 
242-51; see also Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6.  
27 For an historical account of the rise of the modern corporation at the end of the 
19th century, see Fenner Stewart, Jr, “The Place of Corporate Lawmaking in 
American Society” (2010) 23 Loyola Con L Rev 147 at 151-55 [Stewart, “The Place 
of Corporate Lawmaking”]. 
28 Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co, 118 US 394 (1886) [Santa 
Clara]; see also Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 159. 
29  Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777 at 783-84.  
30 For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see William W 
Bratton, Jr, “The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History” (1989) 41 Stan L Rev 1471 at 1502-05 [Bratton, “New Economic Theory”].  
31 John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 
35 Yale LJ 655 at 669 [Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”].  
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essentialist theories do not support or reject any position with corporate governance 
until combined with additional normative claims.32  
Parts 3 and 4 trace this history of indeterminacy, pulling together a synthesis 
of these three essentialist theories of the corporation throughout the twentieth century 
to present. They offer insight into how each essentialist theory has been used to 
rationalize contrasting policy positions. In other words, they focus on how each of the 
essentialist theories have been used to embed a prescription as to how to regulate the 
corporation, and then later, how that same theory was used to advocate for a policy 
prescription that undermines the original.33 Thus, they present historical examples of 
this indeterminacy in action. Specifically, this chapter explains how this has occurred 
in the use of both the concession and entity theories. Part 4 ends by predicting how 
the prevailing aggregate contractarian theory has already past its high-water mark, 
pointing to how alternative and contrasting versions of it may emerge. This history of 
legal thought draws attention to the patterns of how we manufacture knowledge about 
the corporation and corporate law over time.34 
                                                      
32 Ibid. 
33 See text accompanying notes 55-56, 64-67 & 69-71. 
34 For the interplay of corporate legal discourse, theory, doctrine and policy, see 
Harris, supra note 12. For challenges to Harris’s position, see Mitchell, “The 
Relevance of Corporate”, supra note 12. See also Berger & Luckmann, supra note 4 
at 74, 177.  
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In conclusion, the chapter reasserts that embracing the indeterminacy of 
corporate theory will generate the sort of robust debate that we as corporate legal 
scholars ought to have. In the end, the chapter leaves the reader with a simple 
proposal for conceptualizing the corporation:  be self-critical of one’s role in the 
manufacturing of corporate legal knowledge and, in part, be leery of accepting a 
priori knowledge as fact.  
II. THREE ESSENTIALIST THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION AND THEIR INDETERMINATE 
NATURE 
The thoughts of John Dewey explain how the essentialist theories of the 
corporation35 are indeterminate. This part explains his position and then evaluates its 
implications, before disagreeing with his recommendations on what ought to be done 
about this indeterminacy. Then this part delves into an explanation of the three 
essentialist theories of the corporation:  the concession theory, the entity theory, and 
the aggregate contractarian theory. Finally, it foreshadows the historical narrative 
explored in Parts 3 and 4 by briefly explaining how each of these essentialist theories 
                                                      
35 For the purpose of this chapter, essentialist theories of the corporation are 
models of the corporation that assert it has a set of characteristics that all corporations 
must possess. There will be three considered: the concession theory, the entity theory, 
and the aggregate contractarian theory. These theories purport to be determinative for 
particular normative positions. However, if Dewey’s anti-essentialist theory of 
corporate law is correct, then this is not the case. See Dewey, “Corporate Legal 
Personality”, supra note 31 at 669. 
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can be used to endorse contradictory policy prescriptions by altering the additional 
normative suppositions attached to the essentialist theory in question. 
It may not be accurate to call Dewey a realist, but he was most definitely an 
antiformalist, who was very sympathetic to the realist movement against formalism 
that was occurring in a number of disciplines, including law,36 in the early part of the 
twentieth century.37 He was acutely aware that social modeling and formal reasoning 
easily became safe havens for undisclosed normative agendas separate from the 
reasoning itself.38  
In 1926, Dewey published one of the most important articles that the Yale Law 
Review ever printed on corporate theory.39 In the article, Dewey expressed concern 
over how a number of notions about the “inherent and essential attributes” of the 
corporation had been “shov[ed] . . . under the legal idea” of the corporation, leading 
                                                      
36 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law (New Orleans: 
Quid Pro, 2011); William W Fisher III, Morton J Horwitz & Thomas A Reed, 
American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 4; Felix S 
Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Colum L 
Rev 809 at 816; Morris R Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8 
at 12; Robert L Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State” (1923) 38 Pol Sci Q 470. 
37  Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against 
Formalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
38 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958) at 
422-27 [Dewey, Experience and Nature].  
39 Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”, supra note 31. 
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to “a confused intermixture.”40 In fact, he insisted that “there [was] no clear-cut line, 
logical or practical, through the different theories” and that “[e]ach theory [had] been 
used to serve the same ends, and each [had] been used to serve opposing ends.”41 He 
argued that since these essentialist theories were indeterminate, legal thinkers must 
learn to assess critically whether legal assumptions attached to these theories reflected 
functional reality of the corporation.42  
By identifying such legal assumptions and pragmatically assessing their merit, 
Dewey asserted that the law could better address corporate legal problems.43 Put 
differently, Dewey’s solution was not to take essentialist theories too seriously until 
“the concrete facts and relations involved [had] been faced and stated on their own 
account” 44 in order to forge direct connections between legal reasoning and the 
facts.45 The weakness of Dewey’s suggestion is that by discounting essentialist 
theories when mediating corporate legal conflicts, a normative void can emerge, 
which might tempt the less pragmatically minded to fill the void, potentially 
                                                      
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid at 669. 
42 Ibid at 657-58.  
43 Ibid at 673. 
44 Ibid at 673. 
45 Ibid.  
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compromising the problem solving Dewey had envisioned for corporate legal 
thought.46  
This chapter agrees with Dewey’s observations about the potentially negative 
impact of essentialist theories of the corporation, but it disagrees with his solution. 
Rather than largely disregarding essentialist theories as Dewey recommended,47 this 
chapter advocates focusing primarily upon the indeterminacy of these essentialist 
theories.48 Such methodology defends against the meritless privileging of any one 
theory over any other, tearing down monopolies of thought, and creating more 
balance between competing ideas and interests. Corporate legal debates would then 
become less shielded from the complexity of governance and more prepared to reject 
the sort of oversimplifications of corporate function that increase the risk of “positive 
error”49 within corporate governance. 
This chapter next considers each of these essentialist theories:  the concession 
theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory. The concession 
                                                      
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 464-65. 
49 Ibid at 465. 
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theory asserts that corporations are merely creatures of statute. 50  The classic 
articulation of the concession theory was proffered by William Blackstone in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.51 He argued that for a corporation to exist, the 
monarch’s consent was “absolutely necessary.”52 Today, this observation is still 
technically correct: government authority must grant permission for the incorporation 
of a business. However, since the dawn of the twentieth century, corporate law has 
made the approval of this granting process guaranteed as long as the rules of 
incorporation are not violated.53 In other words, instead of the legislature creating 
each corporation through legislation, corporations could be created merely through 
compliance with a general enabling statue. Incorporation now occurs automatically as 
long as the appropriate information and fees are submitted in accordance with 
regulatory requirements.54  
                                                      
50 Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 at 636 
(1819) [Woodward]. For more on the historical roots of the concession theory, see 
Bratton, “New Economic Theory”, supra note 30 at 1502-05. 
51 William Blackstone, Commentaries, vol 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979) at 460. 
52 Ibid.  
53 For legislative treatment of this issue, see, for example, Del Code Ann tit 8, § 
101 (West 2011) (requiring only the filing of a certificate of incorporation with the 
Division of Corporations in the Department of State); Model Bus Corp Act §§ 2.01, 
2.03 (2002); NY Const of 1846 art VIII, § 1. 
54 Of course, this is an oversimplification of the job that lawyers must undertake 
to organize the governance structure of a corporation in a manner that best suits their 
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That said, such legislative reforms do not diminish the basic claim that the 
corporation is a creature of statute. This is a characteristic that all corporations 
possess. It is an essential consideration. It is also indeterminate until additional 
normative claims are introduced. For instance, when the additional normative claim is 
introduced that incorporations are granted in order to help ensure society’s economic 
welfare,55 the concession theory suggests that whether or not a corporation meets this 
standard will dictate if the state will intervene. However, when the additional 
normative claim is introduced that “the state provides the corporate form… solely as 
a means of facilitating private ordering amongst people,”56 then the concession theory 
suggests something much different. In sum, incorporation is essential to the 
corporation, but what follows from this acknowledgement is indeterminate.   
                                                                                                                                                          
client’s needs. See Charles RT O’Kelley & Robert B Thompson, Corporations and 
Other Business Associations, 6th ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010) at 8-19.  
55 Citizens United v FEC, 130 S Ct 876 at 971 (2010) (Stevens J, dissenting) 
(arguing that “[u]nlike other interest groups, business corporations have been 
‘effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare’; they 
inescapably structure the life of every citizen”). 
56 Stephen Bainbridge, “Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of 
the Concession Theory” (1 January 2010), online: 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-
united-v-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html [Bainbridge, 
“Citizens United”]. 
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The entity theory asserts that the corporation is something that exists beyond 
its aggregate parts.57 The clearest case of this is how the law treats the corporation. 
Examples of this include:  judicial enforcement of limited liability, 58  judicial 
reluctance to pierce the corporate veil,59 the general refusal of courts to burden 
corporations with pre-incorporation contractual obligations made by its promoters,60 
and the capacity of the corporation to enter into contracts,61 hire workers,62 and 
acquire property.63 In each of these legal examples, the law treats the corporation as 
                                                      
57 George F Canfield, “The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory” 
(1917) 17 Colum L Rev 128. 
58  Consider the emergence of limited liability companies. See O’Kelley & 
Thompson, supra note 54 at 535-38; see also Elf Atochem North America, Inc v 
Jaffari, 727 A 2d 286 (Del Sup Ct 1999). 
59 See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 54 at 608-11. In contractual situations, 
see Consumer’s Co-op v  Olsen, 419 NW 2d 211 (Wis Sup Ct 1988); K C Roofing 
Center v On Top Roofing, Inc 807 SW 2d 545 (Miss Sup Ct 1991). In torts situations, 
see Western Rock Co v Davis 432 SW 555 (Tex Sup Ct 1968); Baatz v Arrow Bar, 
452 NW 2d 138 (SD Sup Ct 1990). 
60 See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 54 at 658-59; see also RKO-Stanley 
Warner Theatres, Inc v Granziano, 355 A 2d 830 (Pa Sup Ct 1976). 
61 Morton J Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of Corporate 
Theory” (1985) 88 W Va L Rev 173 at 221 (quoting Gerard Carl Henderson, The 
Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1918) at 166 [Horwitz, “Santa Clara”]. 
62 Prudential Insurance Co of America v Cheek, 259 US 530 at 536 (1922) 
(holding that corporations have a right “to enter into relations of employment with 
individuals” subject to the law creating the corporation). 
63 Jones v NY Guaranty & Indemnity Co, 101 US 622 (1879). 
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though it was separate from, and something other than, the sum of its aggregate parts. 
This is a characteristic that all corporations possess; it is an essential consideration. 
And like the concession theory, it is also indeterminate until additional normative 
claims are introduced. For instance, the entity theory could regard the corporation as 
the private property of shareholders,64 justifying a shareholder primacy perspective,65 
or it could be defined as a social corpus that is separate from its shareholders,66 
justifying a stakeholder perspective.67   
Finally, the aggregate contractarian theory argues that the corporation is the 
sum of the contractual obligations that each of its constituents (labor, management, 
shareholders, creditors, the community-at-large, etcetera) owe to each of its other 
constituents.68 Again, all corporations possess this characteristic. Again, it is an 
essential consideration. And again, it is also indeterminate until additional normative 
                                                      
64 AA Berle, Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 
Harv L Rev 1365 [Berle, “A Note”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”]. 
65 Ibid. 
66 E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 
Harv L Rev 1145 at 1153 [Dodd, “Corporate Managers”]. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.; see also Michael C Jensen & Clifford W Smith, Jr, “Stockholder, 
Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory” in Michael C 
Jensen, ed, A Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational 
Forms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 136 at 136. 
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claims are introduced. For instance, the aggregate contractarian theory could stand as 
a barrier to state intervention, based on the assumption that contracting is consensual 
and efficient,69 or it could transcend the notions of market/state and public/private70 
based on the assumption that contracting is a complex, multi-polar governance 
practice, which animates and transcends “the contract.”71  This revitalization of 
relational contract theory invites one to take seriously “the larger context and 
framework within which someone enter[s] into and assume[s] a particular contracting 
position.”72  
These three theories represent dimensions of the corporation that ought to be 
taken into consideration when mediating corporate conflicts, because they are 
essential to understanding the contemporary corporation. Furthermore, all of these 
theories are indeterminate, meaning that they could be used as a platform to take 
either side of any corporate governance debate. Accordingly, each of the theories 
                                                      
69 Joo, “Contract, Property”, supra note 7 at 800 (arguing that the contractarian 
vision of contract is a laissez-faire one, which justifies the assumption that “economic 
relationships are the product of individual free will and rational deliberation, and the 
law respects them for this reason”); see also Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, 
supra note 5 at 30-31 (Bainbridge’s application of “The Hypothetical Bargain 
Methodology”). 
70 Peer Zumbansen, “Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a 
Governance Object” (2012) 32 Seattle UL Rev 1469 at 1496. 
71 Ibid at 1490. 
72 Ibid at 1493. 
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could support or reject any central issue within corporate governance.73 In other 
words, these essentialist theories do not bias one normative claim over another. For 
instance, aggregate contractarian theory does not inherently support the claim that the 
corporation is private, that default rules are superior to mandatory rules, that 
efficiency is more important than fairness, that the law should focus on process and 
leave substance to corporate governance, and that reputational enforcement is better 
for all concerned than state enforcement.  
That said, certain normative preferences tend to attach to each theory at 
different times in history. 74  For instance, Morton Horwitz rejected Dewey’s 
indeterminacy argument, in part, when he used a critical legal history analysis to 
explain how the entity theory became associated with the private nature of the 
corporation. He asserted that conservative interests used the entity theory in a 
determinate way in order to reject governmental intervention. 75  Thus, Horwitz 
claimed that the entity theory was a private theory of the corporation.  
                                                      
73 For a more exhaustive list of debates within corporate governance and how they 
play out in the American legal context, see Bratton, “New Economic Theory”, supra 
note 30. 
74 Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy, 1780–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 68 [Horwitz, 
Transformation of American Law]; Horwitz, “Santa Clara”, supra note 61 at 204-06. 
75 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 74 at 68; Horwitz, 
“Santa Clara”, supra note 61 at 204-06. 
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David Millon qualified Horwitz’s argument by illustrating that the entity 
theory was later used to support the public nature of the corporation. 76  By 
highlighting the indeterminacy of the entity theory, Millon did not however diminish 
Hortwitz’s argument that “the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a 
major factor in legitimating big business,”77 because, although theories may be 
inherently indeterminate, they become less indeterminate when studied within their 
historical contexts. Put differently, indeterminate theory can be used in a determinate 
manner when additional normative claims are imported. Horwitz asserted, “[W]hen 
abstract concepts are used in specific historical contexts, they do acquire more limited 
meanings and more specific argumentative functions. In particular contexts, the 
choice of one theory over another may not be random or accidental because history 
and usage have limited their deepest meanings and applications.”78 
In sum, the concession, entity and aggregate contractual theories are all 
essential to an understanding of what the corporation is. Each of these theories is 
indeterminate and can be used to justify or reject any position within corporate 
governance. To build an argument for or against any position, additional normative 
claims need to be imported. These claims are not inherently connected to the 
                                                      
76 Millon, supra note 26 at 204, 242-51; Dewey, “Corporate Legal Personality”, 
supra note 31 at 669. 
77 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 74 at 68. 
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essentialist theory. Finally, examining these theories within their specific historical 
contexts helps to expose how additional normative claims are imported to these 
essentialist theories in order to create safe havens for undisclosed normative agendas 
separate from the theories themselves. 
III. THE CONCESSION AND ENTITY THEORIES - A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. The Concession Theory 
The concession theory was quite compelling in the early part of the nineteenth 
century when corporations were created exclusively through the legislative process.79 
The legislation in question would prescribe the corporate powers and purpose,80 
                                                      
79 Woodward, supra note 50 at 636 (“A corporation is an artificial being…existing 
only in contemplation of law.” [emphasis added]); Cassatt v Mitchell Coal & Coke 
Co, 150 F 32 at 44 (3d Cir 1907) (“[A corporation] is a creature of the state.”); Adolf 
A Berle, Jr, “Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of 
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power” (1952) 100 U Pa L Rev 
933 at 935, n 3 [Berle, “Constitutional Limits”]; Adolf A Berle, Jr, “The Theory of 
Enterprise Entity” (1947) 47 Colum L Rev 343 at 343 [Berle, “Enterprise Entity”]. 
80 Woodward, supra note 50 at 636 (“Being the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best 
calculated to effect the object for which it was created.”); see also Bank of Augusta v 
Earle, 38 US (13 Pet) 519 at 584 (1839); Bank of US v Dandridge, 25 US (12 Wheat) 
64 at 68 (1827); Head & Amory v Providence Insurance Co, 6 US (2 Cranch) 127 at 
162 (1804). 
 
 
 
 52 
which would, in principle, be designed for the satisfaction of the public interest.81 
Corporations had no right to act outside of these legislated boundaries, and they bore 
only some resemblance in function to the modern corporation.82  
As early as 1819, the shift away from the concession theory can be observed 
within American case law.83 In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the 
United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that corporations were created by 
the unilateral legislative act of the state and endorsed the argument that a corporate 
charter was a bilateral contract between the state and the incorporator. 84  Put 
differently, instead of accepting Blackstone’s more traditional view of a unilateral 
sovereign authority over incorporation,85 this process was regarded as a contractual 
relationship.86 The state granted the power and privilege to operate as a corporation, 
and the incorporator promised to engage in the objectives for which corporation was 
                                                      
81 See Woodward, supra note 50 at 637 (“The objects for which a corporation is 
created…are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the 
consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.”). 
82  See Paul Lagasse, ed, The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000) at 688. 
83 See Woodward, supra note 50 at 518. 
84 Ibid.  
85 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
86 Woodward, supra note 50 at 658-59. 
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created. 87  Thus, the court held that the power of the state to either revoke 
incorporation or modify the terms of the corporate charter was quite limited.88 
The case that marked the demise of the concession theory, as well as the death 
of the public corporation within American legal thinking and practice, was Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, in which the Supreme Court 
held that corporations are entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection of 
the law on the same footing as individuals.89 Up until Morton J. Horowitz wrote his 
classic article on the case,90 it was conventionally understood that the Santa Clara 
Court granted the corporation Fourteenth Amendment rights because Justice Field, 
writing for the majority, adopted the entity theory. 91  Horowitz considered the 
theoretical deliberations at the time, and then argued that it was more likely that 
Justice Field was following an early prototype of the aggregate theory of the 
corporation, which asserted that it could be treated much like a partnership.92 This 
point of technical clarity is not as important as Horowitz’s argument about the 
                                                      
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Santa Clara, supra note 28; see also Horwitz, “Santa Clara”, supra note 61. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid at 174, 178.  
92 Ibid at 182, 204.  
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significance of the case. His argument proceeded to contextualize Santa Clara within 
the larger shift in corporate legal theory and practice to shield economic activities 
from government interference at that time.93  
Later, David Millon wrote that the development of corporate theory and 
doctrine was a more complicated matter than Horwitz’s critical narrative suggested; 
in particular Millon suggested that the theory at the time was employed not only to 
advocate for a private conception of the corporation, as Horwitz’s critique might 
suggest, but also a public one.94  That said, Millon himself also asserted that this case 
was a watershed moment in the shift toward protection of corporate power from state 
interventions.95  
There were a series of corporate law reforms immediately after Santa Clara, 
which contributed to this turn to private theories of the corporation. Starting in 1888, 
states began to allow business people to acquire incorporation through an 
                                                      
93 Ibid at 204-06. 
94 Millon, supra note 26 at 204, 242-51. 
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administrative process, rather than a legislative one.96 This made incorporation more 
or less automatic.97 The ultra vires doctrine98 was also largely dismantled.99  
By the start of the 20th Century, states legislated the right for corporations to 
possess all of the freedoms of a natural businessperson.100 Other corporate law 
reforms that were enacted at this time granted the corporation the capacity to buy and 
sell shares of other corporations.101 The corporate form could now become a holding 
company with many new powers and potentials.102 These new corporate holding 
companies created the ability to construct complex and opaque ownership structures. 
                                                      
96 See David Sciulli, Corporations vs. The Court: Private Power, Public Interests 
(Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner, 1999) at 89-91; William G Roy, Socializing Capital: The 
Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997) at 152-53. 
97 O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 54 at 162-63; see also supra note 53. 
98 In this context, the ultra vires doctrine forbids a corporation from acting beyond 
the scope of powers granted to it. Henry Winthrop Ballantine, “Proposed Revision of 
Ultra-Vires Doctrine” (1927) 13 ABA J 323. 
99 Millon, supra note 26. 
100 Horwitz, “Santa Clara”, supra note 61 at 186-88. 
101 Joel Seligman, “A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 
1899” (1976) 1 Del J Corp L 249 at 265. 
102 For more on the rise of holding companies, see Fred Freedland, “History of 
Holding Company Legislation in New York State: Some Doubts as to the ‘New 
Jersey First’ Tradition” (1955) 24 Fordham L Rev 369. 
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Each of these chipped away at the idea that the corporation was merely a creature of 
government concession, which resulted in the denial of its public dimension. 
Upon reflection, it is unfortunate that American legal scholarship largely 
rejects the concession theory today, because it is one of the essentialist theories that 
ought to be taken seriously in order to obtain a comprehensive appreciation of the 
modern corporation. The prevailing attitude toward the concession theory is reflected 
in the following passage from Stephen Bainbridge: 
It has been over half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any 
political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously. In 
particular, concession theory is plainly inconsistent with the 
contractarian model of the firm, which treats corporate law as nothing 
more than a set of standard form contract terms provided by the state 
to facilitate private ordering. The state provides the corporate form not 
so the corporation can ensure social welfare, but solely as a means of 
facilitating private ordering amongst people.103 
It is significant to note that Bainbridge’s statement demonstrates much of 
what is problematic about corporate law from Dewey’s perspective. If Dewey is right, 
then it follows that the “contractarian model” [aggregate contractarian theory] and the 
concession theory can be “used to serve the same ends,” or “to serve opposing 
ends;”104 thus, they can be consistent or inconsistent with each other. In other words, 
both essentialist theories are indeterminate. So how can they be “plainly 
inconsistent?” In actuality, Bainbridge proves that they can be consistent in the last 
                                                      
103 Bainbridge, “Citizens United”, supra note 56. 
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sentence of the passage:  “The state provides the corporate form not so the 
corporation can ensure social welfare, but solely as a means of facilitating private 
ordering amongst people.”105 Bainbridge is employing a variation of the concession 
theory here that states: at the point of incorporation the state does not impose an 
obligation upon the corporation to ensure social welfare, but merely offers a means to 
facilitate private ordering without a social welfare obligation. This is a version of the 
concession theory, one he takes seriously, and it is consistent with his version of the 
aggregate contractarian theory. 
B. The Entity Theory 
It is important to note from the outset that there can be a distinction drawn 
between the corporation as an artificial entity and the corporation as an entity, whose 
nature emerges from social action.106 For the purpose of this chapter, the artificial 
                                                      
105 Bainbridge, “Citizens United”, supra note 56.  
106 Millon, supra note 26 at 211. The entity theory of the firm invites sociologists 
to understand this complex human interaction. Max Weber discussed the meaning of 
social action in the following passage: “By ‘action’ in this definition is meant the 
human behavior when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively 
meaningful…The meaning to which we refer may be either (a) the meaning actually 
intended either by an individual agent on a particular historical occasion or by a 
number of agents on an approximate average in a given set of cases, or (b) the 
meaning attributed to the agent or agents, as types, in a pure type constructed in the 
abstract. In neither case is the ‘meaning’ to be thought of as somehow objectively 
‘correct’ or ‘true’ by some metaphysical criterion. This is the difference between the 
empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and history, and any kind of prior 
discipline, such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, or aesthetics whose aim is to extract 
from their subject-matter ‘correct’ or ‘valid’ meaning.” Max Weber, “The Nature of 
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entity theory is considered to be a version of the concession theory, based on the 
reasoning that the artificial entity theory concentrates on the concession and the 
consequences of that concession.107 This version claims that the corporation is created 
by incorporation, and thus it is an artificial construction of the state. By contrast, the 
natural entity theory [hereinafter just “entity theory”] suggests that the corporation is 
a “‘natural’ phenomenon” that is something more than merely an artificial creation of 
the state.108  
Millon explains that prior to the twentieth century the corporation was 
considered to be an artificial entity and it was not until the beginning of the twentieth 
century that the entity theory started to gain popularity.109 In the American context, 
the entity theory was first used as a vehicle to make the normative claim that “the 
corporation [was] the creation of private initiative rather than state power.”110 As 
Millon explains: 
The triumph of the new theory therefore signaled a willingness to 
dispense with the use of corporate law as a regulatory tool designed to 
address the special social and economic problems that Americans saw 
                                                                                                                                                          
Social Action” in WG Runciman, ed, Weber: Selections in Translation (Cambridge: 
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as stemming from the rise of the business corporation. Theory instead 
tended to assimilate corporate persons to the status of natural persons, 
eliminating the many special limitations on corporate freedom of 
action that the states had imposed in the past. With this change in 
theory came a new willingness to treat corporate activity as 
fundamentally private in nature, differing in no important ways from 
ordinary individual commercial activities and therefore free from 
special legal regulations designed to protect public welfare.111 
Millon’s explanation is an example of Horwitz’s “history and usage” analysis,112 
which acknowledges that the “deep[er] meanings and applications” of an essentialist 
theory may be limited by the social context in which it is used.113 Although this 
version of the entity theory was used to block state intervention in corporate affairs,114 
much like how the aggregate contactarian theory is used today,115 in time, a new 
version emerged that changed this usage. This new version of the entity theory was 
                                                      
111 Ibid at 213. 
112 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. For more commentary on Horwitz’s 
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used to attempt to tie corporate managers to a social responsibility agenda, as the 
works of scholars such as Adolf A. Berle116 and E. Merrick Dodd117 demonstrate.  
It is important to note that European scholars have had a much richer 
intellectual history of contemplating the corporate form as a natural entity. 118 
Generally, these European scholars advanced entity theories, which asserted that there 
was something essentially natural about how individuals congregated in order to 
accomplish tasks and that the power and complexity that emanated from such 
organization ought to be studied at a social rather than an individual level.119 Such 
theories took very seriously the effects of the social dimensions of group activity. 
Today, for instance, Marjatta Maula is taking the German theory of the corporation as 
a social system120 in a promising direction, offering an accessible theory of “the 
                                                      
116 Berle, “A Note”, supra note 64; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 64. 
117 Dodd, “Corporate Managers”, supra note 66.  
118 For instance, Otto Gierke drew upon the medieval understanding of the 
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model of living organizations, which explains the processes or learning and 
renewal . . . that are based on continuous co-evolution and self-production of an 
organization.”121 
American corporate legal scholars never attempted to grapple as deeply with 
these more social implications of the entity theory. This could be because, as Thomas 
Joo suggests, “[t]he general emphasis on groups as entities may have been too 
reminiscent of socialism and communism and too alien to American individualism” 
to be seriously contemplated. Thus, although the potential options for understanding 
the corporation as an entity were and are numerous,122 American scholars narrowly 
conceived the corporate entity, the general scope of which can be appreciated from a 
reading of the Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s.123  
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The dawn of the twentieth century marked the rise of large corporations, 
professional management, and passive investors. 124  This shift to professional 
management created new opportunities for the exploitation of shareholders,125 who 
were not only growing in number, but were also increasingly less sophisticated.126 
This created a fear in some that the social bonds, whether fiduciary or contractual in 
nature, between those who nominally owned and those who in fact controlled were 
too weak to adequately prevent managerial opportunism. The champion of these 
concerns was Adolf A. Berle, who, starting in 1923, developed legal arguments to the 
effect that the contractual and fiduciary bonds owed by corporate managers to 
shareholders needed to be taken more seriously.127 Accordingly, his shareholder 
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primacy argument declared that stock ownership was a new type of private property, 
which divorced ownership from control and, thus, demanded heightened fiduciary 
duties to complement the contractual obligations placed upon corporate managers.128 
Yet, these obligations were not between the managers and the owners; rather, the 
obligations were between the managers and the property, which had “a corporal 
existence distinct from that of its owners.”129  
Underpinning Berle’s efforts was the ever-widening diversity of share 
ownership, which he thought continued to increase the potential for democratizing 
corporate power.130  For this reason, Berle theorized that if the law compelled 
corporate managers to act for the sole benefit of shareholders, then the corporation 
would eventually be aligned with the broader polity of American society.131 This was 
the foundational motivation for Berle’s shareholder primacy argument.132 
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It is important to note that in 1932 Berle published The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property with Gardiner C. Means.133 This book, in part, has a much 
different message than his shareholder primacy argument.134 Berle understood that 
shareholder primacy was not the only path to making corporate power respect public 
interest concerns.135 He believed that another path was that of greater government 
intervention in corporate affairs, which he endorsed in the last chapter of the book.136 
However, he also appreciated that greater government intervention was only possible 
if the political landscape shifted. And by the early 1930s, Berle began to appreciate 
that such a shift might occur if Roosevelt won the election in 1933.137  
The first article of the Berle–Dodd debate is a replication of a chapter from 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, with one key omission:  Berle’s 
shareholder primacy argument was constructed “with full realization of the possibility 
that private property may one day cease to be the basic concept in terms of which the 
courts handle problems of large scale enterprise.”138 He also admitted in this omitted 
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text that it was possible that “the entire system [had] to be revalued” and that “the 
corporate profit stream in reality no longer [was] private property,” asserting that a 
new theory of the modern corporation would likely develop.139 But he qualified these 
views as a matter of sociological study, which had not yet attained a standing as a 
“matter of law.”140  
Accordingly, Berle recommended that until a new corporate theory became a 
“matter of law,” lawyers and legal academics must do their best within the existing 
legal framework—that being to think “in terms of private property.”141 Berle did just 
that in his 1931 article, arguing “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . at all 
times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears”142 without qualification. Knowing that the concession theory would not be 
accepted in the 1920s, and still wanting to tie corporate power to the concerns of the 
boarder polity, he believed that the only corporate theory that could adequately serve 
as a tool to regulate the firm—at that time—was the corporation as private 
property.143 Berle saw this as his only solution.144  
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Berle did not directly explain the entity as private property, but the theory is 
simple enough. The law regulates the corporation as property. This property is owned 
by shareholders. Shareholders have the authority to elect directors because of their 
ownership interest in the corporation. When shareholders elect directors, they also 
delegate the authority to run the corporation to the directors. Directors then in turn 
delegate part of this authority to executive management to oversee the day-to-day 
affairs of the corporation. Thus, directors and management had an obligation to 
shareholders as a class and not merely to the group of shareholders that consolidated 
control.145 This created fiduciary and contractual obligations to protect minority 
shareholder interests in all circumstances. 146  In other words, the law imposed 
obligations upon directors and management to treat all shareholders evenhandedly, 
guaranteeing that the interests of ownership were not undermined.147 
E. Merrick Dodd thought Berle’s shareholder primacy argument was 
dangerous, because such shareholders only cared about profits and not about the 
broader issues of corporate social responsibility.148 Dodd endorsed a more radical 
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entity theory of the firm that hinted at the idea that the corporation was more than 
private property, and thus when managers served the best interests of the corporation, 
they would be serving more than merely the interests of property holders.149 Dodd 
was, in fact, suggesting that the corporation was separate from its aggregate parts, a 
social entity which tied managers to serve the interests of a broader spectrum of 
corporate constituents.150 He never clearly articulated what the corporation was as an 
entity, and yet he pushed forward, advocating for managers to be freer than Berle 
thought they should be. 151  Dodd thought this would protect better employees, 
creditors and the community-at-large;152 this “theory,” which promotes a broader 
discretion for managers over corporate function, has been called managerialism.153 
Although Berle was sympathetic to the ends of Dodd’s managerialism, he 
thought that Dodd’s agenda was dangerously optimistic, because his theory was 
theoretically impoverished.154 Berle argued that this form of managerialism would 
free directors and executive officers from the constraints of their fiduciary duties to 
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shareholders, basically granting them broad discretion over corporate power in the 
vain hope they would be responsible.155 This freedom to engage opportunism was 
precisely what Berle was attempting to avoid, and he was thus skeptical and leery of 
Dodd’s corporate social responsibility agenda.156  
Berle’s and Dodd’s entity theories of the corporation largely framed discourse 
until the start of the 1970s. For instance, in 1970 Milton Friedman took up a version 
of Berle’s private property entity theory of the corporation,157 writing:  
In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is 
an employee of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
of society.158   
It is interesting to note that Friedman constructed the interests of shareholders as 
those of profiteers with minimal regard for corporate social responsibility, while 
Berle constructed the interests of shareholders as those of the broader polity with 
great regard for corporate social responsibility.  
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A counter example to Friedman’s entity theory was that of his mid-twentieth 
century contemporary John Galbraith. Galbraith argued that management of the 
economy was to be carried out as a public–private partnership between large 
corporate entities and government; implicit in this argument is a Dodd-ish 
managerialism that suggested that managers were not accountable to shareholders but 
to the corporation, which in turn was accountable to broader public interest 
concerns.159 It is also important to note, for general context, that this sort of heroic 
managerialism captured the public imagination at the time. It was deeply enamored 
with the vision of corporate managers as stewards of society. Like with Dodd’s 
theory, there was little concern for theoretical assumptions that underpinned this 
enthusiasm, regarding the corporation as a “social institution” without further 
contemplation for what sort of entity this might be.160 
Upon reflection, what is clear about the use of the entity theory during the 
mid-twentieth century was that it could be, and was, employed by both advocates for 
free markets, like Friedman, 161  and by advocates for government control, like 
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Galbraith.162 This observation conforms to Dewey’s163 and Millon’s164 arguments, 
which contended that these essentialist theories are indeterminate, and also 
Horwitz’s 165  historical narrative that argued that this indeterminacy has been 
narrowed at different points in history, because of its political usage by prevailing 
interests. Thus, although the entity theory was used to advocate the private nature of 
the corporation, it was also used to argue for government intervention. When the 
indeterminacy of an essentialist theory is exposed in this manner, it becomes more 
translucent and the interests behind the theory become more visible. 
As with his rejection of the concession theory, when Bainbridge rejects the 
entity theory, he provides another excellent example of how some aggregate 
contractarian theorists fail to appreciate that all essentialist theories, including the 
aggregate contractarian theory, are indeterminate. Bainbridge writes: 
[An entity theory] requires one to reify the corporation; i.e., to treat the 
corporation as something separate from its various constituents. While 
reification provides a necessary semantic shorthand, it creates a sort of 
false consciousness when taken to extremes. The corporation is not a 
thing. The corporation is a legal fiction representing the unique vehicle 
by which large groups of individuals, each offering a different factor 
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of production, privately order their relationships so as to collectively 
produce marketable goods or services.166  
Bainbridge steps into the world of the sociology of knowledge when he chooses to 
discuss how theory reifies reality, and he is only partly correct in his assessment. The 
entity theory reifies the corporation, but all essentialist theories “reify the 
corporation.”167 The entity theory provides a form of “semantic shorthand,” but all 
essentialist theories are forms of “semantic shorthand.”168 The entity theory creates 
“false consciousness,” but all theories create “false consciousness.”169 Bainbridge 
slips when suggesting that aggregate contractarian theory is superior to the other 
theories. Simply put, his tacit claim that aggregate contractarian theory is non-
reifying is unsupportable.  
Dewey appreciated this point: the factualness of a claim was neither absolute 
nor arbitrary.170 He suggested that the “eventful character of all existences” was no 
reason to attempt to find balance by clinging to either extreme.171 Instead, he advised 
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that the inquirer should examine the relevant variables involved in a problem,172 so 
that no claim is uncritically reified as fact.173 Dewey suggested that without a 
reflective re-assessment of claims within specific social contexts, these claims stop 
serving as tools for the honest observation of social function, and can start 
“prevent[ing] the communication of ideas,”174 and thus learning. Consequently, if 
Dewey is correct, embracing the indeterminacy of various essentialist theories ought 
to better equip legal thinkers to learn how corporations function.  
IV. THE RISE OF THE AGGREGATE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY  
The entity theory of the corporation as private property began to lose its hold 
on American corporate legal thinking in the 1960s.175 In 1962, Henry Manne attacked 
Berle’s model of ownership and control, arguing that there were links between the 
price of stocks on secondary markets, the residual value of the corporation, and 
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managerial behavior that anachronistic thinkers like Berle never appreciated.176 For 
instance, Manne detailed how poor corporate management can depress share price to 
a level in which share price does not reflect the corporation’s potential profitability; 
the corporation at this point may lure an investor to take over the corporation and 
replace its management team in order to improve corporate performance 
(profitability).177 Such threats to corporate boards thus become a control mechanism 
for managerial performance.178 What is most germane to the rise of the aggregate 
contractarian perspective is that, to make such arguments, Manne employed classical 
economic thinking, which understands the corporation by observing it through the 
lens of the aggregate theory.179  
Manne borrowed from the contribution made by economists, like Ronald 
Coase,180 who set out to challenge the entity theory of the corporation.181 Coase 
suggested that to better understand the corporation, observers ought to focus on the 
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transaction costs that a corporation confronted when operating within the market.182 
By directing legal thinkers to understand the corporation in terms of how its 
aggregates make decisions about how to allocate resources based on price indicators, 
Manne planted the seeds of the modern aggregate theory within corporate legal 
thinking.183 At the core of Manne’s thinking were ideas like Friedrich Hayek’s. 
Hayek suggested that private ordering depended upon the price mechanism, which 
facilitated the necessary information transfers between actors for decentralized 
market-based transactions to occur.184 Such decentralized transactions were desirable, 
Hayek argued, because they were efficient at allocating scarce resources to meet 
demands within an economic system.185  
Coase observed the operation of large corporations and concluded that these 
economic units function in a manner that circumvented the operation of the price 
mechanism. 186  The corporation took what was occurring in the market and 
internalized that function of the market within itself.187 For instance, instead of a shoe 
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producer contracting individually in the market with the makers of shoe soles, leather 
uppers, laces, insoles, and so forth, a corporation may hire all of the people necessary 
to make the shoes and thus it centralizes all of the components of production in-
house. The result is that the corporation makes shoes less expensively by controlling 
production.  
From Coase’s perspective, the corporation was like a more highly coordinated 
micro-market that operated within the larger market and imposed cost efficiencies 
upon the components of production.188 Put differently, the corporation was a centrally 
controlled production system within the larger economy that avoided transaction costs 
by reducing the price of production to less than what occurred in the market without 
such coordinated efforts. Thus, the function of the corporation could be understood in 
terms of the transaction costs within the firm versus those outside the firm. 
From this understanding of the corporation, Coase argued that it was possible 
to understand what controlled the size of corporations. 189  He suggested that 
corporations are created to lower costs below the cost of production in the market.190 
The corporation would only internalize transactions (components of production) until 
the cost of production was equal to or higher than the cost of transactions in the 
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market.191 At this point, the centralized system was no longer more efficient than the 
function of the market.192 Thus, firm size was dependent on the transaction costs 
inside and outside of the corporation.193 A good example of how this theory actually 
translated into practice is when a number of corporations reduced their size in the 
1990s as a result of innovations in communication, logistics and transportation, which 
made outsourcing more cost-effective than maintaining many components of 
production in-house.194 In other words, innovations in communication, logistics and 
transportation made production in market more efficient than production in the 
corporation. 
In 1970, Manne’s theory for a market for managerial control was reinforced 
by a brilliant young economist named Eugene Fama, who had just completed his 
doctoral work on the efficiency of markets.195 Building upon how price mechanisms 
reflect the available knowledge about products and the role that competitive markets 
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played in gathering that knowledge, Fama suggested that the price of corporate 
securities was based on the available information about corporate stocks known by 
investors.196 His research became synonymous with the “efficient capital markets 
hypothesis,” which assumes that financial markets efficiently respond to available 
information.197  
In a practical sense, Fama’s economic model provides an empirical basis for 
studying how sophisticated financial analysts and investors, who closely examine the 
data about publicly traded companies, ensure that stock markets are always highly 
efficient at pricing firm value.198 As new information about a company becomes 
publicly known, the theory asserts that stock price will adjust accordingly.199 Thus, 
the price of a stock reflects the best available opinion as to whether or not a company 
will be profitable moving forward.200  
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Fama’s theory explained the complex interrelationship of managers (directors 
and executives) and risk bearers (investors) as aggregate participants within corporate 
governance. Fama’s work reinforced the work of Henry Manne, which argued that 
investors far removed from the nuances of a corporate governance structure could 
meaningfully participate in corporate governance by responding to price signals that 
reduced the complexity of information into a readily understandable signal:  the rise 
and fall of stock value. 201  Thus, the evolution of “efficient capital markets 
hypothesis” helped to kindle faith in the ability of market competition to produce 
optimal corporate governance outcomes, leading to the general opinion that 
government intervention in corporate governance and markets was not only 
unnecessary, but could in fact hamper the performance of corporations, and even 
possibly, as Milton Friedman, suggested lead to totalitarianism! 202  If markets 
occurred naturally, and if regulation impeded their natural operation, then it was 
assumed that efficient function of financial markets prevented suboptimal corporate 
governance arrangements, simply by exit (selling their stocks).203 In other words, if 
financial markets were largely free from regulation, and if securities law required 
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corporate managers to provide relevant information about corporate governance, 
sophisticated financial analysts and investors could adjust stock value based on the 
present potential for profitability of any particular corporation.  
Fama’s theory and method for establishing the correlations that existed 
between poor corporate governance performance and stock price gave Manne’s 
“market for corporate control” empirical prowess.204 Discounting the stock value not 
only impacted the capability of a corporation to raise capital, but it also increased the 
risk of corporate takeover, which directly threatened the jobs of corporate 
managers. 205  The theory made a convincing argument that it was possible to 
accurately discount stock value as a response to poor corporate governance 
performance.206 It also provided a flexible, responsive and consensual mechanism for 
enforcement, which ensured that corporate managers were performing effectively. 
More specifically, it provided a picture of corporate governance as a complex web of 
aggregate risk bearers and managers all joined by the price mechanism. 
A couple of years after Fama published his seminal 1970 article,207 Armen 
Alchian and Harold Demsetz made another landmark contribution to the aggregate 
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theory of the corporation by introducing the nexus-of-contracts theory as an 
expansion and revision of Coase’s theories.208 They argued that Coase exaggerated 
the importance of transaction costs when attempting to understand why corporations 
exist.209 For Alchian and Demsetz, it was not the reduction of transaction costs that 
made the firm more efficient than markets; rather the firm was more efficient because 
it could channel information between aggregate constituents of the corporation better 
than the market could (resulting in lower information costs).210  
Another perspective that added to the advancement of the aggregate theory 
was the 1976 article by Michael Jensen and William Meckling.211 This article 
changed the way American legal scholarship thought about agency theory by more 
firmly harnessing an expanded theory of transaction costs to agency theory.212 The 
authors tacitly appreciated the operation of the disclosure requirements of the 
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Security Exchange Commission,213 when they argued that one way that managers 
could be held accountable would be to require financial disclosure and inspection of 
the firm’s accounts by independent auditors.214  The work of such independent 
auditors necessarily created “monitoring costs,” which were necessary evils if 
competition was to police managerial discretion.215 This suggestion was much in line 
with Fama’s work on efficient capital markets216 and Manne’s work on market for 
control.217 However, the authors admitted that monitoring strategies218 could not 
eliminate the risk of opportunism and other inefficiencies created by the agency 
relationship.219 They called these inevitable costs “residual loss,”220 referring to the 
shareholder’s residual claim on the corporation. With the growing acceptance of this 
                                                      
213 See e.g. Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 
(2013).  
214 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 211. 
215 Ibid at 308-10, 319-28. 
216 Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets”, supra note 195; Fama, “Stock-Market 
Prices”, supra note 195. 
217 Manne, “Corporate Control”, supra note 177. 
218 In addition to monitoring costs the authors also discussed “bonding costs,” 
which provided managers the opportunity to demonstrate their performance and 
loyalty, but are being left out of the present discussion. See Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 211 at 308-10, 325-30. 
219 Ibid at 357. 
220 Ibid at 308-10, 319. 
 
 
 
 82 
understanding of the agency relationship, the issues of agency theory were decisively 
shifted from the entity to aggregate theory.221 Jensen and Meckling’s theory also was 
much in line with Alchian and Demsetz’s.222 They also argued that all of the firm’s 
activities could be explained in terms of the contracts (the formalized normative legal 
information) that shape the relationships between constituents.223 They suggested that 
the corporation was no more than a “nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
among individuals.”224  
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In the 1980s, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel crystalized the 
aggregate contractarian theory within American corporate law by publishing the 
lion’s share of this legal and economic theorizing. 225  Their translation of the 
arguments of Coase, 226  Hayek, 227  Friedman,228  Fama,229  and other economists 230 
persuaded corporate legal thinkers that if corporate law better facilitated freedom of 
contract, then the potential of markets could be unleashed.231 Furthermore, there was 
no need to be concerned about the loss of regulatory control, because competitive 
markets insured a consensual enforcement mechanism for managerial decision-
making based on the ability of self-interested actors to hold each other in check.232 
Thus, if markets were left to their own devices, then they would find an equilibrium 
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that established an optimal balance between all corporate constituents. 233  With 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s publications, these already popular economic notions about 
corporate governance, markets and regulation soon prevailed over other essentialist 
theories within corporate legal thought.234 
By the 1990s, Easterbrook and Fischel marveled at the efficiency of modern 
corporate law.235 They detailed the consequences of providing off-the-rack default 
rules for incorporation. 236  On the one hand, these optional rules assisted less 
sophisticated incorporators to select a low-cost framework that, for most firms, would 
“maximize the value of corporate endeavor[s] as a whole”.237 On the other hand, their 
optional nature averted corporate law from imposing a rigid regulatory framework, 
which most certainly would restrict shrewd business people from customizing 
corporate entities to exploit uncommon business opportunities.238 They described 
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modern corporate law as an “economizing device” which reduced the cost of 
consensual bargaining without sacrificing dynamism.239   
Easterbrook and Fischel compared corporate law to the regulation of other 
areas of society, determining that it was unique.240 They compared it to administrative 
law, observing that the discretion of administrative officials was tightly constrained 
by regulation and closely scrutinized by judicial oversight.241 By comparison, they 
observed that corporate law “allow[ed] managers and investors to write their own 
tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a 
regulator,”242 and furthermore, that the “business judgment rule” instructed courts to 
adopt a “hands-off approach.”243 While the administrative officials were tightly 
regulated and closely scrutinized, corporate managers were free to do basically 
whatever they like.244  
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Easterbrook and Fischel explained that, upon close inspection, corporate 
managers were not as free as they might appear at first glance.245 Although corporate 
law stepped back from imposing command-and-control regulation upon corporate 
governance, they asserted that there were still enforcement mechanisms that regulated 
the action of corporate managers.246 They detailed how other constituents of the firm 
(such as investors, employers, consumers, creditors etc.) contracted/negotiated with 
corporate managers in a manner that would make some decisions profitable and 
others not.247 For instance, corporate managers did not engage in opportunistic 
behavior, not because the law was capable of preventing such behavior, but because it 
would decrease the performance of the corporation, which would in turn decrease the 
value of its shares, resulting in ex ante contractual penalties for the managers.248 
Examples of such ex ante contractual penalties include the decreased potential value 
of a manager’s stock options, the threat of removal due to poor performance and/or 
the threat of damage to reputation.249 Thus, a cocktail of free contracting, highly 
liquid markets, free flow of information, and self-interest created a balancing of 
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interests between market actors within corporate governance that tended to optimize 
corporate performance in each particular situation, depending upon the competence of 
the negotiating parties in question.250 And, in a world of consensual contracting, 
without notable power imbalances and information asymmetries, equity was satisfied 
in all but a few cases, because those who freely obliged themselves to bad bargains 
could be expected to suffer the burden of the bargains, hopefully learning from the 
experience, and thus, better equipping themselves for future contracting.251 
The classic concern of corporate governance was the separation of ownership 
and control.252 From this perspective, the most obvious challenge to letting markets 
police managerial behavior was that investors did not have the time, skill, or 
knowledge in order to be able to properly negotiate and enforce the terms of corporate 
governance.253 The authors were quick to suggest how this was a misconception.254 
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They explained that American stock markets had teams of professional investors 
working alongside investment advisors in order to oversee corporate performance.255 
Even though an individual investor might not have the capacity to contract effectively 
they would be able to respond to increases or decreases in stock value triggered by 
more sophisticated and powerful investors in the market.256 
The large sophisticated investors, having enough financial might in stock 
markets, could push the price enough to signal other investors that a stock value is too 
high or too low.257 These professional investors constantly engage in detailed analysis 
of corporate management, governance structure, debt/equity ratios, and relative 
prowess when compared to competitors.258 Thus, tacitly relying on the commonly 
accepted arguments of Friedrich Hayek,259 Henry Manne260 and Eugene Fama,261 the 
authors suggested that the operation of an effective price mechanism provided enough 
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information for decentralized actors to make efficient decisions.262 The corporate 
legal world quickly warmed to the idea that a corporate law that allows actors to 
“consensually” contract to protect their own interests resulted in more optimal 
corporate governance structures.263 By doing less and allowing markets to function 
efficiently, corporate law encourages “what is optimal for the firm and investors.”264  
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of powerful critiques reacted to the 
aggregate contractarian theory.265 In 1985, Mark Granovetter noted that modeling 
based on this theory tended to either undersocialize 266  or oversocialize 267  the 
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corporation, leading to the same result of formalizing the actual social relationships to 
a degree that did not reflect what was actually happening within corporations.268 In 
1989, Bratton carefully contemplated a number of questionable assumptions about 
discrete contracts and contractual gaps, which needed to be accepted, if the theory 
was to work. 269  In 1995, Lawrence Mitchell argued that the theory favored 
shareholders at the expense of other corporate constituents, who either had no 
contract (like the community at large), or had little power to negotiate the terms of 
their contract (like un-unionized workers).270 Each of these critiques, and others like 
them, suggested that, in the end, this seemingly neutral theory might not be as 
objective as some assumed.271 But, in the end, these critiques had little impact on the 
use of this theory in corporate legal academia.272  
During the last decade, one model of the aggregate contractarian theory, 
which largely mirrors the operation of Delaware’s General Corporation Law,273 
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stands out:  Bainbridge’s director primacy model.274 Bainbridge adopts a hierarchical 
management structure that earlier contractarians tempted to flatten.275 These earlier 
contractarians used contract to explain away corporate hierarchy,276 but Bainbridge 
rejects such temptations, embracing the need for contract theory to account for 
“asymmetric information” and “bilateral monopoly.”277 Bainbridge is not as willing 
as Easterbrook and Fischel were in 1991 to optimistically believe in the power of the 
market to arbitrate equity within corporate governance.278 Bainbridge describes his 
model as follows: 
Instead of viewing the corporation either as a person or an entity, 
contractarian scholars view it as an aggregate of various inputs acting 
together to produce goods or services. Employees provide labor. 
Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders initially provide capital 
and subsequently bear the risk of losses and monitor the performance 
of management. Management monitors the performance of employees 
and coordinates the activities of all the firm’s inputs. Accordingly, the 
firm is not a thing, but rather a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts 
establishing rights and obligations among various inputs making up 
the firm.279  
                                                      
274 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 5. 
275 Ibid.  
276 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3. 
277 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 5 at 24. 
278 Ibid.  
279 Ibid at 28. 
 
 
 
 92 
This model does have its contractarian challengers. Contractarian purists, like Lucian 
Bebchuk, are not so willing to give up the market for corporate control.280 Bebchuk 
rejects Bainbridge’s notion that allowing for managerial discretion maximizes 
shareholder wealth and most effectively protects the interests of shareholders as a 
class.281  
The Bebchuk–Bainbridge debate282 may prove to be the high watermark for 
the present embodiment of the aggregate contractarian theory. The debate exemplifies 
how, in the highest echelons of American corporate legal discourse, such debates 
could fit comfortably within the still largely uncontested aggregate contractarian 
theory. This chapter uses the words “largely uncontested,” because in 2005–2006, 
when their debate occurred, cracks had emerged in this paradigm. The succession of 
shockwaves, which started in March 2000 when the Dot-Com Bubble started to burst, 
damaged the credibility of this theory.283 The Enron fiasco did not help things 
                                                      
280 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” (2005) 
118 Harv L Rev 833 [Bebchuk, “Increasing Shareholder Power”]. 
281 Lucian A Bebchuk, “Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules” (2006) 119 
Harv L Rev 1784 [Bebchuk, “Shareholders Set the Rules”]. 
282  Ibid.; Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment” (2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1735 [Bainbridge, “Director Primacy”]; 
Bebchuk, “Increasing Shareholder Power”, supra note 280. 
283 For a critique highlighting the flaws in the efficient markets hypothesis just 
prior to the crash, see Robert J Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). To put the Dot-Com Bubble within a historical context, see 
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either,284 marking a potential opportunity for a significant shift in corporate law.285 By 
2008, confidence in the efficient market hypothesis was clearly shaken;286 even some 
of the most prominent advocates of the market efficiency theory, such as Alan 
Greenspan, publicly began to express doubt about it as presently conceived.287 
In light of this, Thomas Joo envisions that corporate legal scholarship is about 
to enter into a new post-contractarian era, 288 seeing promise in the work being done 
in behavioral finance,289 although some scholars question the merits of a turn to 
                                                                                                                                                          
Charles P Kindleberger & Robert Z Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History 
of Financial Crises, 6th ed (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
284 Rapoport, Van Niel & Dharan, supra note 9. 
285 David A Westbrook, “Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a 
Capitalist Reimagination” (2003) 92 Geo LJ 61 at 69-70. 
286 Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”, The New York 
Times (6 September 2009) MM36; John Cassidy, “After the Blowup: Laissez-faire 
Economists Do Some Soul-Searching—And Finger-Pointing”, The New Yorker 85:44 
(11 January 2010) at 28, online: The New Yorker.com 
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/11/100111fa_fact_cassidy>. 
287 Edmund L Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation”, The New 
York Times (24 October 2008) B1. For an example of the Chicago School academia 
distancing itself from such theory, see Richard A Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: 
The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009). 
288 Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170. Joo points to the work of 
Donald Langevoort, see Donald C Langevoort, “Taming the Animal Spirits of the 
Stock Market: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation” (2002) 97 Nw UL 
Rev 135 [Langevoort, “Taming the Animal Spirits”]. 
289 Ibid. 
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psychology in corporate law and scholarship.290 This chapter agrees with Joo’s 
observation that a shift appears to be occurring,291 but predicts a different outcome. It 
expects that the emerging innovations will be generated within the aggregate 
contractarian theory. As this chapter has illustrated, history indicates that the 
indeterminacy of a given essentialist theory of the corporation allows for counter 
positions and apposing policy positions to emerge within it.292 There does not appear 
to be any reason why it would not happen again within the aggregate contractarian 
theory. In other words, if an understanding of history helps foresee the potential for 
future events, the aggregate contractarian theory ought to remain the dominant 
theoretical approach in legal academia. Leading thinkers will still regard the 
corporation as being a group of aggregate constituents who are connected through 
contract, but their assumptions about contracts and markets will change to 
accommodate factual circumstances, leading to different policy prescriptions. 
                                                      
290 Mae Kuykendall & David Westbrook, “Introduction: Unsettling Questions, 
Disquieting Stories” (2009) 2009 Mich St L Rev 817 at 828. 
291 Ibid. 
292 See supra notes 148-165 and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The contestation that has emerged about aggregate contractarian theory is like 
the history of the entity theory at the beginning of the twentieth century.293 As 
covered in this chapter, the entity theory shifted from defending claims about the 
private nature of the corporation to defending the opposite claim by the 1930s.294 And 
yet, the future of corporate legal theory does not need to be predetermined; history 
does not have to repeat itself. As an alternative, we could embrace the indeterminacy 
of the aggregate contractarian theory (and the other essentialist theories of the 
corporation), providing a path to a corporate legal discourse with greater contestation 
and complexity. Such contestation and complexity ought to be welcomed. Joo argues 
when considering post-contractarian directions in corporate theory that, “[a]s the best 
theorists appreciate, rational behavior theory, and grand constructs generally, offer 
ease of comprehension at the cost of oversimplification. The spectacular recent 
failures in the financial markets illustrate how the costs of oversimplification can 
outweigh the benefits.”295 
Of course, Joo is not suggesting that there is a direct correlation between the 
prevailing version of the aggregate contractarian theory and the recent failures in the 
                                                      
293 See supra notes 124-165 and accompanying text. 
294 Joo, “Theories and Models”, supra note 6 at 170. 
295 Ibid.  
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financial markets. Rather, he is suggesting that this example provides a dire warning 
about how theorizing that blindly adheres to oversimplified versions of reality risks 
disastrous results.296 If Joo is correct, then corporate legal theory ought to offer 
complexity and indeterminacy to legal thought, not an “ease of comprehension,” 
because such “oversimplification” can lead to the serious risk of misapprehension and 
poor judgment.297 
This final thought brings this chapter back to the introduction with Bratton’s 
comment about the elements of a “wholesome” corporate legal dialectic.298 Consider 
his words carefully:  
Whatever the future interplay of theory and power, the concepts that 
make up theories of the firm – entity and aggregate, contract and 
concession, public and private, discrete and relational – will stay in 
internal opposition. This tendency toward contradiction should be 
accepted, not feared. The contradictions are intrinsic. No foreseeable 
scholarship or legislative reform will resolve them. The contradictions 
also are wholesome. Studying and reflecting on their interplay in the 
law enhances our positive and normative understanding. Legal theories 
that heavily privilege one or another opposing concept risk positive 
error. Theory, instead of denying the existence of the contradictions, 
should synchronize their coexistence in law.299 
                                                      
296 Ibid.  
297 Ibid. 
298 Bratton, “Nexus of Contracts”, supra note 3 at 465. 
299 Ibid at 464-65. 
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Unfortunately, this particular message of Bratton never gained enough traction in 
corporate legal academia to bring about the quality of discourse that this passage 
suggests.  
This chapter will end with the recommendation that it endorsed at the outset. 
We as corporate scholars need be self-critical of our roles in the manufacturing of 
corporate knowledge and, in part, be leery of accepting a priori knowledge as fact. If 
we will do this, it should lead to a more wholesome corporate law, whatever that law 
might look like. 
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CHAPTER 3: BERLE’S CONCEPTION OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY:  
A FORGOTTEN PERSPECTIVE FOR RECONSIDERATION 
DURING THE RISE OF FINANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s marked an American revolution in corporate governance as 
managers shifted their focus toward greater market accountability with the rebirth of 
the shareholder primacy argument.1 By the late 1980s, the resulting efficiency gains 
                                                      
1 Much of this revolution occurred in the economic literature, which built on the 
work of Henry Manne in the 1960s. For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see 
Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 J Pol 
Econ 110 [Manne, “Mergers and the Market”]; Henry G Manne, “Some Theoretical 
Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle” (1964) 64 Colum L 
Rev 1427 [Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”]; Henry G Manne, “The ‘Higher Criticism’ 
of the Modern Corporation” (1962) 62 Colum L Rev 399 [Manne, “Higher 
Criticism”]; Henry G Manne, “Corporate Responsibility, Business Motivation, and 
Reality” (1962) 343 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 55 [Manne, “Corporate 
Responsibility”]; Henry G Manne, “Current Views on the ‘Modern Corporation’” 
(1961) 38 U Det LJ 559 [Manne, “Modern Corporation”]; Henry G Manne, 
“Accounting for Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws” (1959) 54 Nw UL 
Rev 285 [Manne, “Accounting for Share Issues”]. For more on the economic 
literature of the 1970s, see Armen A Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777; 
Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305. This 
economic literature was translated by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel in 
the early 1980s. See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Close Corporations 
and Agency Costs” (1986) 38 Stan L Rev 271 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Close 
Corporations”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases” (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 611 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Optimal 
Damages”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Limited Liability and the 
Corporation” (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 89 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Limited 
Liability”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors” (1984) 70 Va L Rev 669 [Easterbrook & Fischel, 
“Mandatory Disclosure”]; Frank H Easterbrook, “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of 
Dividends” (1984) 74 Am Econ Rev 650; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, 
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placed the firm in a competitive position to dominate within an increasingly global 
marketplace. The firm no longer looked like the tired and bloated conglomerate of the 
1960s; it had shed its skin and transformed itself into a glistening profit-maker 
designed to entice the interest of the emerging class of global investors. 
As detailed in Chapter 2, although a collection of academics created the 
theoretic groundwork that inspired this heroic rebirth of the American firm, Henry 
Manne deserves much of the credit. Manne’s success can be attributed, at least in 
part, to how he redefined the interests of shareholders by “flipping”2 Adolf A Berle, 
                                                                                                                                                          
“Voting in Corporate Law” (1983) 26 JL & Econ 395 [Easterbrook & Fischel, 
“Voting”]; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Auctions and Sunk Costs in 
Tender Offers” (1982) 35 Stan L Rev 1 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Auctions”]; Frank H 
Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) 91 Yale LJ 
737 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “Corporate Control Transactions”]; Frank H Easterbrook 
& Daniel R Fischel, “The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a 
Tender Offer” (1981) 94 Harv L Rev 1161 [Easterbrook & Fischel, “The Proper 
Role”]. Easterbrook and Fischel’s work from the 1980s was then used to form the 
basis for The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, which is perhaps their most 
influential work to date. Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) 
[Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure]. 
 2 A flip occurs when legal language is used to endorse a particular reform (like 
Berle advocating shareholder primacy to open the corporation to public-interest 
concerns) and then that same language is used to endorse the opposed reform (like 
Manne advocating shareholder primacy to close the corporation to public-interest 
concerns). For more on how arguments can be flipped, see Duncan Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication: Fin de siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); 
see also Kerry Rittich, “Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in 
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates” (2005) 55 UTLJ 853 at 857. 
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Jr’s “shareholder primacy” argument. 3  For the Berle of the 1920s and 1930s, 
shareholders were the middle- and working-class “Everyman.”4 Berle believed that if 
shareholder primacy was ensured, it would correct the democratic deficit that existed 
in the management of the American economy. For Manne of the 1960s, shareholders 
were much different; they were rational actors whose constructed intentions could be 
used to ascertain and justify market function. 5  While Berle believed that the 
democratization of the shareholder class would make the corporation a tool for the 
wider polity, Manne used shareholder primacy to focus managerial efforts on 
economic efficiency. When Manne’s thoughts on shareholder primacy were married 
                                                      
3 For Manne’s work on shareholder primacy, see Manne, “Mergers and the 
Market”, supra note 1; Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 1; Manne, “Higher 
Criticism”, supra note 1; Manne, “Corporate Responsibility”, supra note 1; Manne, 
“Modern Corporation”, supra note 1; Manne, “Accounting for Share Issues”, supra 
note 1. 
4 “Everyman” is a reference to The Summoning of Everyman, usually referred to 
simply as Everyman, written in the late fifteenth century. See Anonymous, The 
Summoning of Everyman, Geoffrey Cooper & Christopher Wortham, eds (Nedlands, 
WA: University of Western Australia Press, 1980) (15th century). The term may not 
be altogether the best term to use because there was a large population of female 
investors at the time. See Harwell Wells, “The Birth of Corporate Governance” 
(2010) 33 Seattle UL Rev 1247 at 1257, n 39 [Wells. “Birth of Corporate 
Governance”]. 
5  The aggregate, private, contractual theory of the corporation that Manne 
endorsed was later employed by Armen A Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, 
and William Meckling in a manner that allowed theorists to use the sum of the 
constructed motives of economic actors to explain why organizations (like 
corporations) and institutions (like the market) functioned as they did. See Alchian & 
Demsetz, supra note 1; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1 at 308-10, 319. 
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with those of Ronald Coase’s on transaction cost theory,6 what emerged was a 
powerful reconceptualization of the corporation in legal thought.7 With the success of 
Manne’s perspective, the shareholder wealth maximization norm eventually became 
firmly embedded within the corporate legal literature, 8  defining the interest of 
shareholders and planting the seeds for the financialization of the firm.9 
                                                      
6 RH Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
7 See Oliver E Williamson, “The Economics of Governance” (2005) 95 Am Econ 
Rev 1 at 2-5. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1; Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 1. 
8 See e.g. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure, supra note 1; Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 
Geo LJ 439 at 439 (arguing that it is settled that corporate law’s main purpose is to 
maximize “long-term shareholder value”); Roberta Romano, “Less is More: Making 
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance” 
(2001) 18 Yale J on Reg 174 at 186, n 30 (arguing that “the objective of U.S. 
corporate law…is to maximize share value”). 
9 Financialization of the corporation occurred when the understanding of the 
corporation successfully endeavored to narrow the understanding of all social 
relationships within the corporation so that their value can be translated into an 
exchangeable instrument, which makes it possible for the financial industry to assess 
value to them and trade them. See generally Simon Deakin, “The Rise of Finance: 
What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop It? A Comment on ‘Finance and 
Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality and Democracy’ by Sanford Jacoby” (2008) 
30 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 67; Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Morals of the Marketplace: 
A Cautionary Essay for Our Time” (2009) 20 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 171 [Mitchell, 
“Morals of the Marketplace”]; Peer Zumbansen, “The Evolution of the Corporation: 
Organization, Finance, Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility” (Osgoode 
Hall L Sch Comp Res in L & Pol Econ Res Paper Series, Paper No 6/2009, 2009) 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971>. 
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Today, Berle is celebrated as the grandfather of modern shareholder 
primacy,10 but this description glosses over his opposition to Manne’s flip of his 
argument.11 Berle’s objection is not always appreciated in commentaries of his 
shareholder primacy argument. For this reason, this chapter offers a closer reading of 
Berle’s argument, providing a clear observation point for examining the shift from his 
shareholder primacy argument to the one of today. This shift is a transition from 
promoting shareholder primacy in order to protect minority constituents to promoting 
shareholder primacy in order to protect majority rights and the right of exit for any 
disgruntled minority.12 It is also the shift from promoting shareholder primacy in 
order to tie corporate managers to public interest to promoting shareholder primacy in 
order to endorse minimizing transaction costs—even when efficacy gains 
unfortunately result in costs being externalized upon people who did not ex ante 
negotiate contract safeguards to protect themselves against such risk.13 From this 
                                                      
10  See William W Bratton & Michael L Wachter, “Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation” (2008) 34 J Corp L 
99 at 101. 
11 Adolf A Berle, “Modern Functions of the Corporate System” (1962) 62 Colum 
L Rev 433 at 435 [Berle, “Modern Functions”]. And for what inspired Berle to reply 
to Manne, see Manne, “Higher Criticism”, supra note 1 at 400-06. 
12 William W Bratton, “Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law” 
(2005) 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 59 at 74-76 [Bratton, “Welfare”]. 
13 Williamson, supra note 7 at 11-13. 
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point of observation, the shareholder primacy argument offers another perspective 
upon investor empowerment during the “rise of finance.”14 
Part II briefly recounts the early life of Berle. It then introduces Berle’s theory 
of the corporation and how this theory plays out in his early endorsement of 
shareholder primacy from 1923 to 1926. Part III explores the development and 
content of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, with particular emphasis 
on the relationship between the book and the Berle–Dodd debate. Part IV provides a 
fresh analysis of the debate. Part V contextualizes Berle’s thoughts on shareholder 
primacy within the rise of finance as an organizing force not only for the firm, but 
also for the rest of society. Finally, Part VI offers a concluding thought. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE: 1923–1926 
A. Berle as a Young Man 
Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr showed his intellectual capacity from an early age. 
He was homeschooled15 by his father, who taught him “how to learn what he needed 
to know before others [could detect] his ignorance.”16 This teaching probably served 
                                                      
14 Deakin, supra note 9. 
15 Jordan A Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era 
(New York, London, UK: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1987) at 7-9. 
16 Ibid at 23. 
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him well, as he entered Harvard at the age of fourteen.17 By the age of twenty-one, he 
had received three Harvard degrees and was the youngest student ever to graduate 
from Harvard Law School.18 After a year at Louis Brandeis’s Boston law firm,19 Berle 
enlisted in the army20 and was placed on inactive duty to assist in sorting out the title 
system in American-occupied territories in order to boost sugar production, which 
was in high demand and short supply.21 Berle was next assigned by the military to the 
Paris Peace Conference as an expert (which he was not) on Russian economics.22 The 
destruction, disease, starvation, and general desolation of postwar Europe horrified 
and marked young Berle.23 Upon returning to America, he spent a short time at a 
lucrative New York law firm before establishing a modest practice on Wall Street in 
                                                      
17 Ibid at 13. 
18 Ibid at 13-17. For additional information on Berle’s education, see ibid at 1-17.  
19 Ibid at 16. 
20 Ibid at 17. 
21 Adolf A Berle, Navigating the Rapids 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. 
Berle, Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973) [Berle, Navigating the Rapids]. 
22 Ibid at 23-24 (writing of how his “expertise” consisted of a few months research 
after coming back from the Dominican Republic). 
23 Ibid at 28. 
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1924. This position freed Berle to pursue more legal scholarship and social 
activism.24 
B. Berle’s Foundation of a Shareholder Primacy Theory 
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a period of violent 
labor relations.25 Berle regarded the trends toward the consolidation of economic 
power in the hands of elites as a dangerous misstep toward plutocracy and away from 
egalitarianism and democracy,26 which could further destabilize American society. 
Berle wanted to place economic and corporate power in the hands of the people. 
Berle published an early plan for how this transfer of power could be 
accomplished in a short article entitled “How Labor Could Control”.27 In the article, 
he explained that the corporation could be used as a tool for the redistribution of 
wealth and power to “the staff of the plant, including, of course, the chairman of the 
                                                      
24 Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal 
diary on 25 August 1932). 
25 See generally Graham Adams, Jr, Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1915: The 
Activities and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). 
26 Berle suggests that the rise of Bolshevism in Italy and Russia was being caused 
by the needless division between capitalists and labor. See AA Berle, Jr, “How Labor 
Could Control” (1921) 28 New Republic 37 [Berle, “Labor Could Control”]. 
27 Ibid. 
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board, the directors, as well as the oilers and feeders and loomfixers.”28 He suggested 
that organized labor (unions) could pool its resources to purchase or create 
corporations, and then could grant the shares of such corporations to the “staff of the 
plant.”29 Berle further explained: 
How shall the stock be distributed? According to the fairest appraisal 
of the value of the employee-stockholder’s services. The general 
manager ought to have more stock than the unskilled worker. His vote 
at a stockholders’ meeting ought to be worth more. He has earned it. 
What about wages? Every employee ought to draw a regular base pay 
just as a partner in a firm is entitled to his drawing account; he must 
live. How about labor turnover? One hopes this scheme would lessen 
it; but men will always leave old jobs for new. When a man leaves his 
job he must leave his stock too, resell it to the corporation, to use the 
vocabulary of corporation law, for a price. What price? The amount by 
which the value of the stock has been increased while that employee 
held it.30 
Each worker would be given ownership and control of the corporation in 
proportion to his contribution to the firm. Berle argued that if this occurred: “No 
single process in the industry would have to be changed, but each man would be 
working for himself and his ‘wage slavery’ would become merely an occupation in 
cooperative endeavor.”31 
                                                      
28 Ibid at 38. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid at 37. 
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What about the role for traditional shareholders in the corporation? He 
suggested: 
These stockholders are, in many corporations, not true investors; they 
“took a chance” . . . . They would not say so, but they looked for 
something for nothing; they bought the stock for a rise, and to collect 
large dividends if they can. This class is under attack as exploiters.32 
So, Berle advocated for shareholder control of the corporation, but he wanted 
to change who populated the shareholder class. According to his article, if he had his 
way, the deserving “staff of the plant”33 would replace the undeserving exploiter–
gambler shareholders. That said, he did see a place in the shareholder class for 
manager–investor shareholders who, although rare, were of value to the corporation. 
He wrote: 
The legitimate side to [the operation of traditional shareholders in 
corporate governance] lies in the fact that these stockholders have a 
power of management. . . . As matter of plain fact however they 
usually do not manage . . . [but a] small group do manage and earn 
much of what they receive.34 
In summary, Berle not only advocated for keeping the corporate structure of 
the business organization, but also for repopulating the shareholder class. He wanted 
to remove those shareholders who merely bought, hoped, held, and cashed in “when 
                                                      
32 Ibid at 38. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid at 37-38. 
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they [could] reap where they did not sew.”35 These shareholders did not deserve more 
than “the current rate of interest”36 because “the value of their management was 
nil.”37 Berle concluded that his argument was “[n]o . . . attack on private property; on 
the contrary, it [was] the emphasis of the strength of property. It [was] not a blow at 
our settled economic institutions; it [was] the sane use of them.”38 
After this article, Berle shifted his position slightly. He began to focus on how 
the American economy was evolving. He witnessed the greater dispersion of share 
ownership out of the hands of business elites and into the hands of the middle and 
working classes.39 Berle viewed this transfer of power as a positive development, 
which could achieve the same ends as his previously devised scheme: the 
democratization of economic power.40 To his disappointment, the legal community 
was compensating for this change in ownership by advocating for less shareholder 
control and more managerial control over the corporation. Berle thought that this 
advocacy of managerialism would compromise this transfer of power. In his more 
                                                      
35 Ibid at 38. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at 39. 
39 See Schwarz, supra note 15 at 65-66. 
40 Ibid at 66. 
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personal and candid writings, he revealed that these concerns motivated him to 
promote shareholder primacy.41 
Berle envisioned how an empowered shareholder class, with its expanded 
working- and middle-class membership, could transform American society.42 This 
corporate liberal revolution43 was, as Berle put it, merely “the logical working out of 
[the American] system,” which, as a liberal, he believed to be a sound foundation for 
social order.44 His vision of the corporate liberal revolution placed the corporation at 
its center because the corporation had the capacity to disperse ownership and 
economic power widely with little change to the legal structure of the corporation and 
the economy.45 All the safeguards were in place to protect this emerging class of 
shareholders; all that was needed was the will to follow through. 
Berle became convinced that the key to unlocking the potential of the 
corporation as a tool of economic revolution was to firmly establish the property and 
                                                      
41 Ibid; see also Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from 
Berle’s personal diary on 25 August 1932, in which he reflects upon how the fact that 
directors and managers abused their authority inspired him to advocate for greater 
fiduciary protection of shareholder rights from 1923 to 1926). 
42 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66. 
43 Although Schwarz uses the terms “corporate,” “liberal,” and “revolution,” there 
is no clear evidence that Berle used this language. Yet this language aptly describes 
his vision. See ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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fiduciary rights of shareholders within the governance mechanism. This governance 
mechanism would be a safeguard against the action of powerful elite interests that 
would want to counteract the threats of the egalitarian operation of the corporation. 
Although too radical to be an explicit policy-reform agenda, the Corporate Liberal 
Revolution was at the core of the shareholder primacy argument that Berle would 
develop in the 1920s. 
Berle’s theory of the Corporate Liberal Revolution is significant to understand 
because it makes clear that his motivation for endorsing shareholder primacy was to 
shape the corporation to be a tool to democratize the American economy. 
Understanding this motivation helps one appreciate Berle’s later shift away from 
shareholder primacy toward other strategies to bring economic power under 
democratic controls. Shareholder primacy was not an end for Berle, it was merely a 
means to an end. 
C. Berle’s Shareholder Primacy Theory 
Berle’s 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles map the progress of his shareholder 
primacy theory.46 Berle stated explicitly in his diary that these articles “led to the next 
                                                      
46 For a complete record of Berle’s published works up to the early 1960s, see 
Manne, “Theoretical Aspects”, supra note 1. 
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stage of [his] career.”47 In a diary entry from August 1932, he further reflected upon 
these four articles, writing: 
The attempt I was then making was to assert the doctrine that 
corporate managements were virtually trustees for their stockholders, 
and that they could not therefore deal in the freewheeling manner in 
which directors and managers had dealt with the stock and other 
interests of their companies up to that time. It was the beginning of the 
fiduciary theory of corporations which now is generally accepted.48 
Put differently, Berle emphasized shareholder rights, arguing that managers were 
accountable to exercise their discretion within, and only within, the scope of their 
preexisting obligations to shareholders in order to ensure some measure of 
accountability within corporate operation and thus avoid at least some incidents of 
managerial opportunism. 
The first article, published in 1923, argued that the discretion of management 
was not so broad that it could ignore the contracted procedure for the manner in 
which dividends were to be distributed.49 In his second article, Berle advanced his 
                                                      
47 Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal 
diary on 25 August 1932). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Berle noted that the trend in corporate law to grant directors broad power to 
distribute dividends could violate shareholders’ rights, which necessitated a more 
narrow interpretation of managerial power. Although the discretion to withhold 
dividends to bolster the capital of the corporation was absolute and equitable, if the 
corporation used the dividends of non-cumulative preferred stockholders, these 
dividends were not lost to this class, but had to be recorded and returned to them 
before common shareholders could receive dividends. See AA Berle, Jr, “Non-
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theory, arguing that managers had an equitable duty that controlled managerial 
discretion when financial innovations (like the discretionary issue of non-par stocks) 
created holes in preexisting contractual obligations.50 
The final two articles were both written in 1926. The first, published in the 
Columbia Law Review, argued that equity guided managerial discretion beyond 
contract. Essentially, when contractual safeguards failed to protect minority 
shareholders, management still had an equitable duty to defend weaker shareholders 
from powerful ones who might exercise their influence over management in a manner 
oppressive to the minority.51 Finally, in his 1926 Harvard Law Review article, Berle 
                                                                                                                                                          
Cumulative Preferred Stocks” (1923) 23 Colum L Rev 358 at 358-59, 367 [Berle, 
“Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock”]. 
50 In this article, preexisting shareholders’ rights were challenged by discretion to 
issue non-par stocks. This challenge was significant because such contractual 
arrangements could not have foreseen this innovation. Berle acknowledged that such 
unforeseen evolutions in corporate law created a crisis because they potentially freed 
management to act without regard for the interests of shareholders. To remedy this 
failure of the contract, Berle asserted that the rights of shareholders created an 
obligation for management (like agents) to manage the corporation in shareholders’ 
best interests, regardless of whether this obligation was explicitly contractual. Berle 
appeared confident that courts would recognize that shareholders could rely on equity 
to protect their rights. See AA Berle, Jr, “Problems of Non-Par Stocks” (1925) 25 
Colum L Rev 43 at 43-46, 63 [Berle, “Non-Par Stocks”]. 
51 Berle explored how management allocated dividends (and losses) between 
share classes of the corporation. Once again, he employed the theory of the 
corporation as the private property of shareholders. He asserted that even after 
management allocated initial preferred dividends in accordance with explicit 
contractual requirements, the remaining surplus, if it was be to be allocated as 
dividends, was subject to an equitable distribution. This illustrated how principles of 
equity, beyond contract, provided a rationale for ordering how dividends were to be 
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furthered this argument by demonstrating that equity compensated for the de facto 
imbalance of power between shareholders. He argued that the law would ensure that 
management treated all shareholders evenhandedly, guaranteeing that the interests of 
ownership were not undermined.52 
When these articles are read with Berle’s biographical context in mind, it 
becomes clear that his prime concern was controlling the self-interested and 
irresponsible actions of management, who controlled one of the most important 
political actors within American society: the corporation.53 More importantly, Berle’s 
more candid writings indicate that he wanted the corporation to help American 
society avoid the internal strife that Europe appeared doomed to suffer. 54 
Accordingly, his objective was to help empower shareholders (which he saw as 
representative of the middle and working classes) to make corporate managers firmly 
accountable to their control: in other words, the wider polity. He envisioned the 
distribution of corporate ownership through the middle and working classes as a 
                                                                                                                                                          
portioned among shareholders. This protected weaker shareholders from the influence 
of powerful ones. See AA Berle, Jr, “Participating Preferred Stock” (1926) 26 Colum 
L Rev 303 at 303, 305, 317 [Berle, “Preferred Stock”]. 
52 See AA Berle, Jr, “Non-Voting Stock and ‘Bankers’ Control’” (1926) 39 Harv 
L Rev 673 [Berle, “Non-Voting Stock”]. 
53 Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 19 (entry from Berle’s personal 
diary on 25 August 1932). 
54 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66. 
 
 
 
 114 
mechanism to place the power of economic concentration under a form of democratic 
control through shareholder power. In fact, Berle had the bold ambition of becoming 
the prophet of the shareholding class, or as he so modestly put it, “the American Karl 
Marx.”55 
Berle’s articles did not express his radical hopes for the corporate-liberal 
revolution. This restraint is understandable. As a young academic attempting to 
establish his reputation, it would have been unwise to frame his shareholder primacy 
theory in line with his radical labor and anticapitalist views. Although the hostilities 
and violence that characterized America’s industrial relations at the turn of the 
century seemed to have ended,56 the “age of industrial violence” was still fresh in the 
minds of Americans.57 Consequently, such extreme opinions would likely have been 
either rejected outright or would have drawn serious and unnecessary criticism to 
Berle’s project. He figured that he did not have to preach the revolution because the 
market was evolving the corporate form toward an ever-more widely dispersed share 
                                                      
55 Berle exclaimed to his wife that “his real ambition in life is to be the American 
Karl Marx—a social prophet.” See Schwarz, supra note 15 at 62; see also Thomas K 
McCraw, “Berle and Means” (1990) 18 Rev Am His 578 at 579. 
56 In 1928, only 694 strikes occurred representing the fewest since 1884, and in 
1929, there were only 900 work stoppages, involving merely 1.2% of the labor force. 
For more details on how the rise of living standards in the 1920s helped smooth the 
way for more peaceful industrial relations, see Robert H Zieger & Gilbert J Gall, 
American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 3d ed (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) at 45. 
57 Adams, supra note 25. 
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ownership. So, as long as the rights of shareholders were protected, his more radical 
surreptitious agenda would be furthered without making his goals explicit. In other 
words, Berle predicted that the existing regulation and market function would guide 
the radical social work so long as the corporate legal infrastructure was in place to 
protect the rights of shareholders. 
Confident in the direction the market was moving, Berle constructed 
arguments based on property rights, justifying shareholder authority over corporate 
management.58 Each article followed a similar logic: the corporation was the private 
property of its shareholders, and because managers had a fiduciary relationship with 
these owners, managers owed a duty of care to owners. This relationship was 
captured in law by contract and, as Berle noted in later works, by equity as well. Each 
article noted how corporate management was granted discretion over the 
administration of shareholder rights, which prima facie appeared quite broad.59 But 
each area of discretion was held in check by a broad interpretation of shareholder 
rights, and thus the range of managerial choice that actually existed was more 
restricted than an observer might have assumed. 
                                                      
58 Berle, “Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock”, supra note 49; Berle, “Non-Par 
Stocks”, supra note 50; Berle, “Preferred Stock”, supra note 51; Berle, “Non-Voting 
Stock”, supra note 52. 
59 See supra notes 44-47. 
 
 
 
 116 
It makes sense to track Berle’s work up to 1927 because that is when he likely 
wrote the first article in the Berle–Dodd debate, “Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust.” And this article is a word-for-word reproduction of most of a chapter from 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (a point noted in detail in the 
following sections). And because Berle’s work on the book started in 1927, a draft of 
this article could have been written anytime between 1927 and 1931. Thus, the article 
could have been drafted in 1927.60 This fact creates a reasonable end point for the 
consideration of Berle’s shareholder primacy argument prior to the writing of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
                                                      
60 The obvious challenge to drawing a distinction as early as 1927 is that the 
footnotes in “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” make reference to cases as late as 
1930. But this detail is less significant in light of the fact that in practice, drafts of 
articles are constantly modified prior to publication so that they reflect the current 
commentary on the law. Therefore, it is very plausible that the footnotes only indicate 
that a revision of the article occurred during or after 1930, which is much different 
than the potential claim that a draft of the article could not have been written before 
1930. Furthermore, one should consider how similar “Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust” is to the other law review articles up to 1927. In fact, this article could easily 
be regarded as a direct extension of the 1923, 1925, and 1926 articles. Thus, it is quite 
reasonable—even if unconfirmed by the historical record—to suggest that “Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust” might have been one of the first parts of the book written, 
making 1927 a cautious and prudent ending point for Berle’s history up to the Berle-
Dodd Debate. 
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III. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A. The Making of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
In 1927, a Harvard connection helped Berle to land a sizable grant from the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation to study recent trends in corporate 
development. 61  The grant was contingent upon him obtaining an academic 
appointment, 62  which he soon received from Columbia University. 63  The grant 
requirements also demanded that the project use the expertise of an associate 
economist.64 By chance, his old bunkmate from officer training at Plattsburg Camp,65 
Gardiner C. Means, had just enrolled at Harvard as a candidate for a Ph.D. in 
                                                      
61 Edwin F. Gay actually devised the project. Gay was an economic historian who 
became the founding dean of the Harvard Business School. He was advising various 
foundations (including the Social Science Research Council, which sponsored the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation) on what types of economic issues deserved 
funding. For his Rockefeller project, he wanted to blend the expertise of a lawyer and 
an economist to study the modern corporation. See Herbert Heaton, A Scholar in 
Action: Edwin F. Gay (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) at 211. 
62 Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 21 (entry from Berle’s personal 
diary on 25 August 1932). 
63 “C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Adolf Augustus Berle, 
Jr.” online: Columbia University 
<http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/a_a_berle.html>. 
64 Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, 2d ed (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) at xxxix. 
65 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 51; see also Julius Goebel, A History of the School of 
Law, Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) at 299-305, 
316-17. 
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economics.66 Means’s interests in the economic implications of the separation of 
ownership and control dovetailed nicely with Berle’s legal study of the modern 
corporation,67 so Berle invited him to assist.68 The end result was The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. 
Berle intended The Modern Corporation and Private Property to become a 
classic and purposefully crafted the book with this intention. He wanted this work to 
make him an opinion-maker for the intellectual elites of America.69 Berle was not in 
favor of antitrust measures because he believed that the large modern corporation, 
with a widely dispersed share base, ought to be the primary actor of the American 
economy. But he knew that in order to appeal to the legal intelligentsia, he would 
have to be careful to achieve the favor of American legal icons like Louis Brandeis 
and Felix Frankfurter, who were staunch critics of big business and strong advocates 
of antitrust measures.70 
As planned, the book became famous as a warning of the potential threat of 
corporate managerial plutocracy over American society, demonstrating how modern 
                                                      
66 Berle, Navigating the Rapids, supra note 21 at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal 
diary on 25 August 1932). 
67 Ibid at 51. 
68 Ibid at 20 (entry from Berle’s personal diary on 25 August 1932). 
69 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 62. 
70 Ibid at 14, 67-68, 83-85, 89, 104. 
 
 
 
 119 
corporations were consuming the American economy 71  and how unrestrained 
managers were controlling these modern corporations. By focusing on the latter and 
ignoring the former when making his recommendations, he could offer a sacrifice to 
powerful antitrust advocates but still focus his recommendations on the distinct issue 
of the control of management. In short, he appeased the antitrusters for the time being 
while still progressing with his alternative agenda of transforming the corporation 
into a mechanism that ensured the greater democratization of economic power. In the 
end, Berle succeeded in his ambition; when published, the book was celebrated as one 
of the most important of its time.72 
                                                      
71 For a later and far more advanced understanding of how corporations capture 
economies, see Coase, supra note 6 at 389-91. 
72 In Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era, Schwarz notes 
that the book review from the New York Herald Tribune applauded the book as a 
“masterly achievement of research and contemplation” and wondered if it could be 
“the most important work bearing on American statecraft” since the Federalist Papers. 
Jerome Frank wrote, “This book will perhaps rank with Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the existence of a 
new economic epoch.” Ernest Gruening called it “epoch-making.” Harry W Laigler 
proclaimed it was “bound to make economic history.” In 1932, Justice Brandeis cited 
the book calling it the work of “able, discerning scholars” in Liggett v. Lee, 288 US 
517 (1933). By the spring of 1933, Time magazine dubbed it “the economic Bible of 
the Roosevelt administration.” Schwarz, supra note 15 at 60-61 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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B. The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
Berle and Means pointed to the key features of the modern corporation’s 
evolution, namely: an increase in corporate concentration of property73 and a decrease 
in control over corporate management by owners,74 which was a by-product of ever-
increasing stock ownership dispersion.75 They noted that this led to an increased 
concentration of power for corporate managers76 and elite financial groups.77 The 
book cast the threat of corporate hegemony over freedom, suggesting that plutocracy 
could supersede state democracy as the dominant form of social organization. 
Berle and Means centered on the need for shareholders to have meaningful 
control over their corporations. What Means’s empirical research proved was that the 
                                                      
73 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at vii-viii, 44-45; see also Adolph A Berle, 
“Property, Production and Revolution” (1965) 65 Colum L Rev 1 at 1 [Berle, 
“Property”]. 
74 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 119-40. 
75 Ibid at 64-65. 
76 Berle and Means prophesize: 
What will be the development in the field of ‘control’? It is not easy to 
proph[esize]. . . . Economically, the problem is likely to change in 
form as corporations gradually increase in size and as stock 
distribution increases, to the point where the ‘control’ is virtually in 
the hands of a self-perpetuating Board of Directors. 
Ibid at 217-18. 
77 See ibid at 206. For an example of such control groups, see Berle, “Non-Voting 
Stock”, supra note 52 at 673-77. 
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opposite was occurring,78 resulting in a fracture between ownership and control of 
property.79 The authors warned that this emergent situation might cause market 
distortions,80 especially if the gap between ownership and control continued to widen, 
amplifying the perversion of the classic theory of market function.81 To explain their 
logic, if profit was to work as a virtuous incentive, the traditional logic demanded that 
only a “fair return” be dispersed to the shareholders (as the owners of the property 
without control) and that the remainder go to the management (who control the 
property) because profit would induce the most efficient decision-making, and 
management made the decisions.82 The authors concluded that: “The corporation 
would thus be operated financially in the interest of control, the stockholder 
becoming merely the recipient of the wages of capital . . . [running] counter to the 
conclusion reached by applying the traditional logic of property to precisely the same 
situation.”83 
                                                      
78 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 128-31, 245; see also Gardiner C Means, “The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry” (1931) 46 QJ Econ 68 
(an article that Means published a year before with much of the core research 
findings). 
79 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 303-08. 
80 Ibid at 302-08. 
81 Ibid at 302. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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What Berle and Means probably meant by “the traditional logic of property” 
is that there is control of that piece of property. Or, as Morris Cohen characterized it, 
a right over a possession,84 which implicitly is assumed to grant a right to self-
assertion, 85  or a claim to a sovereign power 86  over a possession, without the 
interference of government power.87 To put the term more concretely, in the context 
of the authors’ suggestion, it means that owners ought to receive the profits of the 
corporation because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and are the 
rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclusion of all 
nonowners. 
Berle and Means predicted that separation of ownership and control would 
create a new logic for property,88 which would be inspired by the better appreciation 
of the “economic relationships” between economic actors.89 They did not provide any 
hints as to what these new “economic relationships” would be like. And no evidence 
                                                      
84 Morris R Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8 at 12. 
85 Ibid at 18. 
86 Ibid at 29. 
87 Ibid at 11. 
88 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 302. 
89 Ibid at 308. 
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exists that Berle ever seriously entertained the more radical ideas of the legal realists 
regarding property.90 
C. A Note on the Use of Corporatism 
William W Bratton and Michael L Wachter discuss how Berle and Dodd 
competed in their advocacy of rivaling models of corporatism.91 In Bratton and 
Wachter’s opinion, Berle endorsed planners’ corporatism,92 which describes the 
cooperative relationship between business, civil society, and government. Together, 
these parties determine and coordinate policies that satisfy the public interest. Bratton 
and Wachter also suggest that Dodd endorsed business commonwealth corporatism.93 
Like planners’ corporatism, this form of corporatism focuses on the collaborative 
relationships shared by different groups in order to establish what is in the public 
interest.94 After the public interest is established, policies are adopted, adapted, and 
                                                      
90 One’s imagination can easily attach Cohen’s critique of the long-established 
understanding of property rights and his seemingly sensible, but explosively 
contentious, redefinition of property rights as having “positive duties” to public 
interest included. See Cohen, supra note 84 at 15-21. 
91 Bratton and Wachter adopt their models of corporatism from Ellis Hawley. See 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10 at 122-23; see also Ellis W Hawley, The New Deal 
and The Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966) at 36-43. 
92 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10 at 123. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid at 122-23. 
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coordinated among different groups in order to achieve the agreed-upon goals. The 
distinction between the two models of corporatism is that while planners’ corporatism 
advocates that the government take the lead role, business commonwealth 
corporatism argues for industrialists to take the lead, “relegating government to a 
backstop, supporting role.” 95  This chapter agrees that Berle could have been 
characterized as a planners’ corporatist, but rejects the notion that Dodd was a 
business commonwealth corporatist. 
John Cioffi offers complexity to Bratton and Wachter’s use of “corporatism.” 
Cioffi argues that characterizing Berle as an advocate of corporatism is misplaced.96 
He argues that, at best, Berle advocated for “quasi-corporatist arrangements during 
the early New Deal,” which were contradictory and vague in nature.97 Mindful of 
Cioffi’s position,98 this chapter will continue to use the term “corporatism” (more 
                                                      
95 Ibid at 122 (Bratton and Wachter’s explanation of corporatism). 
96 John W Cioffi, “Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s 
Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power” (2011) 34 Seattle UL 
Rev 1081 at 1085. 
97 Ibid at 1086. 
98 Upon reflection, Cioffi’s article ought to be considered in light of the role that 
corporatist thinking now plays in the merging forms of regulatory capitalism that are 
visibly emerging today. So much more could be said about Berle, corporatism, 
regulatory capitalism, and Cioffi’s article, but an aside will have to do for now. For 
more on the role that corporatism is playing in regulatory capitalism, see David Levi-
Faur, “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interest” (2009) 27 
Pol & Soc 181 at 188. 
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precisely, Bratton and Wachter’s planners’ corporatism and business commonwealth 
corporatism) in order to maintain a continuity of language between this chapter and 
the ongoing discussion about Berle and corporatism that Bratton and Wachter 
sparked. This chapter, however, is also mindful that planners’ corporatism cannot be 
said to be a form of corporatism as classically defined.99 To be clear, “corporatism” in 
this chapter refers to the “quasi-corporatist arrangements” that Berle envisioned and 
not corporatism as classically defined. 
D. The Importance of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
to the Berle–Dodd Debate 
It may be useful to sum up before moving forward. In the 1920s, Berle 
regarded the trends toward managerialism as a dangerous mistake that could 
destabilize American society. He feared that managerialism, without safeguards, 
could amplify the economic inequalities in America and provoke Bolshevist elements 
in American society. As a result, Berle started to construct arguments based on 
property rights, which justified shareholder authority over corporate management. 
                                                      
99 Corporatism is classically defined as “a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and support.” Cioffi, supra note 96 at 1088 (quoting Philippe C Schmitter, “Still the 
Century of Corporatism?” (1974) 36 Rev Pol 85 at 93-94). 
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Underpinning Berle’s efforts (and this is important for understanding Berle’s 
arguments throughout the debate) was the evolution of the public corporation with its 
ever-widening ownership class, which continued to increase the potential of 
democratizing economic power within American society. For this reason, if corporate 
managers could be compelled to act for the sole benefit of shareholders, the 
corporation ought to be the primary actor of the American economy. This ties his 
early shareholder primacy arguments firmly to the perceived needs of the broader 
polity of American society. 
Against this background, the importance of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property to the Berle–Dodd debate becomes clear. The first article in the 
debate was an exact replication of a chapter from the book, with one key omission. 
The article did not contain his candid admission that his arguments were constructed 
“with full realization of the possibility that private property may one day cease to be 
the basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale 
enterprise.”100 In the missing text, he also argued that it was possible that “the entire 
system [had] to be revalued” and that “the corporate profit stream in reality no longer 
[was] private property,” asserting that a new theory, which adequately explained the 
phenomenon of the modern corporation, would likely develop.101 But he qualified 
                                                      
100 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 219. 
101 Ibid. 
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these views as a matter of sociological study, which regardless of their factual merit, 
had not yet attained a standing as a “matter of law.”102 He suggested that finding a 
superior theory to explain the distortion created by modern corporations upon private 
property was “rather the [reflection] of a movement which [was] likely to take form 
in the future, than the statement of a present ordering of affairs.” 103  Berle 
recommended that until a new corporate theory became a “matter of law,” lawyers 
and legal academics must do their best within the existing legal framework—that 
being to think “in terms of private property.”104 And that is exactly what Berle did in 
the 1931 article with his bullish argument that “all powers granted to a 
corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the 
shareholders as their interest appears”105 without qualification. 
At first glance, Berle’s apparent support for planners’ corporatism might seem 
to contradict his argument for shareholder primacy. Berle’s arguments, however, are 
consistent because he only meant judicial protection of shareholder primacy to be an 
interim measure. He concluded that the shareholder primacy position, which he fully 
acknowledged was less than adequate, would need to be advocated until a satisfactory 
                                                      
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid at 219-20. 
105 Ibid at 220; AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 
Harv L Rev 1049 at 1049 [Berle, “Corporate Powers”]. 
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solution to the corporate power problem could be established.106 Berle thought that 
the chapter endorsing planners’ corporatism was the most important107 because it 
pointed toward what he believed to be the future direction of corporate law. Thus, the 
book is rightly interpreted to be both endorsing planners’ corporatism 108  and 
shareholder primacy. This clarification provides critical insight into the nature of his 
shareholder primacy argument and contextualizes it with the rest of the arguments 
from the book.109 As a result, Berle’s evolving position was not inconsistent, as most 
scholars suggest.110 
                                                      
106 See Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 219-20. 
107 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 63; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10 at 
121. 
108 Ibid at 118-222. 
109 It is unfortunate that none of Berle’s personal writings, his biography, or any 
of his other publications acknowledge this connection between the article “Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust” and The Modern Corporation and Private Property. As a 
result, no explanation exists for why he omitted this important insight from the 1931 
article that was published just before the book was released. The missing text is 
critical to properly contextualize the Berle–Dodd debate. This insight clearly 
establishes that, although Berle appeared to be entirely committed to his shareholder 
primacy argument in the 1931 article, he undoubtedly acknowledged that this 
argument represented no more than an interim solution. Thus, although the argument 
in “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” appeared unequivocal, the missing text, 
which would soon appear in the book, established that his argument was equivocal. 
110 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10 at 101, n 5. For allusions to the 
contradictions in Berle’s work and thus the danger of misrepresenting his position, 
see David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 1990 Duke LJ 201 at 222, and 
see generally CA Harwell Wells, “The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century” (2002) 51 U Kan L Rev 77 at 
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This discussion leaves one final loose end: Berle’s understanding of the 
corporation as a democratizing actor within modern society in the future. It can be 
argued that his vision of how the corporation related to the wider polity shifted from a 
vision of private government in which managers ran larger corporate actors, 
controlling the American economy for the benefit of shareholders representing all 
classes of American society, to a vision of hybrid public–private government in 
which a democratized corporate actor took a partnership role in the co-governance of 
the economy with government. But this shift is not such a dramatic shift as one might 
first assume. Both roads lead to the same end: using the path of democracy through 
the corporate governance mechanism to achieve the alignment of corporate action 
with public interest. 
IV. THE BERLE–DODD DEBATE 
A. Berle’s Declaration: “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” 
While working on The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle 
continued to publish other pieces.111 These works continued to argue for greater 
                                                                                                                                                          
95-99, 101-04 (describing Berle’s transitions of opinion from 1931 up to the 1960s) 
[Wells, “Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility”]. 
111 Those pieces were the following: Adolf A Berle, Jr, Cases and Materials in the 
Law of Corporation Finance (St. Paul, Minn: West, 1930) [Berle, Cases and 
Materials]; AA Berle, Jr, “The Organization of the Law of Corporation Finance” 
(1931) 9 Tenn L Rev 125 [Berle, “Organization of the Law”]; AA Berle, Jr, 
“Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations” (1931) 31 Colum L Rev 1239 
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protection of shareholder rights. His writing inspired a range of reactions. Although 
some agreed that new safeguards were needed to protect shareholders (especially to 
secure a higher rate of investment),112 the majority argued that Berle’s assessment 
was a reactionary overstatement that ran “counter to the historical evolution of the 
corporation.”113 With “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,” he probably expected 
                                                                                                                                                          
[Berle, “Corporate Devices”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Liability for Stock Market 
Manipulation” (1931) 31 Colum L Rev 264 [Berle, “Stock Market Manipulation”]; 
AA Berle, Jr, “Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits” 
(1929) 42 Harv L Rev 748 [Berle, “Compensation”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Promoters’ Stock 
in Subsidiary Corporations” (1929) 29 Colum L Rev 35 [Berle, “Promoters’ Stock”]; 
AA Berle, Jr, “Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act” (1929) 29 
Colum L Rev 563 [Berle, “Investors”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Subsidiary Corporations and 
Credit Manipulation” (1928) 41 Harv L Rev 874 [Berle, “Subsidiary Corporations”]; 
AA Berle, Jr, “Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants” (1927) 36 Yale LJ 
649 [Berle, “Convertible Bonds”]; AA Berle, Jr, “Publicity of Accounts and 
Directors’ Purchases of Stock” (1927) 25 Mich L Rev 827 [Berle, “Publicity of 
Accounts”]. 
112 Karl McGinnis believed that the law was progressing toward greater protection 
of shareholders and that Berle’s Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation 
Finance was an important contribution toward understanding the problem of 
shareholder protection. See E Karl McGinnis, Book Review of Cases and Materials 
in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf A Berle, Jr (1931) 10 Tex L Rev 122. 
Irving Levy observed that Berle’s suggestions in Studies in the Law of Corporation 
Finance were heterodox, acknowledging the protest of corporate lawyers to Berle’s 
advocacy of the equitable control of management by shareholders. He explained that 
some practitioners believed that Berle’s theory in action would be paramount to 
judicial interference with the ability of managers to exercise their professionally 
informed discretion over the corporation. That said, Levy sided with Berle because he 
believed that establishing safeguards over managerial dissertation was prudent. See 
Irving J Levy, Book Review of Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf 
A Berle, Jr, (1929) 7 NYULQ Rev 552. 
113 Joseph L Kline, who was a Wall Street corporate lawyer, argued, “Any 
movement to increase the power of shareholders as such runs counter to the historical 
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more of the same criticism; however, his most formidable critic would be unexpected. 
In the Harvard Law Review, E. Merrick Dodd accused Berle of being a dangerous 
conservative. This was too much for the self-styled American Karl Marx to bear, and 
he promptly penned a reply in the following issue.114 
In the initial article, Berle argued that because “all powers granted to a 
corporation . . . [were] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all the 
                                                                                                                                                          
evolution of corporations. Mr. Berle’s thesis is therefore essentially reactionary.” See 
Joseph V Kline, Book Review of Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf 
A Berle, Jr, (1929) 42 Harv L Rev 714 at 717. Laylin K James, in reviewing Berle’s 
Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance, attacked his arguments for 
the greater protection of shareholders as too zealous. See Laylin K James, Book 
Review of Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance by Adolf A Berle, 
Jr, (1932) 26 Ill L Rev 712. Franklin S Wood responded to Berle’s 1926 article “Non-
Voting Stocks and “Bankers’ Control,” arguing that Berle’s equitable remedies 
solution to the problem of managerial control was unjustifiable under sound 
principles of law and equity. See Franklin S Wood, “The Status of Management 
Stockholders” (1928) 38 Yale LJ 57. When reviewing Berle’s Studies in the Law of 
Corporation Finance, Robert T Swaine disagreed with Berle’s position, but did not 
question his statement of the law, writing: “But, however much one may dissent from 
Mr. Berle’s underlying philosophy, these essays must be recognized as an excellent 
and stimulating bit of advocacy. As a statement of the present state of the law they are 
of doubtful accuracy.” See Robert T Swaine, Book Review of Studies in the Law of 
Corporation Finance by Adolf A. Berle, Jr, (1929) 38 Yale LJ 1003 at 1004. And 
Wilber G Katz argued that Berle overstated the law; he also rejected his shareholder 
primacy theory, arguing that Berle underemphasized the potential downside of his 
equitable solutions, condemning him for being too critical of management and being 
too eager to create the impression that the complexities of many financial and 
intercorporate transactions are all the result of “corporate skullduggery.” See Wilber 
G Katz, Book Review of Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance by 
Adolf A Berle, Jr, (1931) 40 Yale LJ 1125 at 1128. 
114 For the observation that Berle considered himself the American Karl Marx, see 
McCraw, supra note 55. For his outrage at being accused of being a Tory, see 
Schwarz, supra note 15 at 66. 
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shareholders as their interest appears,”115 a legal foundation, based on the property 
rights of shareholders, could be bolstered to develop and enforce fiduciary ties 
between management and shareholders. He explained that the existing rights and 
restrictions of corporate law were no more than “nominal[]” rules,116 in the sense that 
they were only guidelines for how corporate governance ought to function. But when 
these guidelines conflicted with the equitable rights of shareholders, he opined that 
equity prevailed.117 As a result, managerial actions were bound by equity, no matter 
how absolute the power granted to managers might appear or how technically correct 
the exercise of such power was.118 Although the argument was obviously anti-
managerialist, he explained the nature of the equitable protections of shareholders in a 
manner that did not appear to be limiting managerial discretion; rather, he suggested 
that such interpretation of the rules expanded managerial authority to go beyond the 
technical limitations in order to better protect the interests of shareholders.119 
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Berle further described five scenarios 120  in which shareholders granted 
management wide discretion over corporate conduct.121 In each, no matter how 
absolute the discretion appeared, such power had to be exercised in accordance with 
equitable limitations.122 The underlying theory that bound managerial discretion to 
equitable control in each of the five scenarios was the understanding of the 
corporation as being exclusively private property, which supported the argument that 
all powers granted to management were exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.123 
But Berle hesitated to assert that this understanding of the fiduciary duty of 
management could evolve into a branch of trust law because such a duty must be less 
rigorous than other trust situations. Otherwise, the burden placed upon corporate 
management could be too great to reasonably optimize market efficiency.124 
                                                      
120 The five examples are: (1) power to issue stocks, (2) power to declare or 
withhold dividends, (3) power to acquire stocks in another corporation, (4) power to 
amend the corporate charter, and (5) power to merge with another enterprise. See 
Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 221-40; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 105 
at 1050-72. 
121 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 220; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 
105 at 1050-72. 
122 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 221; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 
105 at 1050. 
123 Berle & Means, supra note 64 at 241; Berle, “Corporate Powers”, supra note 
105 at 1072-73. 
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105 at 1074. 
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The timing of the publication of “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” is 
noteworthy because it occurred just months before the publication of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.125 It was much like Means’s publication of “The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry,” which was published at 
about the same time and was designed to have much the same effect in the world of 
economics.126 Given the academic community’s anticipation of the upcoming book, 
the article provided Berle with an opportunity to emphasize his central argument prior 
to its release.127 This early exposure was important to Berle because he wanted to 
ensure that other important points in the book did not overshadow his shareholder 
primacy argument. In other words, the early release of this argument can be 
interpreted as Berle’s effort to prevent shareholder primacy from becoming obscured 
by the pandemonium the book was anticipated to create about the looming threat of 
corporate power. 
                                                      
125 This original publisher decided shortly after the original publication that it 
“could not handle the book properly” and arrangements were made to transfer the 
book to Macmillan and Company. It was General Motors (a client of Corporation 
Trust) that pressured the publishing house to drop the book. Schwarz, supra note 15 
at 67. 
126 For the article in question, see Means, supra note 78. 
127 Schwarz, supra note 15 at 62-64. 
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B. Dodd, the Anti-Managerialist 
Edwin Merrick Dodd, the son of a wool merchant, was born in Providence, 
Rhode Island, in 1888.128 He entered Harvard College in 1910.129 His first teaching 
position in law was at Washington & Lee,130 but the Great War interrupted his 
fledgling career. During the war, he served as a member of the legal staff for the War 
Industries Board.131 After the war, he practiced law for a short time but soon realized 
that he preferred academia.132 He taught at both the Universities of Nebraska and 
Chicago133 before returning to Harvard Law School in 1928,134 where he taught for 
twenty-three years.135 
Two recurring anti-managerialist leanings can be found in Dodd’s work. First, 
he emphasizes the promotion of the fiduciary duty of corporate management. Second, 
he places importance on the protection of fairness and equity between classes of 
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security holders.136 Dodd consistently asserted that managers were in a position of 
trust and confidence, which led him to urge courts to be more diligent in enforcing 
managerial obligations.137 His works indicated that he generally argued the anti-
managerialist position, so one would assume that he would agree with Berle’s 
position. But this was not the case, for although they may have shared much common 
ground, upon reading Berle’s 1931 article (and possibly all of his legal articles up to 
                                                      
136 Baker, supra note 134 at 389. 
137 A review of examples that support this claim from the body of Dodd’s work 
follows. In a two-part series, Dodd explored the limits of management power to alter 
corporate charters. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “Dissenting Stockholders and 
Amendments to Corporate Charters” (1927) 75 U Pa L Rev 585 [Dodd, “Dissenting 
Stockholders and Amendments”]; E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “Dissenting Stockholders and 
Amendments to Corporate Charters (Continued)” (1927) 75 U Pa L Rev 723 [Dodd, 
“Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments (Continued)”]. In another particularly 
relevant article, Dodd traced the radical change in the impact of the fiduciary 
principle from small-scale to large-scale capitalism. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 
“Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation” (1941) 54 
Harv L Rev 917 [Dodd, “Modern Corporation”]. In another, Dodd argued that 
corporate management’s ability to purchase and redeem its own company shares 
ought to be brought within the fiduciary obligation. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 
“Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive 
Law” (1941) 89 U Pa L Rev 697 [Dodd, “Purchase and Redemption”]. Dodd again 
argued that corporate management ought to act in light of their fiduciary obligation 
for the benefit of security holders in relation to their interest. See E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 
“Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations” (1942) 55 Harv L Rev 780 [Dodd, 
Recapitalizations”]. In the following article, he showed great concern for the 
fiduciary principles, especially in relation to the obligation of majority shareholders to 
minority shareholders or to a particular class of shares. See E Merrick Dodd, 
“Liability of a Holding Company for Obtaining for Itself Property Needed by a 
Subsidiary—The Blaustein Case” (1944) 58 Harv L Rev 125 [Dodd, “Liability of a 
Holding Company”]. For supporting commentary, see Baker, supra note 134 at 390; 
Chaffee, supra note 128 at 382. 
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1931), Dodd deduced that Berle was too radical in his protection of shareholder 
rights. Berle’s radical stance, from Dodd’s perspective, was sacrificing the broader 
responsibility of managers to the community, as well as the potential that corporatism 
had to stabilize American capitalism at the time.138 
In fact, Dodd was so disturbed by the implications of Berle’s argument that he 
uncharacteristically employed a managerialist argument in order to attempt to 
undermine Berle’s shareholder primacy theory. He determined that Berle’s extreme 
stance was dangerous, making management no more than advocates solely for 
shareholders by limiting the scope of managerial accountability to the maximization 
of profits, and when necessary, doing this at the expense of all other corporate 
constituents. 
C. Dodd’s Response to Berle: “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” 
Both authors had different views on to whom duties should be owed. Dodd 
argued that the managers’ duty ought to be extended to other stakeholders. From his 
perspective, managers were granted many freedoms to conduct business in a manner 
that would not necessarily maximize profits.139 Dodd observed that this freedom 
appeared to have agitated Berle to place undue emphasis on the fiduciary relationship 
                                                      
138 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 10 at 124-28. 
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45 Harv L Rev 1145 at 1147 [Dodd, “Corporate Managers”]. 
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between managers and shareholders. 140  Dodd’s assumption regarding Berle’s 
motivations was incorrect, even at face value: Berle was clearly attempting to prevent 
managerial opportunism.141 In other words, he wanted to bring managerial discretion 
under legal control, not line shareholders’ pockets regardless of the consequences. 
Dodd also wanted to maintain the gap between ownership and control of the 
modern corporation so that private property rights would not restrict management’s 
decisions. He adopted an understanding of the underlying structure of the corporation 
and agreed with Berle that managers owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, not as 
individuals, but only to shareholders as a group.142 What Dodd meant by this was that 
it was not the actual interest of particular shareholders (actual people), but a 
constructed interest of “the shareholder,” to which management owed a duty. He 
argued that this conceptualization of shareholders required corporate managers to 
treat the corporation differently than merely an amalgamation of contractual and 
fiduciary obligations owed to actual and immediate shareholders. This created a space 
for management to find a balance between the optimal immediate and perpetual 
performance of the organization by serving the best interest of the corporation as a 
whole. 
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Dodd further asserted that his suggestion was not a dramatic shift of 
perception from Berle’s understanding of the firm, for the picture was altered “more 
in form than in substance”143 because the sole function of the corporation (to make 
profit for its shareholders) remained unaltered. 144  But this statement was not 
altogether true. Although the sole function of the corporation was still profit-making, 
Dodd’s perspective would further jam the wedge between ownership and control, 
aligning managerial discretion with the best interests of the corporation rather than 
the shareholders. This opened a debate as to what was in the best interests of the 
corporation. Such ambiguity was what Berle was attempting to eradicate, so as to 
limit managerial opportunism—at least in the interim. Dodd hoped that if this 
theoretical tweak were accepted, it would free management enough to take into 
consideration the interests of other stakeholders, even at the expense of maximizing 
profits.145 
Dodd was aware that he was placing power into the hands of management. He 
argued for placing faith in management rather than shareholders to guide the 
corporation, asserting that the fiduciary relationship, as Berle conceived it, would 
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create a serious obstacle to achieving socially responsible managers.146 Dodd wrote: 
“Desire to retain their present powers accordingly encourages [managers] to adopt 
and disseminate the view that they are guardians of all the interests which the 
corporation affects and not merely servants of its absentee owners.”147 He suggested 
that one must look to the managers, not to the owners, for professionalized corporate 
conduct,148 for it was “hardly thinkable” that absentee owners, who have little or no 
contact with their business other than collecting a dividend, would be filled “with a 
professional spirit of public service.”149 Moreover, if corporate managers had a duty 
solely to shareholders, all other stakeholders with a vested interest in the corporation 
(including employees, consumers, and the community) would have to find protection 
from corporate power when their interests were contrary to maximizing profits for 
shareholders. 150  Therefore, to promote socially responsible behavior, corporate 
managers needed to be the guardians of all interests that the corporation affected, and 
this result could only happen if corporate managers were freed to be able to employ 
the corporation’s “funds in a manner appropriate to a person practicing a profession 
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and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a 
breach of trust.”151 
If freed from the constraints of a shareholder primacy agenda, why would 
managers use this broad discretion for the betterment of the community when they 
could use it to enrich themselves instead? Dodd acknowledged the problem of 
opportunism and then stated that it was not the concern of his article to question 
“whether the voluntary acceptance of social responsibility by corporate managers 
[was] workable, but whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to 
fundamental principles of the law of business corporations.” 152  But he tacitly 
contradicted himself by appealing to the claims of high-minded managers who 
espoused the virtue of public duty. 153 He used this approach to establish that 
managers might be worthy of trust.154 
                                                      
151 Ibid at 1161. 
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154 But why would one attempt to wrench managers out of fiduciary relationships 
without understanding the outcome? As William W Bratton has pointed out, the 
advocates of greater corporate responsibility have followed Dodd down this slippery 
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Dodd merely employed optimism for the new generation of managers who 
claimed to be enlightened enough to use their discretion to assist other stakeholders, 
like employees, who needed protection from the inequities of their bargaining 
positions with the corporation.155 He romanticized the potential to transform modern 
business from a “purely private matter” into a “public profession,” in which managers 
would undertake a role as stewards of society.156 His arguments were inspiring, but 
also lacking substance, rendering them no more than corporate futurism. 
But, when one considers Dodd’s broader publication record,157 it becomes 
questionable whether the suggestion that Dodd was a business commonwealth 
corporatist can stand up to scrutiny. Admittedly, Dodd’s argument from the 1932 
article suggests that he was using the business commonwealth corporatists (in 
particular, Owen D Young and Gerald Swope) as examples of professionalized 
corporate managers who voluntarily accepted a responsibility for achieving public-
interest ends.158 But when one puts the 1932 article to one side and reviews Dodd’s 
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other writings before and after the 1932 article, it becomes clearer that Dodd was 
primarily an anti-managerialist. Therefore, one can conclude that Dodd was merely 
open-minded to Young and Swope’s business commonwealth corporatism, adopting a 
wait-and-see approach to “whether experiences in that direction [ran] counter to 
fundamental principles of the law of business corporations.”159 
Dodd sided with business commonwealth corporatists merely because he 
needed examples of potentially enlightened managers to counter what he believed to 
be Berle’s alarmingly extreme shareholder primacy position. In other words, Dodd 
did not use the examples of Young and Swope because he genuinely endorsed their 
specific agenda, but merely because he was encouraged by their efforts, which 
appeared to be moving in the direction of corporate responsibility. Dodd’s point was 
that such attempts at enlightened managerial behavior would be stamped out by 
Berle’s strategy to bind managers to the whims of absentee profiteers. 
In sum, Dodd’s 1932 article ought to be regarded as a reaction to Berle’s 
position. The argument in this article contradicted his own best judgment (as 
established by the archive of his work).160 This is why he later admitted that this 
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argument was “rash” and riddled with “legal difficulties.”161 Thus, it should be 
regarded more as a consequence of Berle’s extremism and less as a sincere 
endorsement of business commonwealth corporatism. Dodd was merely petitioning 
those potentially lured by Berle’s perceived extremism to keep an open mind to the 
potential for enlightened managerial behavior, but Dodd was overzealous in making 
this point, at least in Berle’s opinion. Therefore, though the case can be made that 
Dodd advocated business commonwealth corporatism, his level of enthusiasm 
actually skews understanding of what Dodd was doing. To be more accurate, one 
must emphasize that the contradictory nature of Dodd’s other writings, before and 
after this article, point to the conclusion that he was not a business commonwealth 
corporatist.162 
D. Berle’s Reply: “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” 
One could imagine a number of ends to this story. For instance, Berle could 
have explained his position in a congenial manner, highlighting the similarities of his 
arguments with those of Dodd and explaining their differences as not so dissimilar 
after all. But this never happened. Instead, Berle’s biographer explains that Berle was 
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outraged by Dodd’s accusation that he was a conservative, writing: “Dodd’s real 
crime was making Berle seem like a Tory in the midst of an American revolution.”163 
Imagine how agonizing it must have been for the sometimes pompous Berle to 
endure such an affront on the eve of the release of his crowning achievement, which 
was to be (by his design) his coming-out party into the world of the left-leaning 
intellectual elites of America.164 Berle had expected a managerialist attack from 
conservatives, who would rhetorically defend the status quo ante of managerial 
discretion, but he did not expect to be accused of being a conservative. Dodd was 
probably equally surprised that Berle’s reply was left-leaning. This family feud of the 
left exposed Berle’s argument as being less than ideal, based on the weak assumption 
that the interests of absentee owners would make management more accountable, 
while also exposing Dodd’s corporate responsibility argument as being naively 
trusting of corporate managers.165 
To address Dodd’s criticism and, one surmises, to defend his own reputation 
and exact a little revenge, Berle elaborated on his main thesis that “all powers granted 
to a corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefits of all 
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the shareholders as their interest appears.” 166  He argued that the present law 
established that managers were required to manage the corporation in the interest of 
its shareholders, and that although many groups, notably labor, were gaining 
recognition as having claims against the corporation (which created legitimate cost to 
industry), the recognition of these costs (which reduced profits) did not alter the main 
objective of the corporate managers.167 Berle continued to fire back at Dodd by 
arguing that the “real justification” for Dodd’s opposition to his thesis stemmed from 
Dodd’s underlying assumption that industrial managers of the day functioned more as 
government officials than as merchants, 168  which Berle tacitly (and spitefully) 
suggested was a foolhardy reason because managers did not see themselves as 
such.169 
Berle did not dispute Dodd’s suggestion that the corporation needed to be 
accountable to the wider polity.170 This concession probably shocked Dodd because it 
was a slippery slope, which opened the door to the primacy of the public interest over 
property rights. This is an argument that a clever and conservatively minded liberal, 
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like Dodd accused Berle of being, would never make. After making clear his colors, 
Berle then went on the attack, clarifying with slightly condescending undertones that 
managers did wield immense (government-like) power over society, but did not 
regard themselves as stewards of society and did not assume social responsibilities.171 
And to make matters worse, no mechanism existed to enforce the applications of 
Dodd’s pseudo-theory of the corporation.172 Furthermore, if the fiduciary obligation 
of mangers to shareholders was ignored, then the management and control173 would 
become “for all practical purposes absolute”—resulting in greater corporate 
irresponsibility. 174  Therefore, until such time as Dodd (or any others who 
sympathized with the noble manager) was prepared to offer a “clear and reasonable 
enforcement scheme of responsibilities,” emphasis would have to be placed on the 
fact that the corporation’s sole purpose was to make profits for their shareholders. 
This was because there existed no other legal control over corporate power, however 
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imperfect it may be.175 Berle emphasized that shareholder primacy was the best 
option available to take “responsibility for control of national wealth and incomes” in 
a manner that properly protected the majority of the community.176  
Berle provided an echo of his corporate-liberal revolution by arguing that the 
only way to slip public interest through the backdoor of what today’s observer would 
call corporate governance was through the shareholder primacy model. Berle noted 
that the working and middle classes were ever-more populating the American 
shareholder class and thus the construction of shareholder interests ought not be 
characterized as the interests of greedy profiteers, but as the interests of the average 
American. Admittedly, he does not come right out with this argument, but he did hint 
at its potential, writing: 
The administration of corporations—peculiarly, a few hundred large 
corporations—is now the crux of American industrial life. Upon the 
securities of these corporations has been erected the dominant part of 
the property system of the industrial east. A major function of these 
securities is to provide safety, security, or means of support for that 
part of the community which is unable to earn its living in the normal 
channels of work or trade. Under cover of that system, certain 
individuals may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of wealth. 
But this is an incident to the system and not its major premise; 
statistically, it plays a relatively minor part. Historically, and as a 
matter of law, corporate managements have been required to run their 
affairs in the interests of their security holders.177 
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In his conclusion, Berle reiterated that the law could not surrender the present 
fiduciary controls over management before the social sciences could more adequately 
explain the corporate form in a manner that could frame a substantial reform of 
corporate law, noting that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening periods 
of chaos,”178 but would only respond to new outcomes or theories as they were 
established.179 He foresaw that social theorists would guide the establishment of a 
revised institutional design of American society, and that at this point, the law could 
play a role stabilizing expectations and relations between stakeholders as they 
emerged.180 But until such a time, lawyers were in a position where they needed legal 
tools to meet day-to-day situations. The fiduciary duty of management to 
shareholders was presently the best legal tool they had to control corporate 
behavior.181 And as it stood, the shareholder primacy model worked as a method to 
ensure public interest, if envisaged in the correct manner. 
Berle punctuated his reply to Dodd, declaring that “it is one thing to say that 
the law must allow for such developments. It is quite another to grant uncontrolled 
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power to corporate managers in the hope that they will produce that development.”182 
Berle’s bad-natured reactions aside, he focused his attack on what Dodd had actually 
attempted to accomplish in his article, namely weakening the fiduciary obligations of 
managers to shareholders before social theorists could rationalize the modern 
corporation in a manner that could be adopted by law. Berle did so because he 
thought that the application of Dodd’s argument would result in a carte blanche for 
corporate irresponsibility, and because Dodd did not appreciate what Berle was 
attempting to accomplish with shareholder primacy. 
In sum, Berle argued clearly that shareholders’ fiduciary controls over 
management could not be abandoned by lawyers until a new order emerged. He noted 
that “legal technique [did] not contemplate intervening periods of chaos,” but would 
only respond to new outcomes or theories as they were established.183 Berle’s 
argument in the 1932 article mirrored the missing passages from the 1931 article 
(which were published in The Modern Corporation and Private Property). He argued 
that social science needed to better guide the legal understanding of the evolving 
corporate form and that only after this was done could the law play a role in the 
emerging new order.184 Without providing hints as to what sort of reforms might be 
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implemented, Berle emphasized that lawyers needed new legal tools to bring 
corporate behavior under greater control.185  
E. Berle’s Reluctance in “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” 
One question may be nagging the reader at this point: Why did Berle not take 
the time to write a more thorough response to Dodd? If Berle had more to say about 
the future regulation of corporations and how the shareholder primacy argument was 
merely to be an interim solution before adoption of planners’ corporatism, why did he 
not present it in the Harvard Law Review? The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property was merely weeks away from release, and his 1932 article could have been 
a great support for the book’s launch, which Berle so desperately wanted to be a 
success. And yet, Berle’s response can be interpreted as guarded. One answer may be 
that Berle was irritated by Dodd’s reply, firing off an emotional response rather than a 
thoughtful clarification of his position. Another possibility is that he feared alienating 
Brandeis-style antitrust advocates. But William W Bratton and Michael L Wachter 
provide a more provocative alternative. They write: 
We suspect he thought that the timing was wrong. The battle between 
his progressive vision of corporatism and business commonwealth 
corporatism was taking place behind closed doors. Berle wanted to 
ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would be adopted by 
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the Roosevelt Administration and presumably was jealous to protect 
his influence.186 
They note that Raymond Moley, a colleague at Columbia University, lured 
Berle away from full-time academia in 1932 by convincing him to join Roosevelt in 
his bid to win the presidency.187 But the authors are vague as to when this offer was 
made, writing only: it was “early in [Roosevelt’s] 1932 presidential campaign.”188 
The argument calls for more precision. If a connection is to be established between 
Berle’s reply to Dodd and Berle’s Roosevelt years, pinpointing months matters. So to 
be more exact, Berle was aware that he would be functioning in his new position as a 
political advisor for a presidential candidate in May.189 Dodd published his reply to 
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Berle on May 8, 1932,190 and Berle fired back his reply to Dodd after that date in the 
following edition.191 The “New Individual” speech (presented about three months 
later), which was penned by Berle for Roosevelt, clearly established that corporatism 
was on Berle’s mind.192 
The “New Individual” speech argued that citizens had the right to have their 
interest in the economy protected from the irresponsible exercise of corporate power, 
and that the government needed to protect this right.193 As Bratton and Wachter 
explained, this speech called for “government controls” over managerial power so 
that managers would be compelled to “assume responsibility for the public good, end 
their internecine disputes, come together as industrial groups, and cooperate toward a 
common end.”194 If industrial groups failed to do so, the government would make 
them do so.195 
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Berle understood that shareholder primacy was only one manner of enforcing 
the public interest in corporate governance. In 1932, the political landscape was 
shifting. Berle believed that planners’ corporatism, which he endorsed in the last 
chapter of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, was possible if Roosevelt 
won the election and if Berle could convince Roosevelt to see things his way. In sum, 
Berle wanted to ensure that corporate governance could be directed to take into 
consideration the wider polity, and he believed that he had an opportunity to make 
this happen. 
Bratton and Wachter, however, did not get it totally right. The battle behind 
closed doors was not between Berle’s corporatism and business commonwealth 
corporatism. The battle was actually between: (1) his corporatism, and (2) Brandeis-
style antitrust economics.196 The champion of the latter was Felix Frankfurter and his 
acolytes, whom Berle called “the would-be Brandeis followers of today” who “lacked 
the great man’s admirable genius for being both radical and practical.”197 
The tension between Frankfurter and Berle goes back to their time at 
Harvard.198 Frankfurter joined the faculty at Harvard when Berle was in his first year 
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of law school.199 Frankfurter’s biographer describes his chief personality imperfection 
in the following passage: 
Because his self-image was inflated, and because his psychological 
peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not accept 
serious, sustained opposition in fields he considered his domain of 
expertise; he reacted to his opponents with vindictive hostility.200 
When one considers this idiosyncrasy in light of the following passage from Berle’s 
biographer, one begins to appreciate how a young Berle would be particularly 
irritating to Frankfurter: 
Later in life neither man cared to discuss the other, and there are only 
snippets of stories concerning their Harvard years. Yet, what emerges 
is an arrogant young Berle bent on cutting others down to size. The 
young Adolf relentlessly challenged Frankfurter in class, thereby 
making himself an unforgivable embarrassment to the professor. 
According to William O. Douglas, later a Columbia Law School and 
New Deal colleague, in the years following Berle’s enrollment in 
Frankfurter’s course, Berle began attending it for a second year in a 
row. Frankfurter was puzzled and asked Berle if he had taken the 
course the previous year. Berle replied affirmatively and Frankfurter 
asked, “Then why are you back?” “Oh,” Berle responded, “I wanted to 
see if you had learned anything since last year.” Another story had a 
vengeful Frankfurter blocking the young Berle from making the Law 
Review.201 
From one perspective, Frankfurter’s animosity was understandable. From 
another, it was not. It is difficult to image a pupil exhibiting such disrespect for a 
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professor without inciting disciplinary action. But for Frankfurter to personally 
retaliate against the immature Berle (remember Berle started law school three or four 
year earlier than most students), thereby exhibiting transparent signs of vindictiveness 
to a poorly adjusted (yet arrogant) student might be seen as unprofessional. 
Putting this relationship into relevant context, Roosevelt strategically divided 
his advisors so that no one camp within his ranks enjoyed the position of privileged 
insider,202 thus creating a competitive decision-making process. Berle and Frankfurter 
fit this mold because any decision-making process that involved both men could be 
nothing less than competitive. While on the campaign trail before Berle had written 
the “New Individual” speech, Roosevelt invited Frankfurter’s opinion regarding 
policy development. Berle’s biographer writes: “Felix Frankfurter’s intrusion into the 
campaign [was] intolerable. Aside from his old personal animus to the Harvard law 
professor, Berle saw in Frankfurter an ideological adversary—a Brandeisian 
“atomist” who opposed the brain trust consensus on large economic units for 
industrial planning.”203 
Berle warned Roosevelt that he should not give Frankfurter’s “New Freedom” 
speech, which was similar to what Brandeis had drafted for Woodrow Wilson.204 
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Berle thought that Brandeis-style individualism was what the Coolidge and Hoover 
Administrations used as a euphemism for inaction. He argued, “Whatever the 
economic system does permit, it is not individualism.”205 He then advised Roosevelt: 
[I]t is necessary to do for [the American] system what Bismarck did 
for the German system in 1880, as [a] result of conditions not unlike 
these . . . . Otherwise only one of two results can occur. Either [the] 
handful of people who run the economic system now will get together 
making an economic government which far outweighs in importance 
the federal government; or in their struggles they will tear the system 
to pieces. Neither alternative is sound national policy.206 
Berle pressured Roosevelt to make a “pronouncement” arguing for “public 
collective planning.”207 Berle suggested to Roosevelt that this pronouncement “would 
probably make at once [Roosevelt’s] place in history and [have] political significance 
vastly beyond the significance of [his] campaign.”208 Five weeks later, Roosevelt 
gave the “New Individualism” speech, which Berle named in order to contrast 
Frankfurter’s old freedom mantra and to make the statement that he had 
countermanded Frankfurter’s attempts to make individualism a core principle of the 
campaign.209 
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The antipathy between Berle and Frankfurter helps explain why Berle did not 
defend his ideas as strongly as he could have against Dodd. Indeed, the timing was 
wrong. But the battle was not between his corporatism and business commonwealth 
corporatism, it was between his vision and Frankfurter’s vision. As far as the business 
commonwealth corporatism model, no evidence exists that Frankfurter, or others in 
the democratic camp, directly advocated it. Furthermore, Berle did want, as Bratton 
and Wachter put it, “to ensure his vision of corporatism was the one that would be 
adopted by the Roosevelt Administration.” 210  He “was jealous to protect his 
influence,”211 but not from his few members of the brain trust at the time (Moley, 
Rexford Tugwell, and James Warburg), rather from his old nemesis—Felix 
Frankfurter. 
From the outset of joining Roosevelt’s campaign, Berle would probably have 
known that Frankfurter had been informally advising Roosevelt from the time that 
Roosevelt was Governor of New York State,212 and that at some point Frankfurter 
would be called in to assume a similar role during this campaign. Furthermore, 
Frankfurter was Brandeis’s protégé, and Berle knew the ideological connection 
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between Frankfurter and Brandeis.213 So Berle, being a former student of Frankfurter 
and a young lawyer for a year at Brandeis’s law firm, would have known that a battle 
was coming. He also would have known the position that Frankfurter would be 
espousing to Roosevelt. Here, Berle had an advantage because he knew Frankfurter’s 
plan of action, but Frankfurter was blind to Berle’s. Berle’s biographer sets the scene 
in the following passage: 
Both men were anxious to succeed and there developed between them 
a strong animus that would ripen into the bitterest and most ideological 
of New Deal rivalries . . . the issue between them being whether the 
antitrust laws should be used to break up big corporations and restore 
the competition [Frankfurter’s view] or whether big corporations were 
the products of natural economic forces and should be controlled 
through federal regulation [Berle’s view].214 
Berle would have appreciated that he had an ace up his sleeve, being that his 
planners’ corporatism pitch to Roosevelt was unknown to Frankfurter. It is easy to 
imagine Berle wanting to write a much different reply to Dodd, outlining planners’ 
corporatism, but Berle had not won the ideological struggle with Frankfurter by the 
time that Berle fired back his reply to Dodd.215 Berle must have felt that it was too 
risky to reveal his position in the Harvard Law Review (Frankfurter’s backyard). 
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Berle could have foreseen the “vindictive” Frankfurter not only being aware of, but 
also enjoying, Dodd’s reply to Berle on the eve of the much-anticipated release of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle must have figured that 
publishing a full disclosure to Frankfurter of how he would advise Roosevelt in the 
coming months would not be worth the possibility of Frankfurter winning the opinion 
of Roosevelt on this issue at such a critically sensitive moment in American history. 
Having a hand in the future course of American society at a time when it was on the 
verge of economic collapse raised the stakes so high that Berle had to play his cards 
close to his chest. 
F. A Final Word From Berle and Dodd 
In the end, Dodd rejected his original arguments from the debate. In a 1942 
book review, Dodd expressed regret for taking the position that he did in the debate, 
reflecting: 
I was rash enough to suggest that our law of business 
corporations . . . might develop a broader view which would make the 
proposition that corporate managers are, to some extent, trustees for 
labor and for the consumer more than meaningless rhetoric. The legal 
difficulties which were involved were clear enough, as Mr. A. A. Berle 
was quick to point out.216 
                                                      
216 Dodd, Book Review, supra note 161. 
 
 
 
 161 
On the other hand, Berle never made such a concession.217 Even when 
confronted by contemporaries for his apparent shift in opinion without sufficient 
explanation, 218  he denied he ever made concessions, claiming that others 
misunderstood his writing. 219  Hopefully, revisiting the Berle–Dodd debate has 
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clarified Berle’s position, rectifying the long-held misunderstanding of his 
shareholder primacy argument. 
V. THE RISE OF FINANCE, BERLE, AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
A. Commoditization, Financialization, and Society 
Commoditization means to treat something as though it were a product that 
could be bought and sold. Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time tells the story of a critical point in the 
commoditization of English society.220 It describes how peasant farmers were evicted 
from land that was communally used for generations and then were forced to accept 
harsh factory work. In other words, Polanyi explains the result of transforming the 
natural environment and the traditional ways of life of a people into commodities 
(property and labor)221 and harnessing these commodities to the price mechanism in 
order to create a new social order. 222  Although Polanyi regarded this social 
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experiment as a “stark utopia,”223 others disagreed, arguing that it was an essential 
step in the birth of modern society.224 
The financialization of society has much in common with this story of The 
Great Transformation. Financialization is an evolution of the commoditization 
process that Polanyi contemplated. Financialization holds great potential benefits for 
society by dispersing risk throughout society; however, it is also dangerous because it 
makes society more complex to manage by creating layers of interconnected markets 
for commodities. Maybe the best example of such financialization is the operation of 
derivatives.  
B. Some Questions and Answers on Berle’s Shareholder Primacy and Today’s Rise of 
Finance 
Can corporate legal scholarship contribute to a better understanding of 
financialization? On one hand, stocks are different from other exchangeable 
instruments in the sense that only shares have rights attached to them that grant 
shareholders power within corporate governance.225 Yet many shareholders treat 
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stocks much the same as they would other exchangeable instruments: “buy, hope, 
hold, and cash in.”226 In other words, they do not participate in corporate governance 
directly. As with financialization, the existence of stocks creates two worlds: the 
market world (stock markets) and the social world (the corporation’s social 
relationship227 or “nexus of contracts”228). For these reasons, events in corporate 
governance that are affected by stock price and passive investors are comparable to 
the phenomena of financialization. 
Do Berle’s thoughts provide insight on today’s financialization? The answer is 
yes, but in considering today’s political economy, Berle would likely want to revisit 
three of his more antiquated positions. 
First is that government was capable of determining the course of the 
economy and that it could enforce this course.229 Modern governance theory resists 
the sort of heavy-handed government interference that Berle envisioned, preferring to 
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relegate government to steering market actors toward targeted ends without dictating 
the means by which market actors achieve these ends.230 And yet, Berle believed in a 
responsible exercise of private economic power in harmony with public authority, 
which carried with it the implicit understanding that government would step in to 
protect the public interest as a measure of last resort.231 So, it is possible to interpret 
Berle’s insights in a manner that is not so far from what modern governance theory is 
attempting to do today.232  
Second is that a new theory would resolve the public–private tension trapped 
within corporate theory.233 One could argue that Bratton and Millon have made short 
work of the argument that a theory could have such influence.234 But upon further 
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inspection, it may not be a theory of the firm that resolves this public–private 
tension.235 As will be explained below, there are ever-more frequent examples of the 
“private” corporation adopting roles once reserved for the very “public” welfare state, 
causing what Braithwaite calls the “reality of hybridity between the privatization of 
the public and publicization of the private.”236 
Third is that Berle argued that when a theoretical model of the corporation 
emerged, it would reject classical economic theory and might make the property 
theory of corporations obsolete.237 To date, the winner of the race for a better 
theoretical model of the corporation might be Oliver Williamson and his theory of 
markets, networks, and hierarchies (New Institutional Economic Theory). 238 
Williamson’s work is derived from classical economic theory and is based on the cost 
of exchanging property (transaction cost theory).239 Berle would certainly adjust his 
arguments to compensate for the realities of the modern corporation and governance 
today, but as suggested, at least in some cases, the adjustment need not be that drastic. 
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Taking into account Berle’s body of work covered in this chapter from 1921 
to 1932, it can be concluded that he argued that the shareholder class needed to 
provide something more to the corporation and society than merely creating passive 
investors.240 He envisioned three different ways that the shareholder class could be 
legitimatized: first, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution of profits 
and power to labor;241 second, by being a mechanism for the egalitarian distribution 
of profits and power to the broader American population;242 and third, by attracting 
sophisticated business expertise that could take an active and constructive role in 
managing the corporation toward the creation of a wealthier and more stable 
society.243 Assuming that the shareholder class was legitimatized, he argued that “all 
powers granted to a corporation [ought to be] at all times exercisable only for the 
ratable benefits of all the shareholders as their interest appears” 244  without 
qualification. But Berle did not have complete faith in its legitimacy, admitting that it 
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was a less than fully satisfying interim measure to help eliminate the democratic 
deficit within the American economy.245 
Would Berle still endorse shareholder primacy today? The answer is probably 
not. Consider the three different ways that he believed the shareholder class could 
legitimatize their position within corporate governance. The first was the 
emancipation of labor through worker control of the shareholder class. This never 
happened and is only realizable in one’s imagination today.246 
The second was the egalitarian distribution of profits and power within the 
corporation through broader shareholder distribution. Today, the middle- and lower-
wage workers that invest in shares generally do so through institutional investors 
(pension funds and mutual funds). These individuals have contracted away their 
rights, allowing that institutional investors can participate in corporate governance on 
their behalf with few exceptions.247 In terms of profit, what these “shareholders” gain 
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through such investments, they may be losing through pension privatization.248 Thus, 
the egalitarian distribution of profits and power has not lived up to Berle’s high 
hopes. 
The third can be posed as a question: Can today’s greater shareholder 
empowerment lead to the sort of active and constructive roles for management that 
Berle had in mind? In other words, can good decisions in the financial world translate 
into good decisions in the social world? The answer to this question is less than clear 
and invites debate. Yet, this tension is healthy249 because private entrepreneurs and 
public lawmakers need to be reminded that the gaps between markets and society 
must be bridged as they create the new hybrid regulatory mechanisms of tomorrow.250 
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C. The Hybrid Regulatory Mechanisms of Tomorrow: Bridging the Gaps Between 
Markets and Society 
As will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5, the privatization of public 
services251 and the use of meta-regulation252 demonstrate how governments have 
placed the day-to-day regulation of public interest in the hands of private actors. 
Business readily accepts these government gifts when they are granted, and rightly so. 
Business wants the profits from managing segments of the public sector. It also wants 
to self-regulate in order to achieve flexibility and a competitive edge. At the same 
time, investors want to capitalize on a full menu of investment opportunities that are 
only limited by the capacity of the imagination of the financial engineers of Wall 
Street and the Square Mile. 
These private actors may soon learn that there is a darker side to privatization 
and financialization. Private actors and governments are blurring the line between 
government responsibility and private freedoms. This blurring of traditional roles is 
shifting some of the underlying assumptions about how society ought to be governed. 
Letting markets regulate society was supposed to fix the problems of political 
organization by removing government from governance.253 But when the power of 
                                                      
251 Aman, supra note 230 at 802-04. 
252 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 230 at 1-29. 
253 Hayek, supra note 224. 
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the market is unleashed, it can create as much vice as virtue.254 Thus, the shift to the 
market may have solved some problems of political organization, but as the credit 
crisis demonstrated, it has also created new problems of market organization. 
The problems associated with social organization, whether political or market 
based, will never go away. The shift to the market has resulted in two things. One is a 
transfer of power from the state to private actors. The other is confusion over whether 
public or private actors are responsible for areas in which there have been these 
transfers of power. As governments scramble to get away from welfare state 
obligations, investors and business actors gamble that they will be able to profit from 
these traditional areas of public interest without attracting greater social 
responsibilities. But a sober look at what is occurring today leads one to believe that 
this gamble is a bad bet for private interests in the long term. Fundamental changes in 
the public–private distinction are occurring, and private actors are being lured into a 
precarious situation. 
What is this precarious situation? It is the circumstances in which private 
actors may find themselves if there is a swing in public opinion. To explain, Polanyi 
argued that there is a “double movement” within society in which people eventually 
                                                      
254 For the theory of how markets create virtue and vice, see John Braithwaite, 
Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 3-15 
[Braithwaite, Markets in Vice]. 
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refuse to tolerate the market overwhelming other social needs.255 Simon Deakin has 
emphasized the opposite side of the “double movement.” He explains that when 
social needs overwhelm the needs of the market, then there is a backlash from 
business interests.256 If this “double movement” exists, then there will be a constant 
tension between favoring the needs of markets and the needs of society. According to 
Deakin, the pendulum is now swinging toward the needs of markets,257 but if Polanyi 
is correct, this shift will not be permanent. 
As these swings occur, New Institutional Economics suggests that institutions 
and organizations will not remain the same, but will evolve in correspondence with 
these swings.258 As the pendulum’s weight swings, the pendulum’s pivot shifts as 
well, thus the weight never returns to precisely the same point. In other words, if 
Polanyi’s “double movement” is right again (as it was in 1944), and the primacy of 
the political over the economic is once again restored, there will be no welfare state 
                                                      
255  For a detailed commentary on the double movement, see Fred Block, 
“Introduction” in Polanyi, supra note 220, xviii at xxiii-xxvii. 
256 Deakin, supra note 9. 
257 Deakin argues that the rise of finance “takes many forms,” including: hostile 
takeover bids, private-equity deals, hedge-fund activism, rise in stock-market values 
relative to national wealth, the use of shareholder-value metrics to measure corporate 
performance, stock-based remuneration, and the shifting boundary between the public 
and private sectors. See ibid at 67-68. 
258  Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 92-106. 
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welcoming the swing back, nor will there be a classic twentieth-century public–
private divide to protect the interest of capital. What is unnerving about this 
precarious situation is that the permutations of how it could be mismanaged 
dramatically dwarf the potential productive ways it could be managed. One thing is 
for certain: the smaller the gap between the needs of markets and the needs of society, 
the easier it will be for the swing to be managed prudently. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it is suggested that a more robust dialectic about the pros and cons of 
the rise of finance is needed in order to properly deal with the present developments 
and their potential impacts on markets and society. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
Berle’s insights into the possibilities for, and limitations of, shareholder primacy offer 
a starting point for a more nuanced conversation about how today’s investors can 
attempt to meet the challenges of governance in a manner that protects both their own 
interests and the interests of society. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PLACE OF CORPORATE LAWMAKING IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of “embeddedness” can be traced to Karl Polanyi’s The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.1 The book is a 
history of the commoditization of English society from the eighteenth century 
forward, recounting how markets became unstitched from the fabric of society. As 
markets became more distinct from everyday life, society began to change in order to 
meet trending economic needs. One example of this transformation was the enclosure 
of English farmlands and the end of the ancient system of farming on land that was 
considered free for the use of all. This created a radical disruption in social function. 
Without farmland, thousands were forced to move to sites of industrial production, 
generating a radical shift in society from traditional agrarian life to one that was 
dominated by factory work. In other words, Polanyi’s book explains how markets 
became disembedded from society and then how these disembedded markets altered 
social activities as they became re-embedded into market function.2 
Polanyi never believed that society could become completely embedded 
within the market function, concluding that society’s members would never tolerate a 
                                                      
1 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time, 2d ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).  
2 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness” (1985) 91 Am Jour Soc 481 at 482. 
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market function which completely overwhelmed their social needs. This resistance to 
market pressures is what Polanyi called the “double movement.”3 Simon Deakin has 
elaborated on Polanyi’s idea of the double movement, explaining how it also operates 
in reverse.4 In other words, market actors will resist projects for greater equality when 
these social demands compromise market functionality. The balance between 
favoring the needs of markets with the needs of society has fluctuated throughout the 
twentieth century.5 According to Deakin, the pendulum is swinging toward the 
modern economy’s increased need for markets as societal governance has become 
ever more closely tied to the expectations of investors. 6  Today, certainly, the 
pendulum appears to be swinging in a different yet still unknown direction.7 
In his seminal article of 1985, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness,” Mark Granovetter elaborated upon Polanyi’s 
disembedded market theory and expanded it into a more complete (and complex) 
                                                      
3  For a detailed commentary on the double movement, see Fred Block, 
“Introduction” in Polanyi, supra note 1 xviii at xxiii-xxvii.  
4 Simon Deakin, “The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What 
Might Stop It? A Comment on ‘Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality 
and Democracy’ by Sanford Jacoby” (2008) 30 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 67 at 67-69. 
5 Block, supra note 3 at xxvii-xxvix. 
6 See Deakin, supra note 4 at 67-68.  
7 See Lawrence E Mitchell, “Financialism: A Lecture Delivered at Creighton 
University School of Law” (2009) 43 Creighton L Rev 323. 
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sociological theory of how embedded social behavior affects economic institutions.8 
Granovetter argued that to adequately study economic institutions, like corporations, 
one must take into consideration how the behavior of such institutions is “constrained 
by ongoing social relations.” 9  Granovetter’s central contention was that when 
economic reasoning ignores an institution’s social embeddedness, such reasoning is 
blinded to the actual social relationships within it and, accordingly, it is unlikely one 
will be able to understand how a particular institution functions (or fails to 
function).10  
Granovetter’s call to scrutinize the social relationships that affect an 
organization’s function has been seen as a sociological plea explaining why 
institutions behave as they do. He criticized the assumptions of New Institutional 
Economics by highlighting how actual social networks inside and outside of the 
corporation operate in ways that handcuff economic thought. Specifically, 
Granovetter took issue with Oliver Williamson’s theory of transaction costs, arguing 
that while there was a certain analytical value to Williamson’s eventually highly 
                                                      
8 Granovetter, supra note 2. 
9 Ibid at 482. 
10 Ibid at 481-82. 
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influential market/hierarchy model of the corporation,11 it remained blind to the social 
reality of corporate function.12  
Up until now, Granovetter has served as something of a connector between 
Polanyi’s efforts and current ongoing investigations into the concept of 
embeddedness.13 Certainly, the new interest in economic sociology and its relevance 
in bridging discourses in sociology, legal theory, and political economy14 contributes 
to a better understanding of the merits and boundaries of “economic governance;”15 
something of particular importance at a time of fundamental readjustments to the 
financial credo of the last two decades.  
                                                      
11  See Oliver E Williamson, “The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, 
Attributes” (1981) 19 J Econ Literature 1537 [Williamson, “The Modern 
Corporation”]; Oliver E Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock, Looking Ahead” (2000) 38 J Econ Literature 595 [Williamson, “New 
Institutional Economics”]; Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess, “Law, Economics 
and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives” 
(Osgoode Hall L Sch Comp Res in L & Pol Econ Res Paper Series, Paper No 
10/2010, 2010) online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595158>. 
12 Granovetter, supra note 2, at 493-504. 
13 Jens Beckert, “The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and 
the New Economic Sciology” (Max Planck Inst for the Study of Societies, Discussion 
Paper No 07/1, 2007) online: <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp07-1.pdf>. 
14  Jens Beckert & Wolfgang Streeck, Economic Sociology and Political 
Economy: A Pragmatic Perspective” (Max Planck Inst for the Study of Societies, 
Working Paper, 08/4, 2008) online: <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-4.pdf>. 
15 Zumbansen & Calliess, supra note 11. 
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Legal theory itself reflects the early beginnings of such critical engagement 
with an exclusively economistic bias. John Dewey, in a famous inquiry into the law’s 
constitution of the corporation, 16 identified the law as a powerful tool with the ability 
to take an abstract idea (such as the suggestion that the corporation was a “person”) 
and transform it into something more concrete and real (by, for example, granting a 
corporation the right to contract or equipping it with constitutional protections). Such 
legal reification, according to Dewey, shapes how people think about a corporation. 
As a consequence, this reification also shapes people’s behavior within, and in 
relation to, corporations.  
An important strand in studies on embeddedness and comparative variations 
in national political economies around the world has been to focus on different forms 
of market organization.17 Central to such inquiries has been the analysis of the 
particular dynamics of reform politics that often emerged against the background of 
historically evolved path-dependencies.18 Similarly, sociologists have long focused on 
sites where law is produced as “sites of contestation” between influential groups 
attempting to maintain or change the embedded patterns of social relationships. In 
                                                      
16 John Dewey, “The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality” 
(1926) 35 Yale LJ 655. 
17 Peter A Hall & David Soskice, eds, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
18 John W Cioffi, “Restructuring ‘Germany Inc.’: The Politics of Company and 
Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union” (2002) 24 Law & Pol’y 
355. 
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“Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon,” Karl Mannheim detailed how preferences 
become entrenched or embedded within society through social processes like 
lawmaking and, in particular, through the competitive actions between influential 
social groups within these social processes.19 From this perspective, Mannheim can 
be seen as providing a promising approach for connecting Polanyi’s and 
Granovetter’s ideas of embeddedness with Dewey’s understanding of the legal 
reification of business ideas. Building upon this connection of ideas, Mannheim’s 
article explores one of the most important sites of contestation between influential 
business groups; namely, the place that has historically triumphed in attracting the 
highest number of Fortune 500 business incorporations in America: Delaware – 
America’s regulatory laboratory for de facto “national” corporate law.   
The social process of how preferences become entrenched or embedded 
within American corporate charters is of particular importance to understanding such 
behavior within the American corporation. If Dewey was correct and the law shapes 
the behavior of actors within the business world, then the corporate charter and its 
bylaws form essential tools in this process. They form the foundational contract of the 
corporation, establishing the distribution of wealth and power between its members 
and. Although the charter and bylaws do not dictate all social relations within the 
                                                      
19 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti, ed 
(London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) at 197-98. 
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corporation, they do set a standard for expectations for social relations and are 
influential in the embedding process. 
This chapter provides a history of the legal debates over corporate charters in 
the American context beginning with a famous dispute that originated in a series of 
contesting law review articles in the 1970s. A brief literature review will recount the 
academic arguments that have provided the intellectual support for sustaining 
Delaware’s primacy over corporate lawmaking in the face of constant attack. By 
understanding the debates that have sustained Delaware’s ability to lead the American 
competition for incorporation, this chapter provides insight into what is regarded as 
the most important legal instrument for maintaining status quo for actual social 
relationships within the American corporation: the “market for incorporation.” 
However, this chapter will also draw attention to the growing skepticism over 
Delaware’s ability to consistently legislate optimal corporate law. This skepticism is 
most clearly evident in the federal government’s growing willingness to design and to 
pursue corporate law policies in the face of corporate governance scandal, 
notwithstanding the fact that corporate law in the United States is governed by the 
states. The consequences of these developments are subject to much discussion and 
debate. In sum, this chapter provides an example of how shifts in lawmaking 
networks outside of the firm demand the potential to shift the embeddedness of the 
behavior of social relationships inside the firm.   
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II. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
During the American republic’s early decades, state legislatures restricted the 
rights of corporate action by scrutinizing petitions for incorporation just as they 
would any other piece of legislation.20 In theory, democratic representatives granted 
incorporation only if it served the public interest, but healthy skepticism should be 
reserved for anyone who claims that this was always the case.21 Restrictions on the 
corporation were severe by today’s standards; for instance: 1) a corporation could not 
accumulate more than a set amount of capital;22 2) a corporation’s life was usually 
fixed to the time required to finish the task(s) that it was incorporated to 
accomplish;23 3) a corporation could not engage in activities that were not explicitly 
                                                      
20 For the boundaries of government’s authority over incorporation, especially 
after the corporate charter was issued by the state, see Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 (1819). For greater detail, see David Millon, 
“Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 1990 Duke LJ 201 at 206-10. 
21 David Sciulli, Corporations vs. The Court: Private Power, Public Interests 
(Boulder: L. Rienner, 1999) at 85 (arguing that each request for incorporation was 
subject to the same lobbying and debate as any other bill, including “power plays, 
personal intrigues and local favoritism”). 
22 For a thorough collection of references to specific legislation from the 19th 
century, see Liggett Co v Lee, 288 US 517 at 550-54 (1933) (Brandeis, J, dissenting) 
[Lee]. 
23 Ibid at 555. 
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defined in the terms of its incorporation;24 and 4) a corporation’s business activities 
could not extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it was incorporated.25   
Yet in spite of such limitations, the corporation was still a coveted investment 
vehicle. One reason for this was that the status of shareholders was a rare and 
prestigious privilege. 26  However, it would be misleading to conclude that this 
investment vehicle was desired merely because it offered a degree of social status. 
The main attraction to the corporation was more likely the limited liability protection 
it offered to businessmen27 and the opportunities for power and profits which large 
“public interest” projects presented.28 
                                                      
24 Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 US (13 Pet) 519 at 588 (1839) (holding that since 
the powers conferred on the corporation can be no greater than state power, which 
granted the incorporation, the firm had no authority to operate outside the state). 
25 Ibid. 
26 James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of 
the United States, 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970) at 
14, 25, 28.  
27 Morton J Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of Corporate 
Theory” (1985) 88 W Va L Rev 173 at 208-09 (arguing that although the common 
law had evolved to the point of presuming limited liability, state legislatures enacted 
legislation to extend their shareholder liability a bit further than the value of their 
share). 
28 Millon, supra note 20 at 207 (arguing that there was fear that the potential for 
power and wealth associated with incorporation caused Americans to fear that such 
organizations could threaten the opportunity of others to enter the market; adding 
that, as a result, governments rarely confer monopoly privileges).  
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By the Panic of 1857,29 Americans had endured a depression, multiple stock 
market crashes, and witnessed what was perceived to be the floundering public 
management of large interstate canal projects. These events provoked a profound shift 
of public opinion regarding the relationship between public and private power in 
American society. 30  People began viewing government intervention in private 
transactions less as a means of securing liberty and more in terms of restricting it. 
Public authorities found themselves faced with a public that demanded justification 
for why the corporation must be a servant of public interest and, more importantly 
from the individual’s perspective, why private citizens should not use such 
corporations solely for personal advantage in the pursuit of happiness.31 Citizens also 
became less trusting of government discretion in granting incorporations because 
                                                      
29 For more, see generally James L Huston, The Panic of 1857 and the Coming of 
the Civil War (Baton Rouge, La: Louissiana State University Press, 1987); Timothy J 
Riddiough & Howard E Thompson, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Agency, Uncertainty, 
Leverage and the Panic of 1857” (HKIMR Working Paper No 10/2012, 2012) online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042316>.  
30 For more on how the canals fiasco shifted public opinion, see Carter Goodrich, 
Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960); see also Carter Goodrich et al, Canals and 
American Economic Development, ed by Carter Goodrich (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961) at 241, 246-47 (describing what was perceived to be the 
costly financial failures of the nineteenth century canal projects, of which almost 3/4 
of the $188 million invested between 1815 and 1860 came from the public purse). For 
more on how the other mentioned financial crisis affected public opinion, see William 
G Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at 71-75. 
31 Sciulli, supra note 21 at 89. 
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accusations of favoritism and corruption became widespread.32 With these adverse 
changes in public opinion, the government walls that confined corporate behavior 
began to crumble. Emerging state policy began to challenge the long-established 
understanding that the function of the corporation was solely to serve the 
community.33 This shift, in turn, opened the door for the considerably activist U.S. 
Supreme Court to determine that corporations had constitutional rights, protecting 
corporations from the threat of public meddling in their affairs.34 
With the loosening of state policy and advancements in technology, the 
number of incorporations increased exponentially. Professional management teams, 
in turn, were hired more frequently as majority shareholders became less commonly 
involved in the corporation’s day-to-day management. 35  These radical 
transformations created a flood of new and complex issues into state courts – 
                                                      
32 Hurst, supra note 26 at 33-36, 136. 
33  Gregory A Mark, “The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law” (1987) 54 U Chicago L Rev 1441 at 1447 (arguing that changes in 
state law incorporation policies “eliminated any notion that incorporation was a 
special grant from the state, even the public nature of a corporation’s purpose could 
be called into doubt”). 
34 Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co, 118 US 394 (1886) [Santa 
Clara]. For a detailed understanding of the case and a detailed argument regarding the 
fallout from this case in America, see Horwitz, supra note 27. For a contrasting point 
of view, see Millon, supra note 20. 
35 Sciulli, supra note 21 at 90. 
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necessitating the call for legal clarity.36 This inspired the creation of specific state 
judiciaries to oversee corporate practice.37 Willing jurisdictions (in particular, New 
Jersey and Delaware) customized regulatory environments to attract those 
businessmen shopping for the most advantageous jurisdiction to incorporate their 
businesses.38 Such states also began to adopt new management-friendly legislation, 
mostly because the franchise taxes, fee revenues, and taxation on extra business 
opportunities (which followed incorporation) filled state coffers.39  
Beginning in the mid-1800s, a gradual loosening of government policy 
occurred. For example, in 1846, New York started a trend in state reform which 
blocked the legislature from creating corporations by special act, except in the rare 
case where the objectives for devising the corporation could not be attained under 
                                                      
36 Hurst, supra note 26 at 82-83. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Federalism and The Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law” (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 1435 at 1443 
(describing the pressures and incentives, which started jurisdiction competition for 
incorporation) [Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation”]; William L Cary, 
“Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale LJ 663 
at 669-70 (arguing that state competition has led to a “a race for the bottom” in terms 
of the standards for corporate governance – in particular to the disadvantage of 
shareholders).  
39 Curtis Alva, “Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency” (1990) 15 Del J Corp L 885 at 888; Cary, supra note 38 at 668-69; John C 
Coffee, Jr, “The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New 
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards” (1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 759 
at 762. 
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general law. 40  In addition, in 1867, the U.S. Congress expanded bankruptcy 
protections to include corporations.41 Further, in 1875, New Jersey eliminated the 
restrictions on the corporation’s ability to accumulate capital.42 In 1886, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the private corporation was a legal person entitled to similar 
rights afforded a natural person under the U.S. Constitution, therefore protected by 
the Bill of Rights, which broadly protected the corporations from public authority.43 
New Jersey offered the first standard articles of incorporation for private businesses 
in 1888.44 In one reflexive jerk away from the growing power of the mighty 
corporation, the Sherman Antitrust Act was signed in 1890.45 But still racing forward 
at the state level, in 1896, New Jersey adopted what could be recognized as the first 
modern corporate statutes and, thus, it became the home to the majority of America’s 
largest corporations (a title that Delaware would steal within twenty years).46 In 1910, 
the Supreme Court nullified restrictions on corporate capacity to conduct business 
                                                      
40 NY Const of 1846 art VIII, § 1. 
41 Sciulli, supra note 21 at 91. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See Santa Clara, supra 34; see also generally Horwitz, supra note 27, Millon 
supra note 20. 
44 Roy, supra note 30 at 152-53. 
45 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC § 1 et seq (2006). 
46 Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation”, supra note 38 at 1443. 
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outside the states in which it was chartered.47 By 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
reflecting on this historical trend toward state competition in corporate law in Liggett 
Co v. Lee,48 expressed concern over how the fear of losing existing state revenue and 
the allure of earning greater state revenue was eroding the diligent construction of 
corporate legal development by replacing it with a permissive consumer product that 
pandered to powerful corporate interests. 
III. THE FIRST WAVE: DRAWING THE DISTINCTION 
In 1974, William Cary reconsidered the trends in federalism and corporate law 
from the nineteenth century forward and declared that modern state corporate law was 
a product of state competition. 49  Most importantly, states were legislatively 
competing to attract incorporation to increase state revenues, creating a dangerous 
“race-to-the-bottom” for corporate governance standards. 50  Cary’s focus quickly 
turned to the by-then leader of this race, Delaware. He opined that Delaware’s 
motivation for its considerably softened stance on corporate governance standards 
was motivated by the state’s budget dependence on revenues from incorporations, 
therefore creating an inversely indebted relationship between the state and those 
                                                      
47 Millon, supra note 20 at 212-13. 
48 Lee, supra note 22 at 557. 
49 Cary, supra note 38 at 666. 
50 Ibid.  
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corporate managers looking to incorporate. This compelled Delaware to offer 
advantageous corporate legal arrangements that allowed managers broad and 
unchecked authority; therefore, corporations were no longer faced with the 
disincentive required to curb less-than-optimal corporate performance.51 Cary argued 
that it was time for the federal government and the judiciary to “import lifting 
standards” that would set a level beyond which corporate standards would not be 
allowed to fall below and “deteriorate.”52 
Three years later, in 1977, Ralph K Winter wrote a reply to Cary’s position 
which by this time had almost universally become endorsed as a matter of fact. In the 
face of this general consensus, Winter boldly rejected Cary’s position arguing that 
state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the shareholders’ 
relationship to the corporation is concerned” and thus corporate governance 
standards, like those of Delaware, “are optimal legal arrangements.”53 Put differently, 
what Cary regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter replaced as a “race-to-the-top.”  
Borrowing from the ideas of Henry G Manne,54 Oliver E Williamson,55 and 
Armen A Alchian,56 Winter constructed an argument which suggested that because 
                                                      
51 Ibid at 668-69. 
52 Ibid at 705. 
53 Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation” (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 251 at 254. 
54 See Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 
73 J Pol Econ 110 [Manne, “Corporate Control”]; see also Henry G Manne, “Our 
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corporations acquired capital by selling bonds and equity, management was therefore 
forced to weigh the interests of such financial actors and instruments.57 Winter 
posited that “the state which ‘rigs’ its code to benefit management will drive debt and 
equity capital away.”58 Furthermore, he argued that, although Cary was correct in 
assessing that managers ultimately had the consumer power to decide which 
jurisdiction to incorporate, managers would not select a jurisdiction that would cause 
their business to: 1) earn lower-than-normal returns; and/or 2) have a higher cost of 
capital.59 On the contrary, managers would select jurisdictions that afforded the 
opposite for the sake of self-preservation. Thus, state competition, also known as the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics” (1967) 53 Va L Rev 259 [Manne, 
“Two Corporation Systems”]. 
55 Oliver E Williamson, “Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm” in Henry 
G Manne, ed, Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities 
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969) 
281 at 281 [Manne, Economic Policy] [Williamson, “Corporate Control”]. 
56 Armen A Alchian & Reuben A Kessel, “Competition, Monopoly, and the 
Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain” in Aspects of Labor Economics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press for Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic 
Research, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962) 157; see also Armen A 
Alchian, “Corporate Management and Property Rights” in Manne, Economic Policy, 
supra note 55, 337; see also Armen A Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777. 
57 Winter, supra note 53 at 289. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
 
 
 190 
charter market, produced an optimal corporate law regime which accurately reflected 
the demands that corporate constituents had for corporate governance.60 
The rationale for the charter market that causes the race-to-the-top can be 
restated as follows: If the corporate legal regime is structured so that management 
cannot maximize the corporate output (profits), debt holders may make it more 
expensive to: 1) hold debt; and 2) raise new debt.61 This corporate legal regime will 
also depress stock price potential thereby making it more expensive to raise new 
capital as well as maintain optimal relations with shareholders and creditors. Such 
underperforming firms will become targets for takeover, and the threat of takeover 
will create a market for managerial control.62 Thus, managers will have ample 
incentive to demand an off-the-rack default statutory model of corporate governance 
that encourages shareholder wealth maximization.63 Since such a default model can 
be assumed to be what managers are shopping for when they select a jurisdiction to 
incorporate, this is what state competition will foster.64 Thus, the charter market 
creates a race-to-the-top. Furthermore, it creates a system of legal innovation that is 
                                                      
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at 290. 
64 Ibid. 
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not compromised by political interference – which would ultimately be the result of 
Cary’s recommendation for federal government intervention.  
With the two sides of the Cary–Winter debate delineated, the stage seemed set 
for the next three decades with the advocates of Cary’s position representing: 1) anti-
managerialism; 2) federal intervention in state competition; and 3) more centralized 
planning, and the advocates of Winter’s position representing: 1) managerialism; 2) 
unfettered state competition; and 3) more decentralized market rationality. 65 
Underpinning both positions was an understanding that the firm was a distinct market 
actor that focused squarely upon finding an optimal solution to the shareholder-
management problem.  
                                                      
65 For more analysis on Winter’s theory, see Roberta Romano, “Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1 JL Econ & Org 225 [Romano, 
“Law as a Product”]; Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1993) [Romano, American Corporate Law]; Stephen M 
Bainbridge, “The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law” (2003) 26 Regulation 
26 [Bainbridge, “Creeping Federalization”]; Leo E Strine, Jr, “Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving 
Corporate America” (2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1759 at 1775 [Strine, “True Corporate 
Republic”]; Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) [Bainbridge, New Corporate 
Governance]. For representatives from the Cary camp, see Melvin A Eisenberg, “The 
Structure of Corporation Law” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1461 at 1508 [Eisenberg, 
“Structure of Corporation Law”]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, “Federalism 
and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers” (1999) 99 
Colum L Rev 1168 at 1170; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, “Vigorous 
Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters” 
(2002) 112 Yale LJ 553; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power” (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 833 [Bebchuk, “Increasing Shareholder 
Power”]. 
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IV. THE SECOND WAVE: EVENT STUDIES AND THE ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE CARY–
WINTER DEBATE 
Winter’s economic analysis of charter markets forced Cary proponents to 
adjust their arguments by taking a more economically sophisticated position. 
Following Winter’s lead, they employed more economically savvy arguments to 
suggest that shareholders (and creditors) had much less control over managers’ 
incorporation preferences in practice than Winter’s charter market theory suggested 
and, thus, the race-to-the-top argument was flawed.66 In response, others became 
inspired to settle this theoretical tit-for-tat debate by engaging in empirical research in 
the form of “event studies.”67 These studies established that many stocks affected by 
the amendments rose in value when the markets learned of the amendments, thereby 
bolstering Winter’s position that state competition was advantageous for 
shareholders. 
Those defending Cary’s position fired back. Melvin Eisenberg rejected these 
event studies, arguing that they had “only limited usefulness” in the context of the 
                                                      
66 Eisenberg, “Structure of Corporation Law”, supra note 65. 
67 Event studies were simply empirical tests which gauged market responses to 
corporate law amendments. See generally Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, “The 
Market for Corporate Charters: ‘Unhealthy Competition’ vs. Federal Regulation” 
(1980) 53 J of Business 259; Romano, American Corporate Law, supra note 65; 
Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, “State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The 
Recent Experience” (1989) 18 Fin Mgmt 29. 
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Cary-Winter debate.68 Specifically, Eisenberg contended that if a uniformly low-
grade corporate law regime existed – as Cary seemed to suggest – then the notice of 
an amendment from “one low-grade regime to another would not be a significant 
event.”69 He also suggested that Delaware’s mature case law increased predictability, 
which helped to countervail potentially suboptimal rules and amendments. More 
importantly, Eisenberg emphasized that other contributory factors may have skewed 
the results of the event studies.70 One example of such factors included packaging 
negative amendments to existing law with positive ones.71 Eisenberg suggested that 
such event studies were limited because the economic analysis was so superficial that 
it could not adequately appreciate the complexity of the American “charter market.”72 
Lucian Bebchuk made similar arguments that suggested how negative information 
can be packaged with positive information in order to maintain or improve stock 
value, while also re-emphasizing that Cary’s position was still correct.73 
                                                      
68 Eisenberg, “Structure of Corporation Law”, supra note 65 at 1508. 
69 Ibid.  
70  Eisenburg posited that such contributing factors were not taken into 
consideration during the event studies. Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid at 1509. 
73 Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation”, supra note 38. 
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Within four years of Eisenberg’s reply, Roberta Romano published what 
would become the landmark statement in support of Winter.74 Aimed at responding to 
Eisenberg’s demand for “deeper economic analysis,”75 Romano employed the lenses 
of: 1) financial risk management within equity markets; 2) agency cost theory; and 3) 
the relational understanding between socio-legal norms and market forces, which – 
taken together – helped to better understand the mechanics of the charter market. In 
the end, this deeper economic analysis led both Eisenberg and Romano closer to a 
centrist position, with Eisenberg leaning toward Cary’s position76  and Romano 
toward Winter’s.77 
V. THE THIRD WAVE: POST-ENRON 
Alas, the debate was not dead. Lucian Bebchuk took Cary’s side and warned 
that state competition encouraged a race-to-the-bottom given the states’ obvious 
inclination to make rules attractive to managers and controllers.78 In 1999, Bebchuk 
and Allen Ferrell illustrated how anti-takeover statutes were inefficient and reduced 
                                                      
74 Romano, American Corporate Law, supra note 65. 
75 See Eisenberg, “Structure of Corporation Law”, supra note 65 (Eisenberg uses 
this language to level his criticism of the superficial nature of the event studies). 
76 Ibid at 1509. 
77 Romano, American Corporate Law, supra note 65 at 148. 
78 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 65. 
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shareholder wealth,79 and illustrated one clear example of how states provided default 
rules that benefited only managers to the detriment of all other constituents, and 
“should lead the many who offer unqualified support of state competition to reassess 
their position.”80 But in 1999, the U.S. economy was hot, the inflation-adjusted 
aggregate output was up, real gross domestic product was up, corporate profits were 
up, employment was up, and everyone was making money. Bebchuk’s concerns were 
inaudible over the sound of investors’ portfolios filling with money. Corporate 
America seemed to be anything but broken.   
All that changed in 2001 when the Enron scandal outraged Americans and 
pulled corporate governance under the microscope.81 In step with this change in 
climate, Bebchuk reiterated his position that the empirical evidence supported the 
view that state competition offered harmful incentives, which privileged managers to 
the detriment of all other corporate constituents.82 Building on this critique, Bebchuk 
went on to argue that Delaware’s position in the charter market was so strong that 
assumptions about the operation of state competition were false. In other words, 
Delaware was more sheltered from the influence of other states’ actions than was 
                                                      
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid at 1199. 
81 See William W Bratton, “Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value” 
(2002) 76 Tul L Rev 1275. 
82 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, “Does the Evidence Favor 
State Competition in Corporate Law?” (2002) 90 Cal L Rev 1775. 
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assumed in the literature, producing suboptimal corporate rules and justifying federal 
intervention.83 
In the summer of 2002, the federal government induced measures to appease 
populist reactions to the Enron scandal. Suddenly, there was a rash movement toward 
Cary’s federal intervention that may have been procedurally pleasing to some 
corporate governance observers, but was ultimately substantively disappointing to 
most. With this came renewed interest in the Cary–Winter debate. 
Mark Roe set out to offer some fresh insight building on Bebchuk’s 
suggestion that Delaware was in fact insulated from state competition, not its 
catalyst.84 Roe concluded that the nature of corporate regulatory competition had been 
“misconceived – and badly so,” arguing that Delaware’s chief competition was never 
other states but, instead, the federal government.85 Other states did not have the 
constitutional authority to trump Delaware’s default rules for corporate governance, 
but the federal government did. In other words, Delaware’s incorporation regime 
existed because the federal government tolerated it. Accordingly, the results of 
corporate law evolution may have been due in part to state competition, but the ever-
looming threat of federal intervention was also a major factor. Which of these two 
                                                      
83 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 65. 
84 Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117 Harv L Rev 588 [Roe, 
“Delaware’s Competition”]. 
85 Ibid at 591. 
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factors affected the evolution of corporate law was difficult to determine because the 
world of Delaware policymaking was opaque.  
Roe further suggested that if the competition between Delaware and the 
federal government was considered when attempting to understand the traditionally 
conceived mechanism of state competition, the state race debate did not play out the 
way charter market analysis had been assuming all along.86 He suggested that a new 
theory was necessary to explain how policy networks forged American corporate law, 
arguing that top-down “centralized strategic” planning had as much responsibility for 
corporate law outcomes as did lateral state competition.87 This would give support to 
the idea that the federal political dimension compromises the narrow quest for solely 
understanding state competition through the assumed model of charter markets as 
constructed during the second wave of the debate. 
In 2003, Stephen Bainbridge took a polarizing position as far to the Winter 
end of the continuum as Bebchuk had taken to Cary’s.88 Bainbridge blasted the 
federalization of corporate law, calling the actions of Congress and other regulators 
“deeply flawed.”89 He argued that, since the Enron scandal, the actions of the federal 
government represented “the most dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power 
                                                      
86 Ibid at 646 
87 Ibid. 
88 Bainbridge, “Creeping Federalization”, supra note 65. 
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over corporate governance since the New Deal.”90 Rejecting the federal reforms as an 
unnecessary encroachment on state jurisdiction, Bainbridge pointed to Romano’s 
event study in support of his claim that state competition, and Delaware’s default 
rules, favored shareholders by maximizing shareholder wealth.91 When addressing 
Bebchuk’s 1999 argument about the negative effects of state competition upon 
shareholder wealth by legislating anti-takeover statutes, his response was, “[S]o 
what? Nobody claims that state competition is perfect.”92 He also proclaimed that 
“even if Bebchuk could prove that state competition is a race-to-the-bottom, basic 
principles of federalism would still counsel against federal preemption of corporate 
law,” because the potential for regulatory innovation would be seriously 
compromised.93 
In 2005, Roe reemphasized that American scholars ought to recognize that the 
presumptions on state competition were skewing their perception, arguing that instead 
of looking at the results of horizontal state competition, observers needed to 
understand when the federal government decided to leave such authority in the hands 
                                                      
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid at 30. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
 
 
 199 
of the states and when it decided to claw back such authority for itself.94 Instead of 
Delaware being the product of market pressures, Roe viewed Delaware as a political 
group with a narrowly-defined range of concerns within the larger policy network of 
corporate law development.95 In this light, Delaware’s policymaking network was 
like a caucus of managers and investors. And within this caucus, Roe deemed that 
managers clearly had the “upper hand” in guiding policy development, but these same 
managers also appeared to exercise self-restraint because they understood “the game 
could move to Washington” if the scales were pushed too far toward managerialism.96  
Also in 2005, Leo E Strine, Jr, Vice Chancellor of Delaware’s Court of 
Chancery, set out to “take some of the mystery out of Delaware’s role in the 
governance of American public corporations.”97 When discussing the politics of state 
competition, however, Strine was noticeably reserved. He alluded to the fact that 
Delaware was and will be in the lead for some time to come in the state race for 
corporate law.98 In defining the boundaries of state competition, he stated that the 
                                                      
94 Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Politics” (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 2491 at 2494 [Roe, 
“Delaware’s Politics”]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid at 2542. 
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issues of competition, labor, trade, and disclosures to public investors were generally 
regulated federally, while Delaware governed the “internal affairs of the 
corporation.”99 He never more than tacitly acknowledged that the federal government 
had full authority to regulate in this area as well.100 In other words, Strine failed to 
directly acknowledge that Delaware’s power was a privilege granted to the state, not a 
constitutional right. Accordingly, Strine does not elaborate on this federal power 
other than to say that present interventions like SOX and the amendments to listing 
requirements were suboptimal reforms. 
In an exchange in the Harvard Law Review, the issue of federal intervention 
in the Delaware caucus was raised once again. Bebchuk argued that managers were 
too powerful and were blocking shareholders from maximizing shareholder value.101 
Accordingly, he asserted that, since managers dominated state law, the federal 
government had to intervene. 102  In response, Strine entertained Bebchuk’s 
proposal, 103  but emphasized that such reform “must emanate from state 
policymakers;”104 Delaware (and not the federal government) ought to be “the 
                                                      
99 Ibid at 674. 
100 Ibid at 686. 
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primary source of substantive corporate law” reform.105 Bainbridge, in his response to 
Bebchuk, did not exhibit any of the potential flexibility that Strine did. He flatly 
rejected Bebchuk’s call for greater shareholder empowerment by arguing that if 
Bebchuk’s proposal could really enhance the value of the firm, why did it not already 
exist? In challenging Bebchuk in this manner, Bainbridge employed a classic 
Winteresque race-to-the-top argument. 106  Bainbridge rejected any changes to 
Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.  
In reply, Bebchuk was somewhat encouraged by Strine’s opinions (although 
he believed they did not extend far enough).107 Bebchuk attacked Bainbridge’s race-
to-the-top argument by referencing a Winteresque argument from 1983, which 
advocated against federal intervention to better regulate insider trading. The 1983 
article argued there was nothing wrong with the existing standards since charter 
competition would have already corrected them if they were suboptimal. This 
example illustrated the error of assuming that state competition already provided 
optimal corporate governance arrangements as Bainbridge suggested. 108  In an 
                                                      
105 Ibid at 1780. 
106 Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment” 
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interesting twist, Bebchuk pointed out that the innovative nature of state competition 
implied state law was subject to improvement in an evolving context.109 Thus, even if 
one assumed Delaware produced optimal corporate law, it did not mean his 
proposition ought to be rejected outright.  
The recent Bebchuk–Strine–Bainbridge debate helps to confirm Roe’s 
observation that the true motivator for shaping corporate governance is the threat of 
federal intervention. Bebchuk’s call for such intervention caused a defense of 
Delaware from both Strine and Bainbridge, and also a willingness on Strine’s part to 
seriously entertain various shareholder empowerment initiatives. This reflects what is 
at stake in these debates over Delaware: the spectrum of embedded relationships 
between public and private power in American society. 
VI. WHAT PLACE DOES DELAWARE RESERVE FOR THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY? A REFLECTION OF BAINBRIDGE 
A. The Delaware Status Quo 
Delaware attempts to enshrine managerialism within American corporate 
governance. Delaware’s defenders have made good use of the race-to-the-top 
argument,110 but recent history challenges whether favoring managerialism is the 
                                                      
109 Ibid at 1808.  
110 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 98-99, 103-04, 192-
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optimal strategy for regulating the corporation. Amidst corporate scandal and 
economic downturns over the past decade, managerialism has garnered much scrutiny 
and created agency issues. The solutions for these agency relationship problems, 
which were inspired by the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling,111 appear 
insufficient to cope with managerial opportunism as well as responsible risk 
management. 
This section explores the writing of one of Delaware’s most loyal defenders: 
Stephen Bainbridge. Bainbridge defends Delaware while simultaneously distancing 
himself from managerialism. Bainbridge claims that American directors are 
undergoing a transformation, becoming more than de facto rubber stamps for 
managerial power.112 He has developed a theory he calls “director primacy,” which 
re-invents the managerialist position in a way that can appeal to both managerialists 
and anti-managerialists. 113  By taking the shareholder–manager dichotomy and 
splitting it into a shareholder–director–manager trichotomy, Bainbridge places 
corporate directors firmly in the middle of the struggle between ownership and 
control. The brilliance of this position is that it personifies what Delaware’s corporate 
law has de jure attempted to enforce since the rise of the modern corporation. The 
                                                      
111  See Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: 
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weakness in Bainbridge’s argument, however, is that history proves that American 
directors have not always lived up to the model of corporate governance.  
If American directors are becoming more loyal to shareholder concerns, then 
director primacy is the driving force in a coup d’état in American corporate 
governance. However, those skeptical of Bainbridge will argue that this shift is not 
occurring and that his director primacy argument is no more than managerialism with 
a twist, albeit a clever twist that distances his position from the criticism of 
managerialism, while still sustaining the status quo in American corporate 
governance. And to a degree this criticism is fair – the ends of Bainbridge’s director 
primacy position are still the same as those of managerialism in one important 
respect: both empower managers, at least until such time as the boards of America’s 
large public corporations start behaving in the manner that Bainbridge projects they 
will.   
Even with federal initiatives to bolster director independence, Bainbridge 
himself acknowledges the Panglossian nature of being optimistic about the present 
potential for director primacy. For example, he fully recognizes the problem of 
directors side-stepping their accountability to important constituents, such as 
shareholders.114 And yet, just under the surface of American corporate law may be 
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another managerial revolution115 which will blur the classic distinctions between 
shareholder–manager and managerialist–anti-managerialist by encouraging the board 
of directors to take their duties more seriously. The director primacy norms may 
cause directors to start standing up to the special interests of managers and protecting 
shareholder interests more diligently. As a result, this may foster a better relationship 
between ownership and control and help resolve some of the serious agency issues 
that exist today. 
B. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy 
The necessary shift in corporate governance, which can make director 
primacy transcend from theory into business reality and become the dominant model, 
will occur when boards of directors become more than mere rubber stamps for CEOs 
and other top executives. Bainbridge claims that this shift has commenced, arguing 
that directors are finally about to seize the mantle of power that corporate law has for 
so long reserved for itself.116 However, until this time, directors have rarely been 
                                                      
115 The first Managerialist revolution occurred with the contractarian shift to “the 
Market” in the 1970s, which resulted in managers shifting their focus away from 
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separated from “managers” in the managerialist forum, and for good reason since 
directors are rarely distinguishable from corporate executives in their decision making 
choices.117 For this reason, beneath Bainbridge’s director primacy lays a contentious 
theory that a functional revolution is occurring in American corporate governance. 
This functional revolution may or may not be happening and is difficult to 
substantiate, but if Bainbridge is correct, then director primacy will mark a historic 
shift in governance away from Chandler’s model of managerialism toward the board-
centered fiat model, which director primacy endorses.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Directors as Nexus of Contracts” (2002) 88 Iowa L Rev 1 (this is an introduction to 
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In promoting director primacy, Bainbridge strongly advocates Delaware’s off-
the-rack default statutory model of corporate governance which protects the board’s 
authority against direct shareholder influence in day-to-day decision making. In fact, 
it has even been suggested that Bainbridge advocates a more pro-board position than 
even Delaware dares.118 He describes how Delaware’s corporate law protects the 
primacy of the directors to govern the corporation, asserting that this doctrinal 
position sits well with prevailing corporate theory.119 In particular, he contends that 
Delaware’s director primacy fits nicely with the contractarian concept of the firm.120 
Bainbridge explains that decision making by fiat, which the board represents, is 
where the nexus of contracts meet and where the decision making power about how 
to manage this nexus is most efficiently allocated.121  
Bainbridge explains that there will always be a need to balance the authority 
and accountability of directors, but the complexities and demands of managing this 
nexus suggest that careful consideration must be taken before limiting the authority of 
                                                      
118  For more detail on this argument, see Brett H McDonnell, “Professor 
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the board. 122  Bainbridge offers a number of arguments for broad directorial 
discretion, 123  possibly providing his best defense of Delaware’s allocation of 
authority to directors (which may be at the expense of greater shareholder 
empowerment). However, if what he contends is true, this broad discretion is 
ultimately in the shareholder’s best interest.  
Although Bainbridge argues that corporate boards do (and should) have final 
authority over decision making, his arguments also align with the shareholder 
primacy position: that such decision making authority must be for the sole benefit of 
shareholders. He justifies this position normatively by using the majoritarian default 
model. This model suggests that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is what 
all stakeholders of the firm ultimately want because default rules that pander to 
management are inefficient, increasing the cost of capital, creating greater 
vulnerability to hostile takeover, and negatively affecting the overall health of the 
corporation. The distinction that Bainbridge makes between director primacy and 
shareholder primacy is that the advocates of shareholder primacy extend their backing 
of shareholder power beyond the shareholder wealth maximization norm by pushing 
                                                      
122 See Stephen M Bainbridge, “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine” (2004) 57 Vand L Rev 83 [Bainbridge, “Business Judgment Rule”]. 
123 For more details on Bainbridge’s relevant arguments, see Bainbridge, New 
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for shareholders to have more direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the firm. 
Director primacy advocates argue only the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  
Putting the collective action problems of a widely dispersed shareholder class 
aside, Bainbridge suggests that directors will more vigilantly care for the firm’s 
wellbeing for the benefit of shareholders than direct shareholder empowerment.124 
One reason for this is the ease with which shareholders can exit the firm. Such 
unattached shareholder influence can shift the firm’s focus to short-term, ill-informed, 
and/or self-serving goals that can possibly corrupt prudent corporate strategy over the 
long-term. Another reason for endorsing director primacy is that such direct 
shareholder empowerment would serve only to endorse the special interests of those 
who have power within the shareholder class: institutional investors.  
Bainbridge justifies why authority ought to rest with the board of directors 
within the corporate governance structure by arguing that a governance group (that 
acts collegially) is superior to a single autocrat at the apex of the corporate 
governance hierarchy.125 In making this argument, he offers evidence from the 
behavioral economics literature which explains why group decision making is of 
higher quality than individual decision making.126 This leads Bainbridge to conclude 
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that corporate boards are more effective at monitoring corporate governance than a 
single autocrat, and thus the fiat model is generally the best option.127  
The main problem with the fiat model remains: who watches the watchers? In 
other words, who keeps the board of directors from being poisoned by groupthink 
and/or other forms of collective action failure? And who keeps the board of directors 
from social loafing and/or other serious opportunistic behavior? Bainbridge’s answer 
is the board itself.128 The arguments justifying this answer are at best hopeful. The 
optimism of his answer may make some hardened anti-managerialists smile cruelly at 
the lack of realism that one must embrace to whole-heartedly be at ease with the 
potential of directors self-monitoring.  
To be fair, this is a serious problem with no easy answer; and to his credit, 
Bainbridge attacks it directly. Ultimately, though, his arguments are more sound 
regarding the avoidance of collective action failure than they are regarding the 
avoidance of opportunistic behavior. Albeit, the group dynamic makes opportunism 
less attractive for one individual within the group than it would for an all-powerful 
autocrat with no equals. That said, the suggestion that social norms (like reputational 
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cost and the virtues of the communal life within the boardroom) will prevent the 
board from acts of opportunism at the expense of all other constituents of the firm 
may be too sweet for some intimate observers of director politics to swallow. 
Bainbridge suggests that a key problem for corporate governance is locating 
the appropriate balance between providing enough authority for the board to govern 
the firm in an efficient manner, while not providing so much discretion that authority 
becomes unreviewable, uncorrectable, and ultimately unaccountable.129 Therefore, at 
one extreme, efficiency demands that board decisions are shielded from shareholders 
and courts; otherwise, optimal risk-taking will be discouraged and the internal team 
governance structure could be seriously compromised by the fear of hindsight review.  
What about the courts protecting shareholders from extensive director 
discretion? Bainbridge reasons that shareholders are protected from “optimal” risk-
taking by the dual functioning of limited liability and portfolio diversity.130 At the 
other extreme, if directors flagrantly violate their obligation to maximize shareholder 
wealth, the threat of judicial accountability must come out as a deterrent for corporate 
irresponsibility. However, this is not an easy balance to strike. Bainbridge warns that 
judges must use caution because they are not business experts, and because hindsight 
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can make decision making look more irresponsible when the consequences of those 
decisions are known to have been negatively magnified. 
In determining the balance to be struck between authority and accountability, 
Bainbridge sides with the Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co case, which provides a 
conservative interpretation of the application of the business judgment rule.131 The 
Unocal interpretation views the business judgment rule through the lens of the 
doctrine of abstention. This interpretation suggests that the business judgment rule 
allows the courts to go no further than to assess whether a board was disinterested and 
independent in their decision-making process (good faith) and that the decision-
making process was reasonable (sans gross negligence).132 Thus, Bainbridge endorses 
a presumption in favor of strong judicial deference to board decisions as long as there 
is some evidence of good faith and competence. He ultimately justifies this position 
by reasoning that directors cannot be made more accountable without compromising 
their authority, leading to less-than-optimal risk-taking.133 
The key to director primacy, therefore, is establishing that directors are 
becoming agents of change by: 1) severing their loyalty to “managers;” 2) 
championing the rights of all shareholders; and 3) forging further corporate 
                                                      
131 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A 2d 947 (Del 1985). 
132  For a full analysis of the Unocal test, see Bainbridge, New Corporate 
Governance, supra note 65 at 137-40. 
133 Ibid at 153. 
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governance. It is here that director primacy either lives or dies by the sword, for when 
Bainbridge attacks managerialism as inadequate he is indirectly challenged to 
establish how the distinction drawn between managerialism and his director primacy 
is in fact defensible.  
Before Bainbridge, most traditional managerialists assumed that their readers 
understood that directors were included in the term “managers” because no clear 
distinction between the decision making outcomes of directors and senior executives 
was thought to exist. One major reason for this pre-determination was that the CEO 
was generally the office where actual power consolidated in public corporations. In 
practice, the CEO had tremendous control over: 1) who would be on the ballot for 
board elections; and 2) the flow of information from corporate operations to the 
board. Many times, the CEO was on the board (if not the chairman of the board), 
making frank discussions about managerial performance during board meetings 
difficult at best. Thus, the CEO accumulated a great deal of power to manage the 
corporation. So much that if there was one individual that Bainbridge had in mind in 
his comparison between group decision making and individual decision making, the 
CEO would likely be that individual as he or she has historically been the 
corporation’s best approximation of the single autocrat at the apex of the corporate 
governance hierarchy. In fact, it is not always clear how much the influence of the 
CEO has changed in the day-to-day function of the corporation. 
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When Bainbridge looks to the future of corporate governance in America, he 
sees two competing models: shareholder primacy and director primacy. 134  He 
petitions for greater vigilance in the face of today’s pressure to extend the shareholder 
franchise.135 Bainbridge notes that there is very good reason why shareholder power 
is so limited.136 He argues that shareholder primacy is a flawed account of American 
corporate governance and, accordingly, in appreciating the reasons for this, director 
                                                      
134  See Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the 
Convergence Debate” (2002) 16 Transnat’l Law 45 [Bainbridge, “Director v. 
Shareholder Primacy”]. 
135 Ibid (clarifying that most scholars in the convergence debate assume that 
American corporate law primarily promotes shareholder primacy, when it actually 
promotes director primacy, warning that such confusion may have serious 
consequences when transplanting the American model into recipient jurisdictions); 
see also Stephen M Bainbridge, “Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors” 
(UCLA Sch of L Law-Econ Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-20, 2005) 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227> (warning of the dangers of greater 
institutional investor activism, arguing that such investors are motivated by narrow 
interests that may undermine passive investors and compromise the effectiveness of 
the board to make decisions in the best interest of the firm) [Bainbridge, “Shareholder 
Activism”]; Stephen M Bainbridge, “The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights” (2006) 53 UCLA L Rev 601 (petitioning for greater prudence before 
extending the shareholder franchise, defending why only shareholders have voting 
rights and then defending why such voting rights are so limited) [Bainbridge, 
“Limited Shareholder Voting Rights”]; Bainbridge, “Shareholder Disempowerment”, 
supra note 106 (responding to Lucian A Bebchuk’s article entitled, “The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power,” and rejecting Bebchuk’s proposals for allowing 
shareholders to have greater voting power so that they can change a firm’s basic 
corporate governance arrangements, defending existing regime of limited shareholder 
voting rights). 
136 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 233-35. 
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primacy emerges from the cries that proclaim greater shareholder primacy is the 
enlightened path for corporate governance.137  
Bainbridge contends that no shareholder empowerment amendments are 
needed in order to ensure that the American corporate governance model optimizes 
shareholder protection.138 He argues that director primacy satisfies this objective by 
ensuring that corporate governance abides by the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm. 139  He warns that shareholder primacy urges policy-makers to grant 
shareholders additional powers to exercise direct control over the corporation, but this 
will prove to be detrimental to the shareholder class as a whole.140 This is because 
special interests (institutional investors), which have consolidated power within the 
shareholder class, will exploit these additional powers at the expense of weaker 
shareholders.141  
Within the existing corporate governance order, Bainbridge suggests that 
shareholders are happy to be rationally apathetic because it is easier to exit than it is 
to fight.142 He contends that this is true even for institutional investors because of: 1) 
                                                      
137 Ibid at 235. 
138 Ibid at 234-35. 
139 Ibid at 234. 
140 Ibid at 228-32. 
141 Ibid at 228-30. 
142 Ibid at 202. 
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the costs of monitoring corporate activities and engaging in activism; 2) the frequency 
of free riding on such efforts; and 3) the marginal gains that result from such 
activism.143 Bainbridge asserts that the apathy of shareholders is normally a good 
thing because when institutional investors are motivated to interfere with corporate 
governance, they usually do so in order to champion their narrow interests which 
undermine shareholders’ interests as a whole and hamper the ability of directors to 
make decisions in the best interest of the firm.144 
There are a number of existing vehicles for shareholder activism including: 1) 
exit; 2) proxy contests; 3) withholding votes in director elections; 4) shareholder 
proposals; and 5) private negotiations between institutional investors and corporate 
management. Bainbridge asserts that shareholder primacy advocates view these 
vehicles as inadequate and that they promote expansion of the shareholder franchise 
by: 1) reforming the director nomination process; 2) reforming the mechanics of the 
voting process; and 3) expanding the substance of what shareholders can vote 
upon.145 Bainbridge flatly rejects that the expansion of shareholder voting rights 
would be prudent, reinforcing his main argument which calls for adherence to the 
status quo. Ultimately, he reminds his reader that one should not take lightly the 
dangers of interfering with board authority for the sake of greater accountability 
                                                      
143 Ibid at 208. 
144 Ibid at 209. 
145 For more detail on these mechanisms of shareholder voice, see ibid at 209-22. 
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because “the preservation of managerial discretion should always be [the] default 
presumption.”146 
The biggest test for the canonization of director primacy is whether it is 
simply a semantic technique to maintain the defense of the professional bureaucracy 
that runs the corporation or whether the function of the board can be established as 
changing. If the behavior of “managers” (excluding directors) is what shareholder 
primacy advocates are up in arms about, and if directors are really the true champions 
of the whole of the shareholder class, then director primacy might be the “Third 
Way” of corporate governance. However, if the distinction between managerialism 
and director primacy cannot stand the test of the Devil’s Advocate, and directors 
cannot be established to be different than “managers,” this theory will fail to be 
convincing as a new path for corporate governance.  
For this reason, the stakes are at their highest when Bainbridge makes the case 
for the distinction between directors and managers in the post-Enron function of the 
American board of directors. Although Bainbridge argues that director empowerment 
started much earlier than the enactment of SOX147 and other amendments to the 
listing requirements of various American stock exchanges, his position is that these 
legal changes have finally tipped the scales as directors are now starting to enjoy 
                                                      
146 Ibid at 235. 
147 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, (codified at 
15 USC § 7201 et seq). 
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enough freedom from executive officers to be able to independently exercise 
authority over the corporation.148  
Bainbridge’s narrative of the shift from managerialism to director primacy is 
persuasive to read. He discusses the director’s evolving role from being the rubber 
stamps of CEOs to potentially having a legitimate monitoring function.149 He explains 
how starting in the 1970s, the pressure mounted to improve what was seen at that 
time as the board’s failure to rein in the excesses of executive officers and improve 
management’s performance.150 From this arose the recognition of the important role 
that independent directors could play within the corporate governance structure. He 
explains how post-Enron developments have bolstered a director’s ability to police 
managers for shareholders by: 1) improving best-practice norms; 2) strengthening the 
threats to a director’s reputation for turning a blind eye to managers running 
roughshod over shareholder interests; 3) increasing judicial pressure for better 
information flow from management to directors; and 4) increasing requirements for 
more independent directors on boards.151  
                                                      
148 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 198-200. 
149 Ibid at 198-200. 
150 See e.g. Melvin A Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal 
Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976) [Eisenberg, Structure of the Corporation]. 
151 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 176-87. 
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Bainbridge’s argument is weaker when he fails to provide strong empirical 
evidence that these changes are creating “strong, active independent directors with 
little tolerance for negligence or culpable conduct.”152 Again, there is little empirical 
evidence to support his claims that this functional shift is, in fact, occurring.153 In the 
end, Bainbridge sounds like E Merrick Dodd, Jr who, in his reply to Adolf A Berle, 
Jr, merely employed optimism for the new generation of managers.154 They are both 
very optimistic about the potential of a bureaucratic revolution, an event which would 
transform the ruling fiats of the great American corporations into group decision 
making centers and, thereby, helping manage the economy in a manner that is more 
beneficial to society.155 Both arguments are inspiring, but also lack substance and 
amount to no more than corporate futurism.  
In the end, even in his best argument for director primacy to date, Bainbridge 
makes quite a weak statement arguing that the “real world practice” of directors is 
still “supine,” but is “closer to the director primacy model than it was in earlier 
                                                      
152 Ibid at 198. 
153 Ibid. 
154 E Merrick Dodd, Jr, “For Whom Are Corporate Mangers Trustees?” (1932) 45 
Harv L Rev 1145 at 1146, 1148, 1151-53, 1165-67. 
155 Ibid at 1148. 
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periods.”156 One must respect Bainbridge’s candor on this point, but it does lay bare 
the weakness of his argument. 
VII. REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE FOR DELAWARE: FORM OR SUBSTANCE? 
Strine was obviously opposed to more federal meddling within Delaware’s 
national corporate law regime and Bainbridge was clearly a defender of the Delaware 
status quo. But by encouraging greater federalization of corporate law, Bebchuk 
appeared willing to risk Delaware’s caucus and the American corporate law status 
quo in order to gain greater shareholder engagement. Although Bebchuk did not 
appear to want to open the Delaware arrangement to the flood of other interests that 
might follow the federal government into the internal affairs of the corporation, he 
was willing to risk it.  
In “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,” Bebchuk used empirical 
evidence to establish that the power between directors and shareholders of larger 
American corporations with dispersed ownership was too unbalanced, as it blocked 
shareholders from maximizing shareholder value when management refused to 
cooperate.157 Bebchuk argued that allowing shareholders to be directly involved in 
corporate decision making would enhance corporate governance by motivating 
management to be more cooperative because shareholders had the power to directly 
                                                      
156 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 200. 
157 Bebchuk, “Increasing Shareholder Power”, supra note 65.  
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intervene. With respect to the reformation process, Bebchuk predictably stated that it 
should be through federal intervention.158 
Bebchuk’s writing indicated that he did not want to open the floodgates 
beyond shareholders and managers to other interests that influenced the federal 
government.159 If he did not want these populous interests to start meddling in the 
internal affairs of the corporation, what was he doing? Doubtless, he was familiar 
with Roe’s position on the matter, so maybe he: 1) did not believe that his petition for 
federal involvement seriously threatened the Delaware caucus; 2) did not care if the 
Delaware caucus was threatened (if managers monopolized it); or 3) maybe he was 
using the Cary card as leverage to up the stakes and, perhaps, make Delaware 
concede without federal intervention. Regardless, the Cary card caused different 
reactions which were interesting to observe. In response to Bebchuk’s proposal, 
Strine suggested that the traditionalist investor would prefer the status quo to what 
Bebchuk proposed.160 This was because the traditionalist investor would fear that 
Bebchuk’s proposal might subvert their interests by compromising managerial 
authority.161 If managerial authority was undermined, institutional intermediaries with 
no interests to serve but their own would further compromise the corporate 
                                                      
158 Ibid at 874.  
159 See e.g. ibid.  
160 Strine, “True Corporate Republic”, supra note 65 at 1775. 
161 Ibid.  
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governance structure. Strine suggested that the traditionalist investor would thus 
“leave things where they [stood] even if the status quo [was] not ideal.”162 But Strine 
still entertained Bebchuk’s proposal (with some slight reframing) in order to be 
“open-minded” to the idea that the traditionalist investor “might embrace reform that 
[was] consistent with Bebchuk’s call for greater managerial accountability.”163 Strine 
bit Bebchuk’s bait, but why? The answer came when Strine asserted: “Therefore, if 
reform attractive to the traditionalist is to come, it must emanate from state 
policymakers who can implement a reform that coheres with an overall approach to 
corporate law.”164 Strine longwindedly made this argument, but he reinforced his key 
point: whatever amendments needed to be made, Delaware and not the federal 
government needed to make them.165  
Strine offered hope to Bebchuk that there might be flexibility on the issue of 
shareholder empowerment but Delaware needed to be the innovator, not the federal 
government, because state competition must be preserved. It made sense that, if the 
choice was between Delaware (form) and the status quo (substance), Strine would 
advocate sacrificing some substance and managerial power and protect Delaware’s de 
facto preeminence. If this situation was to arise it would be ideal for Bebchuk because 
                                                      
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid at 1777. 
165 Ibid at 1780. 
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it would maintain Delaware’s influence while increasing shareholder influence within 
the political caucus.  
As one might expect, Bainbridge opposed Bebchuk’s proposal by employing 
the race-to-the-top argument.166 He argued that existing corporate law was optimal 
because it survived the competitive forces of the charter market.167 He then made his 
director primacy argument defending why this model was the appropriate model to 
protect shareholder interests.168 He concluded that, since director primacy was the 
superior model and since Delaware’s default rules already enshrined director 
primacy, no reform was necessary.169 The bottom line was that Bainbridge rejected 
any changes to the form or the substance of Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.  
In sum, within the battle over corporate governance, there appears to be an 
impasse which allows managers to have the luxury of a heavy hand in shaping its 
evolution. Bebchuk, champion of the shareholder and, to a lesser degree, of Cary, is 
unhappy with this state of affairs and is petitioning federal intervention to shake 
things up. Strine, champion of Winter and, to a lesser degree, managerialism, is happy 
with Delaware’s position as the manufacturer of “national” corporate law but appears 
willing to negotiate with Bebchuk’s position. And Bainbridge is the warrior of the 
                                                      
166 Bainbridge, “Shareholder Disempowerment”, supra note 106 at 1737-42. 
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Delaware status quo and is deeply entrenched in his position. Or is he? For, although 
he initially attacked creeping federalism, he now uses the provision of SOX and the 
amendments to listing requirements to support his director primacy argument.170 This 
might suggest that his race-to-the-top argument gives way at times to pragmatism, as 
does Strine’s defense of the Delaware status quo. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The power to influence the development of the corporate charter within the 
Delaware caucus is the power to potentially influence Granovetter’s actual and 
ongoing social networks inside and outside of the corporation and, hence, underscore 
its embeddedness. The above narrative highlights the levels of contention between 
managers and shareholders for control over future reforms. To date, managers have 
dominated the caucus, marginalizing efforts by shareholder advocates who want other 
shareholders to have greater direct participation within America’s corporate 
governance structures. Historically, the Delaware caucus has weathered tremendous 
economic transformations, remaining relatively unchanged when compared to the 
reforms Britain and Australia took over the last twenty-five years.171 Delaware has 
been less prone to amendment partly because its corporate law regime is regarded to 
                                                      
170 Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance, supra note 65 at 176-87. 
171 For more on this, see Jennifer G Hill, “Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons 
From International Statutory Regimes” (2008) 33 Del J Corp L 819 at 823. 
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be the result of an innovative and inspirational regulatory lab that harnesses the power 
of state competition.172  
With a view to the still-open questions regarding state competition, Bebchuk 
petitioned for more federal intervention, challenging whether the market for charters 
inspires the optimal lawmaking which is claimed to exist. He called for greater 
power-sharing between the federal and state governments in this process, hoping this 
would crack open the Delaware caucus and result in more direct shareholder 
influence over corporate decision making. In response to Bebchuk, Vice Chancellor 
Strine argued that greater power-sharing with the federal government would be a 
mistake because Delaware’s regulatory machinery was not influenced by managers to 
a degree that would prevent greater shareholder participation within corporate 
governance (if such reforms were what shareholders really wanted and what 
American corporate governance really needed). Meanwhile, this dialogue between 
two highly regarded and influential discourse participants – the Vice Chancellor of 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery and America’s top legal academic advocate of 
shareholder empowerment – has been unsettling to the avid champions of Delaware’s 
present status quo.  
Confidence in Delaware, like that heralded by Professor Bainbridge, has made 
some American corporate observers less likely to look beyond national borders for 
                                                      
172 Ibid at 821-29. 
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inspiration in corporate reforms and also less likely to assume that such reforms are 
necessary.173 In this way, the charter competition argument has been very successful 
at maintaining a status quo in which corporate managers have greater control over 
corporate governance policy than similar managers have in either Britain or Australia 
– countries that have both seen an increase in the participatory rights of 
shareholders.174 However, American corporate governance can be said to be in 
transition as there has clearly been a shift of power away from the Delaware caucus in 
response to its “modest and incremental” approach to reform.175 Starting with the 
post-scandal regulatory responses (such as SOX), the federal government has been 
more willing to interfere with the presumed preeminence of the charter market.176 
This may prove to be the harbinger of the demise of the monopoly which Delaware 
has enjoyed for the past century,177 providing new opportunities to increase the 
participatory rights of shareholders. 
Today, corporate managers are under attack for having failed to provide for 
adequate monitoring and oversight of their firms’ investments before the credit crisis. 
The situation has called into question the balance between managerial authority and 
                                                      
173 Ibid at 819-20. 
174 Ibid at 826. 
175 Ibid at 823. 
176 Ibid at 824-25. 
177 Ibid at 841. 
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managerial accountability. Eyes are on the capacity of state-level legal mechanisms 
(in particular Delaware) to deal with these corporate governance failures. 178 
Meanwhile, federal reforms (such as “say on pay” and other shareholder 
empowerment initiatives) have either been established,179 or are in the works.180 Such 
federal interventions demonstrate a continued willingness to intercede in corporate 
regulatory development at the state level.  
It is difficult to foretell the long-term impact of such federal interventions in 
the area of corporate governance. If this attitude prevailed, the federal government 
would likely face increased pressures from a number of interest groups – not just 
shareholder groups – pushing for further corporate governance reform. But is this a 
Pandora’s Box in the making? Alternatively, Delaware may want to answer to the sort 
of pressures that prompted the federal government’s activity in the first place. It 
seems that, either way, more shareholder participation rights in American corporate 
governance is a likely outcome.  
The likelihood of such an outcome brings this argument full circle. As noted 
in the beginning, the British corporate governance expert Simon Deakin observed 
                                                      
178 Anne Tucker Nees, “Who’s The Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within 
The Corporate Power Puzzle” (2010) 35 Del J Corp L 199. 
179 “Rewarding American Bosses: Nay on Pay”, The Economist 395:8682 (15 
May 2010) 70. 
180  “The Rewards of Virtue”, The Economist (26 April 2010) online: 
<http://www.economist.com/node/15993202>. 
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how Polanyi’s double movement had in recent times been off-set to favor market 
interests to the detriment of society, driven predominantly by the power exercised by 
investors in this era of financialization. Now, with the regulatory responses against 
the crisis still forthcoming, one of the questions arising out of the foregoing is 
whether increases in shareholder participatory rights are likely to further increase the 
movement toward the financialization of the firm in the American context? While 
only a few years ago we would have found it hard to see how it would not, the current 
crisis and the emerging regulatory responses might suggest otherwise. 181  This 
uncertainty hints at the political stakes in the Delaware debate and beyond.  
Of course, the issue is more complex. Greater shareholder participation may 
not be a bad thing. As Berle argued in response to Dodd in the classical American 
debate over managerialism, although shareholder empowerment may not be an 
adequate solution to managerial opportunism, enforcement of property rights is the 
only legal tool available to safeguard against it.182 But how much has changed almost 
eighty years later? In 1932, Berle was hopeful that new theories in sociology would 
                                                      
181 Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, “Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation” 
(2010) 32 Law & Pol’y 181. 
182 See AA Berle, Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note” 
(1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1365. 
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soon provide the support for legal innovations which would better regulate corporate 
governance183 . . . the law is still waiting. 
                                                      
183 Adolf A Berle, Jr & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, 2d ed (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) 219-20. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE CORPORATION, NEW GOVERNANCE, AND THE 
POWER OF NARRATIVE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better, 
John Braithwaite wrote an eye-catching phrase: regulatory capitalism represents the 
“reality of hybridity between the privatization of the public and publicization of the 
private.”1 The privatization of the public had been well documented,2 but the idea of 
publicization of the private appeared to hold new promise.3 I had spotted this new 
optimism of Braithwaite earlier in a 2006 working paper, when he admitted that he 
had been concerned about the “neoliberal” shift toward privatization,4 even though, 
for some time, he had been endorsing the self-governance of private actors.5 But now 
                                                      
1 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it 
Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,) at 8 [Braithwaite, Regulatory 
Capitalism]. 
2 See e.g. Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The 
Battle for the World Economy, revised ed (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 
3 For the origins of the concept, see Jody Freeman, “Extending Public Law Norms 
Through Privatization” (2003) 116 Harv L Rev 1285 at 1285 [Freeman, “Extending 
Public Law”]. 
4  See generally John Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism” 
(RegNet Occasional Paper No 5, 2005) online: 
<https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/Neoliberalism_Re
gulatory_2005.pdf> [Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”]. 
5 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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(as of 2006), he was convinced that his fears over “neoliberalism” were excessive and 
that it was merely a stage of “regulatory capitalism.”6  
In April of this year, Braithwaite released a new working paper that further 
extrapolates upon publicization, explaining that it means “the percolation of public 
law values into private law and into corporate self-regulation, [including] the most 
critical public law values such as transparency, accountability, stakeholder voice and 
separations of powers.” 7  Jody Freeman, the originator of this idea, described 
publicization as a process by which “private actors increasingly commit themselves to 
traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities…that might 
otherwise be provided directly by the state.”8 
For the past decade since Freeman hypothesized that this publicization would 
occur, the evidence of this transformation has not been convincing.9 For better or 
worse, business actors do not appear to be any more or less imbued with the spirit of 
public service than in the past, leaving questions as to whether or not endorsing recent 
regulatory experimentation has not been at the expense of the long-term integrity of 
governance. Both the collapse of Enron and the Credit Crisis have been, in large part, 
                                                      
6 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 4 at 8, 18. 
7  John Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism, Strategic Privatization and Crises” 
(2013) [unpublished, archived at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249544] at 4 [Braithwaite, 
“Strategic Socialism”]. 
8 Freeman, “Extending Public Law”, supra note 3 at 1285. 
9 See e.g. Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7 at 5. 
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attributable to the regulatory failures caused by the decisions of for-profit 
“gatekeepers,”10 such as Arthur Anderson11 and Standard & Poor's,12 who were 
enjoying the sort of lucrative opportunities that Freeman had envisioned, but who 
failed to adequately publicize.  
In light of the continued interest in the idea of publicization, this chapter 
offers some considerations that might be taken into account when attempting to 
                                                      
10 John C Coffee, Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1-6 [Coffee, Gatekeepers]. 
11 See e.g. Kristen Hays, “Enron at Eye Level: A Reporter’s View of the Trials” in 
Nancy B Rapoport, Jeffrey D Van Niel & Bala G Dharan, eds, Enron and Other 
Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader, 2d ed (New York: Foundation 
Press, 2009); Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R Macey, “Was Arthur Andersen 
Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large 
Clients” (2004) 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 263 (concluding that after controlling for 
client size, region, time, and industry, there was no evidence that Andersen’s 
performance significantly differed from other large accounting firms). 
12 For how investment banks exploit new governance regulations in order to more 
than double the maximum leverage (15:1) allowable under regulatory requirements, 
see John C Coffee, Jr, “What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 
2008 Financial Crisis” (2009) 9 J Corp L Stud 1 at 10-13 [Coffee, “What Went 
Wrong?”]. Frank Partnoy argues that credit rating agencies have “little incentive to 
‘get it right,’” which “pose[s] a systemic risk.” Frank Partnoy, “Rethinking 
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective” (Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-014, 2009) at 3, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608>.  Timothy Sinclair identifies that the issue is 
conventionally conceived as that the way that credit rating agencies are remunerated 
generates a conflict of interest. He suggests that this conflict of interest is overblown 
and that focus should be upon the challenges rating agencies (and similar 
gatekeepers) face, more generally, in a market system. Timothy J Sinclair, “Credit 
Rating Agencies and the Global Financial Crisis” (2010) 12 Econ Soc 4 at 4. 
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evaluate its potential. To do so, this chapter in part takes a second look at the 
literatures supporting “new governance” initiatives.  
New governance is an umbrella term for theories of governance that 
encourage regulatory architects to marry the best of both the public and private 
orderings.13 It celebrates a “blurring” of public and private functions within areas of 
regulation.14  
The publicization dimension of new governance rhetoric invokes an out of 
focus image of the democratic delegation of power to for-profit agents, who, it is 
assumed, will exercise this power in a benevolent and competent manner. For many 
regulatory scholars, with market failure to their left and regulatory failure to their 
right, publicization of the private represents a best-case metaphor in which 
governance enjoys the optimal balance between the functional efficiencies of 
decentered actors,15 and the integrity of idealized public servants. But again, the 
                                                      
13 See generally David Trubek & Louise Trubek, “The World Turned Upside 
Down: Reflections on New Governance and the Transformation of Law” (2010) 2010 
Wis L Rev 719; William H Simon, “New Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan 
Response” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 727; Lisa T Alexander, “Reflections on Success 
and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the Lawyer” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 
738. 
14  See generally Jason M Solomon, “New Governance, Preemptive Self-
Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice” 
(2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 591. 
15 See e.g. Julia Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002) 27 Austl J Leg 
Phil 1 [Black, “Critical Reflections”]; see also Friedrich A Hayek, “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society” (1945) 35 Am Econ Rev 519 [Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”]. 
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vision of publicization is out of focus, lacking detail, and this may be a serious 
problem if it is creating a false promise of a Panacea for the social ills attributed to 
privatization—such as the “democratic deficit” it creates.16  
This chapter invites other scholars to reconsider whether or not such blurring 
of public and private functions is to be encouraged. It will be argued that the 
publicization of for-profit activities is a goal that is unlikely to be achieved. As a 
result, this chapter suggests that the best-case scenario for new governance may be 
merely the privatization of the public—without the publicization of the private. And 
if this is the case, then new governance, and its call for a further blurring of public 
and private functions, may merit a critical re-evaluation.  
Part II of this chapter provides an introduction to some of the literatures that 
inform new governance. Part III explores the normative strength of corporate 
governance to resist publicization. Part IV looks at the challenges that technocratic 
narratives pose to publicization within both public and private governance. Part V 
concludes by suggesting that, based on the arguments presented, for-profit actors will 
not publicize as the literature suggests. This conclusion invites further discussion as 
                                                      
16 Alfred C Aman, Jr, “Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-
Liberal State” (2007) 51 NYL Sch L Rev 801 at 810-11 [Aman,”Law, Markets and 
Democracy”]. Of course, the concerns over the “democratic deficit” exist beyond 
privatization issues and are considered by those who are concerned about the entire 
project of new governance. See e.g. Victor Bekkers et al, eds, Governance and the 
Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices, 
(Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing, 2007) at 307-11. 
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to the possibility of a more directed process that engineers a reconstitution of the 
public and private in light of the challenges facing modern governance, rather than 
just leaving it to the fortunes of market-driven “spontaneous evolution.”   
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR NEW GOVERNANCE 
It is yet to be determined how new governance will play out.17 Thus, its merits 
are difficult to assess. The literature—if it is a single literature—is fragmented: 
collaborative,18 incentive-based,19 reflexive,20 responsive,21 and decentered22 notions 
                                                      
17 For reflection upon the present transformation, see Lisa Blomgren Bingham, 
“The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for 
Collaborative Governance” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 297; Mark Dawson, 
“Transforming into What? New Governance in the EU and the ‘Managerial 
Sensibility’ in Modern Law” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 389; Poul F Kjaer, “The 
Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental European Perspective on 
Governance, Law, and the Political in the Transnational Space” (2010) 2010 Wis L 
Rev 489; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 100. 
18 See e.g. Jody Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” 
(1997) 45 UCLA L Rev 1 [Freeman, “Collaborative Governance”]; Philip J Harter, 
“Collaboration: The Future of Governance” (2009) 2009 J Disp Resol 411. 
19 See e.g. Richard B Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?” 
(2001) 29 Cap U L Rev 21 at 94-127; Daniel H Cole & Peter Z Grossman, “When is 
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and The Comparative 
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes are Environmental Protection” (1999) 
1999 Wis L Rev 887 at 887-894, 935-938; Lily N Chinn, “Can the Market Be Fair 
and Efficient - An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading” (1999) 26 
Ecology LQ 80 at 80-88, 102-125. 
20  See e.g. Peer Zumbansen, “Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, 
Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law” (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 769 
[Zumbansen, “Law After the Welfare State”]; Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss & 
Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses 
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of governance are not necessarily mindful of each other and appear not to be moving 
toward a single cohesive position. Attempts to synthesis the new governance 
literature23 have been charged with being “overzealous,”24 because to do so invites a 
level of generalization, which threatens to ignore important differences between the 
literatures. In this way, new governance is like critical legal theory,25 and legal 
realism for that matter,26 in the sense that, although a number of authors can be 
                                                                                                                                                          
and Research Programme” (2003) 20 Theory, Culture & Soc’y 1; Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
21 See e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 5; David Levi-Faur, “The Global 
Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism” (2005) 598 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 12 
[Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion”]; Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 
1. 
22  See e.g. Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of 
Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current 
Probs 103 [Black, “Decentring Regulation”]. 
23 See e.g. Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342 [Lobel, 
“The Renew Deal”]. 
24 See Bradley C Karkkainen, “New Governance in Legal Thought and in the 
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 
471. 
25 For a discussion of the nature of the movement and its fragmentation, see 
generally Mark Tushnet, “Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and 
Underpinnings” (1986) 36 J Legal Educ 505. 
26 Joseph Singer discusses the competition notion of legal realism and the idea 
that “we are all legal realists now.” Joseph William Singer, “Legal Realism Now” 
(1988) 76 Cal L Rev 465 at 467. 
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identified as being under the conceptual umbrella, the nature of the movement as a 
whole defies an all-inclusive definition.27  
That being said, it is safe to assert that new governance is the study of the 
ways in which governments release their authority to regulate, or to enforce 
regulation, within regulated spaces,28 allowing non-government organizations to share 
in providing administrative functions traditionally associated with government.29 New 
governance may be the replacement of the command-and-control model of the 
welfare state. If so, it may become the replacement of the welfare state as the 
ideological30 binary pole to a pure free market,31 within the spectrum of “models of 
                                                      
27 See e.g. ibid.; Tushnet, supra note 25. 
28 A prime example of this is regulatory capitalism. See generally Braithwaite, 
Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1. Although this does not bring additional clarity 
to the distinction between the sphere of new commerce and the locus of new 
governance, it is significant to note the distinctions that Braithwaite makes between 
understandings of neoliberalism, privatization, and regulatory capitalism. See 
Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”, supra note 4. 
29 See Colin Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of 
Contemporary Governance” (2002) 29 JL & Soc’y 56 at 57-60 [Scott, “Private 
Regulation”]. 
30 Cukierman emphasizes the importance of ideology, among other forms of 
rationality, for its influence on economic policies, and thus the impact that ideology, 
for better or worse, has on macroeconomic developments. Alex Cukierman, “The 
Roles of Ideology, Institutions, Politics, and Economic Knowledge in Forecasting 
Macroeconomic Developments: Lessons from the Crisis” (2010) 56 CESifo Econ 
Stud 575 at 575-79. Thus, to reject ideology, when your opponents use it effectively 
as a tool for policy, is a disadvantage, pragmatically speaking, if the end goal is to 
influence policy development. 
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capitalism.”32 Accordingly, new governance may become the newest champion of 
“embedded liberalism.”33  
Most new governance literature today appears to be hopeful of the 
“reassertion of the public interest” within governance.34 Instead of framing the issue 
just35 within the context of the “turn to the market,”36 the “withdrawal of the welfare 
                                                                                                                                                          
31 See Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
“Markets and Society: The Life and Thought of Karl Polanyi, Part 5: The Legacy” 
(webcast) (Posted 8 August 2006, 9:53 pm) (interviewing Fred Block), online: 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation <http://www.insidethecbc.com/ideas-series-
markets-and-society-available-for-download/>. 
32 See generally Colin Crouch, “Models of Capitalism” (2005) 10 New Pol Econ 
439; see also Richard Deeg & Gregory Jackson, “Towards a More Dynamic Theory 
of Capitalist Variety” (2007) 5 Socio-Econ Rev 149. 
33  Ruggie coined this term. John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, 
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order” 
(1982) 36 Int’l Org 379 at 392. However, Ruggie was inspired to coin the term 
because of Karl Polanyi work on “embedded” and disembedded” economic orders. 
See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time, 2d ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) at 79. 
34 See generally David Levi-Faur, “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of 
the Public Interest” (2009) 27 Pol’y & Soc’y 181 [Levi-Faur, “Reassertion of the 
Public Interest”]. 
35 Of course, this is not to take away from these debates because they are 
important. It is only to say that different debates ought to also continue to emerge. 
Furthermore, the distinction drawn here is a precarious one in the sense that many of 
the authors of the privatization literature will also have voice in these other literature. 
Thus, although Braithwaite, in particular, is drawing a similar distinction when he 
distinguishes between neoliberalism and regulatory capitalism, see Braithwaite, 
“Neoliberalism”, supra note 4, such distinctions are not embraced by many and are to 
some degree artificial. However, it has been drawn presently in order to see what 
follows. 
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state,”37 or the “welfare state retrenchment,”38 new governance provides a place to 
imagine the “reconstituting,”39 “restructuring,”40 “reasserting,”41 or the “rise”42 of the 
public dimension of governance function. This appears to be the essential promise of 
new governance: to provide an alternative, which is not antibusiness,43 yet still 
attempts to balance the demands of markets with the interests of society in a way that 
generates sustainable and balanced policy options, and a governance mechanism that 
stabilizes wealth creation, protects human dignity, and ensures a habitable natural 
                                                                                                                                                          
36 Bob Jessop, “Governance Failure” in Gerry Stoker, ed, The New Politics of 
British Local Governance (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) at 11. 
37 Vito Tanzi, Government Versus Markets: The Changing Economic Role of the 
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 273. 
38  See e.g. Judith Treas, “Can Families Compensate for Welfare State 
Retrenchment?” (2012) 41 Contemp Soc 33; Nathalie Giger & Miora Nelson, “The 
Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment: Blame Avoidance or Credit 
Claiming in the Era of Permanent Austerity?” (2011) 50 Eur J Pol Res 1. 
39 See e.g. Suzanne Mettler, “Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges 
of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era” (2010) 8 Persp Pol 803; Braithwaite, 
Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1; David Levi-Fair & Jacint Jordana, “The Rise of 
Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order” (2005) 598 Annals 
Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 200; Black, “Decentring Regulation”, supra note 22. 
40 Lobel, “The Renew Deal”, supra note 23. 
41 Levi-Faur, “Reassertion of the Public Interest”, supra note 103. 
42 Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-
Regulatory State” in Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, The Politics of 
Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005) 145 at 148-49 [Scott, “Age of Governance”]. 
43 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1 at vii-x. 
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environment for future generations. As a result, new governance’s boundaries, like 
those of corporate governance, are assumed to be “blurred and porous,”44 and in a 
state of disequilibrium, 45  which allows for a high level of pragmatic 
“experimentalism”46 within new governance’s learning processes.47 Again, all of this 
points to the hopefulness of publicization—hopefulness this chapter wishes to temper. 
Below, a number of literatures on governance are introduced, which help to 
construct a greater appreciation of some of the thoughts that have influenced the form 
new governance appears to be taking.  
                                                      
44 John R Boatright, “The Implications of the New Governance for Corporate 
Governance” in Ingo Pies & Peter Koslowski, eds, Corporate Citizenship and New 
Governance: The Political Role of Corporations (New York: Springer, 2011) 133 at 
141. Ball and Junemann discusses how governance, by its nature, deconstructs or 
transcends organizational boundaries and not these networks are changes alluding to 
the understanding of regulated spaces that a governmentality approach might offer, 
creating “overlap and confusion.” Stephen J Ball & Carolina Junemann, Networks, 
New Governance and Education (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2012) at 1-7; see also 
Simon, supra note 100. 
45  Dewey believed that learning occurred by facing an experience of 
disequilibrium and then finding a “more extensive balance,” arguing “equilibrium 
comes…out of, and because of, tension.” In this sense, life and learning to Dewey 
was a constant cycle of equilibrium and disequilibrium. John Dewey, Art as 
Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1934) at 14 [Dewey, Art as Experience].  
46 For more on the issues related to new governance and experimentalism, see 
generally Grainne de Burca, “New Governance and Experimentalism: An 
Introduction” (2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 227. 
47 See Solomon, supra note 101 at 593-97. In the European context, democratic 
experimentalism is occurring within the European Union in relation to the 
coordination of top-down, as well as bottom-up, learning processes. See generally 
Erika Szyszczak, “Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination” 
(2006) 12 Eur LJ 486. 
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A. Deregulation  
The deregulation literature portrays governments as removing regulations 
from areas of society, allowing markets to operate “freely.” 48  This notion of 
deregulation, although still persistent in the imagination of some, has been largely 
debunked.49 Not only has the administrative state grown in its size (and expense),50 
but there has also been a vast geographical expansion of regulations in previously 
unregulated, or less regulated, spaces.51 Thus, the term “deregulation,” which framed 
                                                      
48 For more on this idea and the regulation literature, see, for example, Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962); see 
also Paul L Joskow, Deregulation: Where Do We Go from Here (Washington, DC: 
AEI Press, 2009); Daniel Immergluck, Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, 
and the Undermining of America’s Mortgage Market (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2009); Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2; Paul S Dempsey & Andrew R Goetz, 
Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology (Westport, Conn: Quorum Books, 
1992); Martha Derthick & Paul J Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). Additionally, consider the quote of Mark Weisbrot, 
an economist at the progressive Center for Economic and Policy Research: 
“[Friedman] had an enormous impact on the shape of most economies in the world in 
the last 25 to 35 years…If you go back to his book Capitalism and Freedom, it wasn’t 
even reviewed by major reviewers like [the] New York Times. By the end of 
Reagan’s last term, most of his policies were implemented…Friedman fought a 
counterrevolution in the 1950s against Keynesianism…” “Nobel Economist Milton 
Friedman Dead at 94”, CNN Money (16 November 2006) online” 
<http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/16/news/newsmakers/friedman/>. 
49 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 5 at 7-12; Levi-Faur, “The Global 
Diffusion”, supra note 21 at 13-14; Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1 
at 4-12. 
50 See Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”, supra note 4 at 8, 18. 
51 See Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion”, supra note 21 at 12-13. 
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much of the conversation about the shift from the welfare state for so long,52 has been 
inaccurate as a description of the evolution of government and governance.53 So the 
literature is worth mentioning, but not worth much more. 
B. Privatization  
The privatization literature54 describes the “withdrawal of the state” as a 
provider of public services, and in particular, various forms of social insurance.55 The 
narrative of privatization is more dramatic and self-apparent in countries such as the 
United Kingdom (which, during the “Golden Age,” had a more robust welfare state 
than the United States),56 but it still strongly shapes how many understand this 
regulatory shift in America.57  
                                                      
52 See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 5. 
53 See Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”, supra note 4 at 8-12. 
54 See generally Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2; Maxim Boycko, Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W Vislny, “A Theory of Privatisation” (1996) 106 Econ J 309; 
Thomas Clarke & Christos Pitelis, eds, The Political Economy of Privatisation (New 
York: Routledge, 1995); Kate Ascher, The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting Out 
Public Services (Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Education, 1987); Friedman, supra 
note 48. 
55 Scott, “Age of Governance”, supra note 42 at 148-49. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Paul R Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government 
Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It (New York: 
Cambrudge University Press, 2007) at 2-8.  
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Privatization generally refers to the outsourcing of government services58—
“essential services”59—that were provided traditionally under welfare state programs 
to for-profit or nonprofit organizations.60  
The rationale for privatization is, in essence, that it improves the efficiency of 
social services provided by allowing private, usually for-profit, organizations to 
manage them. 61  By delegating responsibility, governments achieve more at a 
                                                      
58 For more on privatization in this sense, see Dru Stevenson, “Privatization of 
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract” (2003) 45 Ariz L Rev 83 at 
83-85; Damian Grimshaw, Steve Vincent & Hugh Willmott, “Going Privately: 
Partnership and Outsourcing in UK Public Services” (2002) 80 Pub Admin 475 at 
475-76; see also Andrew Kakabadse & Nada Kakabadse, “Outsourcing in the Public 
Services: A Comparative Analysis of Practice, Capability and Impact” (2001) 21 Pub 
Admin & Dev 401. 
59 For the challenge of how to govern privatized essential services, see generally 
Greg Palast, Jerrold Oppenheim & Theo MacGregor, Democracy and Regulation: 
How the Public can Govern Essential Services (London: Pluto Press, 2003). These 
authors have a broader definition of essential services than the definition of essential 
services in which the right to strike is highly limited. See A Pankert, “Settlement of 
Labour Disputes in Essential Services” (1980) 119 Int’l Lab Rev 723. 
60  Stevenson, supra note 58 at 86-94; see also Aman, “Law, Markets and 
Democracy”, supra note 16. For a more in depth discussion of the appropriate role for 
nonprofits and for-profits in programs that are social services that have been 
outsourced by government, see generally Eric Werker & Faisal Z Ahmed, “What Do 
Nongovernmental Organizations Do?” (2008) 22 J Econ Persp 73; William P Ryan, 
“The New Landscape for Nonprofits” in Victor Futter, Judith A Cion & George W 
Overton, eds, Nonprofit Governance and Management (Chicago: American Bar 
Association, 2002) 13. 
61 See William L Megginson & Jeffry M Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey 
of Empirical Studies on Privatization” (2001) 39 J Econ Literature 321; Catherine C 
Eckel, Doug W Eckel & Vijay Singal, “Privatization and Efficiency: Industry Effects 
of the Sale of British Airways” (1997) 43 J Fin Econ 275 at 297. However, this 
assertion is contested. See e.g. Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, “Does Social 
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decreased expense to the public by allowing free market capitalism to shoulder much 
of the load.62 The main claim is that the consumers of these services receive better 
quality and variety of products, as well as potentially lower prices generated by the 
efficiency gains from market competition.63 These efficiency gains increase the 
profitability of providing services and boost economic growth, ultimately leading to 
more financially stable economies.64 Economic growth increases the tax base, and 
these gains made by governments are then passed down to taxpayers, reducing the 
overall tax burden.65 Low taxes leave more money in the economy, further increasing 
economic growth.66 In the end, taxpayers enjoy lower tax burdens, consumers enjoy 
                                                                                                                                                          
Security Privatization Produce Efficiency Gains?” (2007) 122 QJ Econ 1677; George 
Yarrow et al, “Privatization in Theory and Practice” (1986) 1 Econ Pol’y 323 
(arguing the benefits of privatization can often be achieved through better means). 
62 Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2 at 372-74. 
63 See e.g. ibid at 373-74; see also Eckel, Eckel, & Singal, supra note 61. 
64 For a more detailed understanding, see, for example, Yergin & Stanislaw, supra 
note 2 at 372-74. Additionally, consider the “Washington Consensus.” See John 
Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in John Williamson, 
ed, Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1989) 5. 
65 For a more detailed understanding of this in a modern context, as well as an 
analysis of whether such a policy truly works, see Hang Nguyen et al, How Hard is it 
to Cut Tax Preferences to Pay for Lower Tax Rates? (Urban Institute and Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2012) online: 
<http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412608-Base-Broadening-to-Offset-
Lower-Rates.pdf>. 
66  Generally, “[c]orporate taxes are most harmful for growth, followed by 
personal income taxes, and then consumption taxes.” Asa Johansson et al, “Taxation 
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better services, employees benefit from a better economy, and governments can 
channel resources with more focus upon a narrower range of functions.67  
Unfortunately, this theory has already proven to be too good to be true, and 
policies have modified privatization by applying it in a more incremental, 
experimental, and responsive manner68 than the initial enthusiasm the “Washington 
Consensus” encouraged.69 Still, skepticism remains.70 
C. Risk 
During the time of the welfare state (approximately from the first Roosevelt 
Administration in 1933–1937 until between the Carter Administration in 1977–1981 
                                                                                                                                                          
and Economic Growth” (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 620, 
2008), online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/241216205486>. 
67 For a more detailed understanding, see Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2. 
68 See generally John Bennett, Saul Estrin & Giovanni Urga, “Privatization 
Methods and Economic Growth in Transition Economies” (2007) 15 Econ Transition 
661; Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005) at 165-95, online: 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/>.  
69  See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington 
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning 
from a Decade of Reform” (2006) 44 J Econ Literature 973; see also Yergin & 
Stanislaw, supra note 2 at 237; Williamson, supra note 64 (of additional note are the 
comments to Williamson’s article included in the book). 
70 See Rodrik, supra note 69 at 986. 
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and the first Reagan Administration in 1981–1985),71 a prevailing assumption, at least 
in the earlier years, was that an effective regulatory architecture could be modeled 
upon command-and-control style regulation.72 It was predicted that government 
experts could employ science in order to determine what the law ought to be, while 
administrative and judicial technologies could enforce the regulatory architecture 
devised.73 There were also assumptions made about the nature of natural hazards and 
manufactured risks and how they related to science and its technologies. However, 
these proved to be overly optimistic and simplistic,74 and more problematic than 
anticipated.75  
Anthony Giddens suggests that it was the manufacturing of uninsurable risk 
by progress, and not the financial cost of the welfare state, which led to state 
retrenchment.76 There was an inability to devise a way to use regulatory architecture 
                                                      
71 Salamon argues that “the Carter administration began in the latter 1970s to 
restrain the growth of government social welfare spending” in response to increased 
fiscal deficits. See Lester M Salamon, “The Marketization of Welfare: Changing 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the American Welfare State” (1993) 67 Soc Serv 
Rev 16 at 20-21.  
72 See e.g. Adolf A Berle, Jr, “Government Function in a Stabilized National 
Economy” (1943) 33 Am Econ Rev 27. 
73 See e.g. ibid.  
74 See generally Beck, Bonss, & Lau, supra note 20; Beck, supra note 20. 
75 See generally Robert L Rabin, “Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective” 
(1986) 38 Stan L Rev 1189. 
76 Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility” (1999) 62 Mod L Rev 1 at 4-10. 
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to solve the problems created by progress.77 Faced with this, governments were 
caught between a rock and a hard place: the social experiment of using the welfare 
state to mitigate the dangers of progress was unworkable, and the prospect of 
reverting to a pre-progress, pre-industrial society was similarly impractical. Thus the 
social contract, which obliged the state to mitigate the social and environmental risks 
caused by industrialization, was in breach.78 The state could not meet these lofty 
commitments. As a result, the first project of “embedded liberalism”79 was a failure, 
and the state retreated. From this perspective, the welfare state model proved unable 
to adequately identify risks, or adequately devise solutions that did not manufacture 
new risks and greater complexity.80 This inability left “the path of progress”81 highly 
                                                      
77 Ibid. 
78 See e.g. Beck, supra note 20. 
79  For more on the idea of “embedded liberalism,” see Andrew TF Lang, 
“Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist 
Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime” in John Gerard Ruggie, 
ed, Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 
2008) 13; Jeffrey A Hart & Aseem Prakash, “The Decline of ‘Embedded Liberalism’ 
and the Rearticulation of the Keynesian Welfare State” (1997) 2 New Pol Econ 65; 
John Gerard Ruggie, supra note 33. 
80 Giddens, supra note 76 at 9-10. 
81 For the phrase’s origin, see Michael J Trebilcock & Ronald J Daniel, Rule Of 
Law Reform And Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2008). 
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uncertain.82 It was this uncertainty, then which ultimately led to the demise of the 
welfare state.83  
With no way back and no way forward, the state retrenched, resulting in what 
Ulrich Beck, Giddens’s colleague, calls “reflexive modernization.”84 Mitchell Dean 
uses the term “reflexive government” as an alternative term for “reflexive 
modernity.”85  Dean writes that reflexive government is “a folding back of the 
objectives…upon its means.” 86  In other words, government legitimacy is now 
measured by the efficiency of how it provides services (means), not what services it 
provides (objectives), because, as Giddens explained, the calculus of determining 
what services ought to exist has been exposed as unworkable. In other words, 
governments are at a loss as to how to solve the challenges they face. As a result, they 
outsource responsibilities to the private sector and focus squarely upon improving the 
efficiency of the remaining regimes of practice within its purview of power in order 
to maintain legitimacy. 87  As long as governments do what they do within a 
                                                      
82 See Beck, Bonss, & Lau, supra note 20 at 10-13. 
83 See e.g. ibid; see also Giddens, supra note 76. 
84 Beck, supra note 20 at 10. 
85 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2d ed 
(London: Sage Publications, 2010). 
86 Ibid at 207. 
87 Ibid at 207-08. 
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legitimated measure of accountability (a calculus of risk management and economic 
efficiency),88 the larger issues of whether such government initiatives promote the 
long-term sustainability of society can be shadowed by technocratic narratives.89 
Thus, governments limit their function, and fixate upon the efficiency of their internal 
control systems as a measure of performance.  
Before ending this section it is important to at least reference Michael Power, 
who details how these technocratic narratives “have filtered into regulatory 
organizations [providing] a blueprint for the governance and accountability of the 
regulatory decision process.”90 Power also agrees with the above-mentioned thinkers 
in this area that such patterns of reflexive government are leading to a new and 
potentially dangerous political economy.91 
D. Decentered Regulation  
The decentered literature covers a broad spectrum of ideology from the 
thought of neoclassical economist thinkers, such as Milton Friedman92 and Friedrich 
                                                      
88  Michael Power, Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk 
Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 2-7, 91 [Power, Organized 
Uncertainty]. 
89 See Part IV supra for more on technocratic narratives. 
90 Ibid at 91. 
91 Ibid at 91–92. 
92 See generally Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal 
Statement (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980). 
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Hayek, 93  to governance scholars with roots in responsive law, such as John 
Braithwaite94 and David Levi-Fair,95 to those with roots in systems theory and 
reflexive law, such as Julia Black96 and Colin Scott.97  
Friedman and Hayek, in particular, have become synonymous with predicting 
the failures of the welfare state.98 Historical narratives focused upon their work have 
explained that governments, with the United States and United Kingdom leading the 
way, privatized and deregulated their regulatory models.99 Top-down, command-and-
control regulatory techniques were abandoned, and “free markets” were unleashed.100 
“Free markets,” rhetoric aside, means regulators create more discretionary, process-
based regulation of markets and society, which allows private actors, generally for-
profit actors, to exercise more discretion within regulated spaces.101  
                                                      
93 See generally Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99.  
94 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1. 
95 Levi-Fair & Jordana, supra note 39. 
96 Black, “Decentring Regulation”, supra note 22. 
97 Scott, “Age of Governance”, supra note 42. 
98 See Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2 at 80-81, 126-27. 
99 Ibid at 96-103. 
100 See e.g. Milton Friedman, “Free Markets and Free Speech” (1987) 10 Harv J L 
& Pub Pol'y 1. 
101 Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 2 at 406-08. 
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One of the foundational claims of this neoclassical academic and political 
movement was that the “man on the spot” enjoyed the most intimate vantage point 
that helped him understand complex society.102 For this reason, it was assumed that, 
with the aid of the price mechanism, the “man on the spot” was in the best position to 
make decisions in regulated spaces.103 For instance, Hayek would likely suggest that 
Goldman Sachs does not need a centralized public bureaucracy to operate within the 
global economy. Goldman Sachs is the “man on the spot,” having the most intimate 
knowledge of the ever-changing information it must balance in its decision-making 
processes. What about the knowledge Goldman Sachs lacks? Hayek would argue that 
no actor enjoys perfect knowledge, but the price mechanism adequately supplements 
these limits to be informed about other market actors.104  
The “man on the spot” is plugged into the knowledge of the facts on the 
ground. As such, groups of these actors are collectively, from various decentralized 
locations, in the best positions to exercise governance discretion, since each has an 
intimate knowledge of the small segment of the regulated space in which each 
operates. 105  Consequently, by exploiting the power of information exchange 
                                                      
102 Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99 at 524-25. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Of course, this extends beyond what Hayek was suggesting, but imagine how 
this applies to Hayek’s knowledge theory. See Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra 
note 99. 
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technologies (such as the price mechanism,106 knowledge brokers, and auditing and 
reporting processes 107 ), regulators can create “knowledge networks,” 108  which 
provide decentered actors the additional information they need to coordinate 
activities, and accordingly govern society. 
This sort of thinking emphasizes that an important dimension of an effectively 
regulated space is the willingness of the regulated to respect, follow, and actively 
participate (to the best of their ability) as partners in the regulatory process.109 In fact, 
                                                      
106 See ibid at 524. 
107  Knowledge brokers are people or organizations, who/which act as 
intermediaries between the different manufacturers of knowledge, providing linkages 
and resources. They are conduits for channeling information through a social network 
(like a regulated space). For more on knowledge brokers, see, for example, Gianmario 
Verona, Emanuela Prandelli & Mohanbir Sawhney, “Innovation and Virtual 
Environments: Towards Virtual Knowledge Brokers” (2006) 27 Org Stud 765; 
Andrew B Hargadon, “Brokering Knowledge: Linking Learning and Innovation” 
(2002) 24 Res Org Behav 41; Andrew B Hargadon, “Firms as Knowledge Brokers: 
Lessons in Pursuing Continuous Innovation” (1998) 40 Cal Mgmt Rev 209. 
108 The use of the term “knowledge network” is as an analogy to other literatures 
that use the term. For instance, some have explored the idea of a “knowledge 
network” for coordinating and management at the organization level. See generally 
William Swan et al, “Viewing the Corporate Community as a Knowledge Network” 
(2000) 5 Corp Comm 97; Andreas Seufert, Georg von Krogh & Andrea Bach, 
“Towards Knowledge Networking” (1999) 3 J Knowledge Mgmt 180. Others think of 
it in a most literal sense as a bank of knowledge, and yet, it still has coordinating and 
management application potential, but not so much in the classical regulatory sense. 
See generally Martin Doerr & Dolores Iorizzo, “The Dream of a Global Knowledge 
Network—A New Approach” (2008) 1 J Computing & Cultural Heritage 1; Sandy J 
Andelman et al, “Understanding Environmental Complexity through a Distributed 
Knowledge Network” (2004) 54 BioScience 240. 
109 See Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1 at 88-97.  
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such governance strategies are regarded as dependent upon the information that 
exchanges between regulators and the regulated in order to learn of and respond to 
complex regulatory challenges in a timely and effective manner 110  or, more 
dramatically, simply to avoid regulatory failure. 
Since such information exchanges between actors within a regulated space 
need to be effective, maintaining non-adversarial relationships is given a top priority 
in order to facilitate communication, coordination, and learning.111 The problem is 
that this priority can hamper meaningful enforcement mechanisms in some cases, as 
the regulator becomes fearful that paternalistic punishment of the regulated may 
undermine their partnership, and thus may also compromise the information 
exchanges within the regulated space.112 This places the regulator in a dilemma: if it 
wishes to have effective information exchanges so as to have the best possible 
knowledge about a regulated space, then it must not enforce such regulation with 
vigor, because it may alienate the regulated, upon whom it relies to inform it about 
changes in the regulated space.113 On the other hand, if a regulator does not enforce 
its regulations, or has regulations without “real teeth,” then the regulated may not take 
                                                      
110 See ibid at 65, 70, 79. 
111 See ibid at 88-97. 
112 See ibid. 
113 See ibid. 
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the “law” of the regulated space seriously,114 creating new informal norms, which can 
actually dictate how the regulated space functions and can thus compromise the 
regulator’s intentions.115 
From this perspective, governance is a channeling of discretionary authority 
from government agencies to more hybrid and decentered public–private governance 
processes,116 in the hope of establishing social relationships with “the man on the 
spot.” 117  This channeling is deemed necessary to exploit decentered decision-
making, 118  by using information exchange technologies. This results in the 
replacement of substance-based, state-imposed regulation with process-based, public–
private co-regulation and co-governance.119  
Governments restrict their function to devising strategic plans for regulated 
spaces (called steering), leaving a large portion of the application, monitoring, and 
                                                      
114 See e.g. Clark J Lee, “Federal Regulation of Hospital Resident Work Hours: 
Enforcement with Real Teeth” (2006) 9 J Health Care L & Pol’y 162. 
115 This is what Coffee suggested happened with the Credit Crisis and the shift in 
leverage regulation of banks. See Coffee, “What Went Wrong?”, supra note 12 at 1-
2.  
116 See Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 1 at 7-8. 
117 Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99 at 524. 
118 See Black, “Decentring Regulation”, supra note 22. 
119 See generally Jordana & Levi-Faur, supra note 42. For the dangers this results 
in, see Philip Alston, “Facing Up to the Complexities of the ILO’s Core Labour 
Standards Agenda” (2005) 16 EJIL 467. 
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enforcement of these strategies (called rowing) to non-state actors.120 As a result, 
regulation is becoming intimately linked to other ordering processes, such as markets, 
civil society networks, and the internal control and risk management mechanisms of 
corporate governance.121 In theory, the steering rules are created by the state, but in 
practice this is only partly true, since private participation in strategic rule making is 
becoming more common in regulated spaces. 122  Consequently, the distinction 
between steering and rowing is blurred.123  
For instance, when focusing upon The California Occupational Safety and 
Health Act Cooperative Compliance Plan,124 it is not so easy to draw a distinction 
between the Act’s regulations (steering) and the rules emerging from the regulated 
(rowing).125 Many of the rowing norms are also strategic and steering in nature. The 
                                                      
120 Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion”, supra note 21 at 15-16. 
121 To be clear, although state law will always be present within post-statist 
regulatory processes, it becomes a question of whether the law is steering these 
regulatory processes or whether these regulatory processes are steering themselves. 
122 Harter, supra note 18 at 414-22. 
123 Ibid.; Power, Organized Uncertainty, supra note 88 at 41-42. 
124  For more details on the plan, see Brian Friel, “OSHA: Cooperative 
Compliance” (8 December 1997), online: Government Executive 
<http://www.govexec.com/federal-news/1997/12/osha-cooperative-
compliance/5176/>. 
125  For a general understanding of the situation, see Power, Organized 
Uncertainty, supra note 88 at 36-42. For an analysis of the benefits and pitfalls of the 
strategy of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, see Orly Lobel, “Interlocking 
Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace” (2005) 57 
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blurring between external institutional norms (strategic steering regulations) and 
internal organizational norms (operational rowing norms) demonstrates that the 
differentiation between who is steering and who is rowing is not so clear.126 In such 
heterarchically-regulated spaces, assumptions cannot be made regarding which 
norms, control mechanisms, and regulatory participants are, in fact, directing the 
evolution of regulatory norms at any given time.127  
Regulatory architects within these heterarchically-regulated spaces are 
experimenting with reflexive, 128  responsive, 129  decentered, 130  and collaborative 131 
techniques to harness incentive mechanisms, many times market-based ones.132 The 
                                                                                                                                                          
Admin L Rev 1071 [Lobel, “The Governance of Workplace”]; Marius Aalders & Ton 
Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of 
Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment” (1997) 19 Law & Pol’y 415. 
126 Braithwaite notes the “reality of hybridity between the privatization of the 
public and publicization of the private.” Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra 
note 1 at 8. 
127 See Scott, “Age of Governance”, supra note 42 at 146, 154.  
128 See e.g. Zumbansen, “Law After the Welfare State”, supra note 20; Gunther 
Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 239. 
129 See e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 5. 
130 See e.g. Black, “Decentring Regulation”, supra note 22. 
131 See e.g. Freeman, “Collaborative Governance”, supra note 18. 
132 See e.g. Richard B Stewart & Jonathan B Wiener, “Models for Environmental 
Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches” (1992) 19 BC Envtl 
Aff L Rev 547. 
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umbrella term, “regulatory capitalism,” captures many of these dimensions of 
decentered governance.133 Looking forward, future regulated spaces may host co-
governance mechanisms in which the state, although present, plays a minor role. Such 
spaces of the future have been associated with an understanding of the “post-
regulatory state.”134 Many elements of this post-regulatory state exist today, including 
auditing and reporting mechanisms135 and the incorporation of private monitoring of 
regulated spaces by non-state gatekeepers.136 These gatekeepers can dwell in civil 
society, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals does,137 or in the 
                                                      
133 See e.g. David Levi-Faur, “Regulatory Architectures for a Global Democracy: 
On Democratic Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism” in Tony Porter & Karsten Ronit, 
eds, The Challenges of Global Business Authority: Democratic Renewal, Stalemate, 
or Decay? (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010) 205 [LeviFaur, 
“Regulatory Architectures”]; David Levi-Faur, “Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism: 
Sectors and Nations in the Making of a New Global Order” (2006) 19 Governance 
363 [LeviFaur, “Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism”]; Levi-Fair & Jordana, supra 
note 39. 
134 Scott, “Age of Governance”, supra note 42 at 146. 
135 Power, Organized Uncertainty, supra note 88 at 53, 90, 152-81; see also 
Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) [Power, Audit Society]. 
136 See John C Coffee, Jr, “Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on 
Modern Securities Regulations” (1997) 52 Bus Law 1195 [Coffee, “Brave New 
World?”]; John C Coffee, Jr, “Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms” (2004) 84 BUL Rev 301 at 305-07, 334-35 [Coffee, 
Jr, “Gatekeeper Failure”]. 
137 How Is a Company Certified as Cruelty-Free? (last visited 28 August 2012) 
online: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
<http://www.peta.org/about/faq/how-is-a-company-certified-as-cruelty-free.aspx>.  
 
 
 258 
business sector, such as Moody’s Investors Services does.138 This proliferation of 
these mechanisms is the most obvious sign of this emerging decentered order.139 But 
the question remains: Will these private actors have the requisite public spiritedness 
to sacrifice self-interest when called upon to do so? 
E. Conclusion 
As already suggested, faith in the reassertion of the public interest within 
governance appears in a spectrum of governance literatures. It suggests that a 
counterbalance to privatization is occurring.140 The hope is that, as the bright-line 
distinction between public and private blurs further, some of the rationalities that 
legitimate profit making on the cusp of legality141 will be brought under more 
“unwieldy” public,142 and more careful academic,143 scrutiny resulting in for-profit 
actors becoming more socially minded.  
                                                      
138 Moody’s, online: <http://www.moodys.com/>. 
139 See generally Power, Audit Society, supra note 135; see also Power, Organized 
Uncertainty, supra note 88; Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything: 
Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (London: Demos, 2004) [Power, Risk 
Management of Everything]. 
140 See generally Freeman, “Extending Public Law”, supra note 3; Braithwaite, 
“Neoliberalism”, supra note 4 at 8, 18; Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra 
note 1; Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7. 
141 See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 38-39.  
142 “Talking about a Revolution: A Fascinating and Unwieldy Movement in 
Search of a Narrative”, The Economist (7 April 2012) online: 
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Linguistically, the language of “public-private partnership” 144  and 
“governance”145 has been introduced more frequently into the lexicon of regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.economist.com/node/21552179> [“Talking about a Revolution”]; “Rage 
Against the Machine: People are Right to be Angry. But it is Also Right to be 
Worried about Where Populism Could Take Politics”, The Economist (22 October 
2011) online: www.economist.com/node/21533400 [“Rage Against the Machine”]. 
143 See e.g. David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, “Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The 
Corporation as a Governance Object” (2012) 32 Seattle UL Rev 1469; Aaron K 
Chatterji & Barak D Richman, “Progressive Visions of the Corporation: 
Understanding the ‘Corporate’ in Corporate Social Responsibility” (2008) 2 Harv L 
& Pol’y Rev 33; Ruth V Aguilera et al, “Putting the S Back in Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Social Change in Organizations” (2007) 32 
Acad Mgmt Rev 836; Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, 
The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
144 See generally Aidan R Vining & Anthony E Boardman, “Public-Private 
Partnerships: Eight Rules for Governments” (2008) 13 Pub Works Mgmt Pol’y 149; 
Chris Skelcher, “Public-Private Partnerships and Hybridity” in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence 
E Lynn, Jr & Christopher Pollitt, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 347; Akintola Akintoye, Matthias Beck, 
Cliff Hardcastle, Public-Private Partnerships: Managing Risks and Opportunities 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Wolfgang Kleinwachter, “From Self-Governance to 
Public-Private Partnership: The Changing Role of Governments in the Management 
of the Internet's Core Resources” (2003) 36 Loy LA L Rev 1103 ; Stephen Osborne, 
ed, Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective 
(London: Routledge, 2000); ES Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships 
(New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000); Gerry Stoker, “Public-Private 
Partnerships and Urban Governance” in Jon Pierre, ed, Partnerships in Urban 
Governance: European and American Experience (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 
Press, 1998)  34. 
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New Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jody Freeman, “The 
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discourse. Politically, a “double movement”146 against privatization and deregulation 
has increased support globally for greater accountability of for-profit actors.147 
Vocationally, a strong corporate social responsibility discourse has entered into many 
top American business schools.148 But functionally, are for-profit actors assuming the 
role of public servants? There is scant evidence to support the claim, but faith in the 
publicization of for-profit activities within governance remains strong.149 
So, is this faith in publicization misplaced? Jody Freeman’s account of 
publicization assumes some particular conditions need to be present. She describes 
private actors promising to uphold “traditionally public goals,” because this is “the 
price” governments demand in order for these private actors to have access to these 
                                                                                                                                                          
Pierre, “Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration” 
(1998) 8 J Pub Adm Res Theory 223. 
146 Polanyi, supra note 33 at 79, 136. 
147 “Talking about a Revolution”, supra note 142; “Rage Against the Machine”, 
supra note 142. 
148  Top US business schools with a new emphasis on Corporate Social 
Responsibility include: University of Michigan (Ross), Yale School of Management, 
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Notre Dame (Mendoza), University of 
California Berkeley (Haas), New York University (Stern), Columbia Business 
School, University of Virginia (Darden), Cornell (Johnson), and George Washington 
University School of Business. Cindy Hoots, “The Aspen Institute’s Top 10 Business 
Schools Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility” (21 October 2009) online: 
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149 Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7 at 4. 
149 Freeman, “Extending Public Law”, supra note 3 at 1285. 
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“lucrative opportunities.”150  Does privatization play out under these conditions? Are 
governments generally in the position to make such demands? Short of having to 
cope with a crisis of catastrophic political proportions, are governments willing and 
able to reverse privatization initiatives merely because they are disappointed with the 
performance of private actors? 
Some suggest not, arguing that the state withdrew from being a service 
provider because it could not afford to provide such services.151 This is a story of 
governments amassing debt in a manner that no financially prudent and socially 
conscious citizen with an eye to the welfare of the next generation could tolerate,152 
so they were forced to privatize. This would not appear to be a situation in which 
private actors would be fearful that a government might reverse privatization, if 
private actors failed to uphold traditionally public goals. 
That said, this financial justification for state withdrawal may not be 
altogether convincing, considering that, in the American context, every 
                                                      
150 Ibid.  
151 For a historical perspective post-Bretton Woods, see Thomas L Friedman, The 
Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). For a more 
contemporary rationality of the fiscal pressures facing the state, see Reuven S Avi-
Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” 
(2000) 113 Harv L Rev 1573. 
152 Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S. 
Government (2013) online: 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf>, 
at 5-10, 21-23. 
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administration, both Democratic and Republican, since the Reagan Administration 
has increased the national debt.153 In fact, the Reagan Administration, which to many 
represents the model for fiscal responsibility, did not decrease the overall national 
debt over its two terms.154 Either way, considering the massive amount of national 
debt in the United States, it appears unlikely that private actors need be too fearful 
that the government will reverse privatization—at least in the American context.  
Placing the issue of financial capacity to one side, both the risk and decentered 
regulation literatures suggest that governments cannot reverse privatization, because 
government experts alone cannot determine how to regulate society. In short, 
governments need privatization. Thus, the idea that publicization is the price that 
governments demand in order for private actors to have access to “lucrative 
opportunities” may not be accurate. The more frightening possibility, and possibly the 
more accurate one, is precisely the opposite: privatization is the price that private 
actors demand in order for governments to be able to govern adequately.  
                                                      
153 Ibid at 22-23 (charting the budget deficit from Reagan up to present). 
154 Braithwaite notes the financial analysis of Tramontozzi and Chilton, writing: 
“Overall, real business regulatory spending increased 10 per cent during the Reagan 
years.” See Braithwaite, “Neoliberalism”, supra note 4 at 8 (citing PN Tramontozzi & 
KW Chilton, US Regulatory Agencies Under Reagan, 1960-1988 (St. Louis, 
Missouri: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 
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III. THE GATES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are a number of rudimental ideas that have become anchors for how 
judges, lawyers, and corporate legal scholars understand the corporation and the law 
that regulates it. This section introduces a number of them. Although each of these 
ideas is presented in a largely uncontested manner in this section, of course, there are 
minority voices that contest them.155 That said, corporate legal scholars in the 
American context tend to be more conservative than their European counterparts, and 
thus, many of the ideas presented below are seen by many as commonsense positions 
in the American academy. 
A. The Free Market and Lex Mercatoria   
At its core, free market ideology suggests that if societies strive toward the 
ideal free market, many of today’s social problems would be closer to being 
alleviated.156 Although many accept this without much investigation, the notion is 
                                                      
155 See e.g. William Kline, “Criteria for Good Laws of Business Associations” 
(2005) 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 13; William Bratton, “Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in 
Corporate Law” (2005) 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 59. 
156 See Friedman, supra note 48 at 201-02 (“I believe that we shall be able to 
preserve and extend freedom…But we shall be able to do so…only if we persuade 
our fellow men that free institutions offer a surer…route to the ends they seek than 
the coercive power of the state.”); Murray N Rothbard, Economy, and State with 
Power and State, 2d ed (Auburn, Ala: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009) (“The more 
the market principle prevails in a society, therefore, the greater will be that society’s 
freedom and its prosperity.”). 
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rooted in the story of the medieval European merchant order.157 This order existed 
beyond state law. 158  Accordingly, it was developed though custom and best 
practice.159 Merchants developed and administered their own laws, and the state 
rarely interfered.160 To many, it is a shining example of a period of a purer private 
ordering, in which market mechanisms and social norms governed and society 
flourished.161 This story of lex mercatoria  (merchant law) celebrates the past prowess 
and future potential of the free market.   
                                                      
157 López Rodríguez argues that, during the middle ages, which for hundreds of 
years, at uniform commercial rules, which were enforced through “the market 
tribunals of the various European trade centers.” Ana M López Rodríguez, Lex 
Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract Law in the EU (Copenhagen: DJØF, 
2003) at 87. 
158 It is suggested that these medieval uniform rules did not “benefit of state 
enforcement of contracts,” but solely “evolved their own private code of laws,” which 
was enforced by “local official or a private merchant.” Paul R Milgrom, Douglass C 
North & Barry R Weingast, “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The 
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs” (1990) 2 Econ & Pol 1 at 
2. 
159 This medieval merchant law, which developed privately through best practice, 
provides a model for how law should be constructed and implemented today. Robert 
D Cooter, “Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant” (1996) 144 U Pa L Rev 1643 at 1647; see also 
Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 158 at 2. 
160 Ibid. 
161 See e.g. Cooter, supra note 159 at 1647; see also Friedman, supra note 48 
(applying this idea in a more general and obvious way). 
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Although this story is not historically accurate, it still establishes a “common 
ground” for the proponents of the free market.162 It is used as the model solution to 
solve social problems.163  Free market champions hold this image of the free market 
in their minds—and hearts—when they advocate for the protection of the freedom of 
contract, the inalienability of property, and minimal government intervention.164 Their 
arguments hint that a world without government is possible and desirable.165 Their 
views reflect a deep mistrust of government,166 and a conviction that market function 
can spontaneously order complex society effectively.167 This faith in free market 
ideology loosely underpins much of corporate governance thinking.  
                                                      
162 Ralf Michaels, “Legal Medievalism in Lex Mercatoria Scholarship” (2012) 90 
Tex L Rev 259 at 264. 
163 Ibid. 
164 See Friedman, supra note 48; Rothbard, supra note 156 at 1337-47. 
165 See Bruce L Benson, “Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive 
Societies: Law without Government” (1989) 9 J Libertarian Stud 1; Rothbard, supra 
note 156. 
166  See e.g. FA Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 50th Anniversary ed (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994) [Hayek, Road to Serfdom]. 
167 See Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99 at 519-20. Hayek claimed that 
markets lead to “a more efficient allocation of societal resources than any design 
could achieve.” Christina Petsoulas, Hayek’s Liberalism and Its Origins: His Idea of 
Spontaneous Order and the Scottish Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 2001) at 2 
(2001) (citing Hayek). 
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B. Corporate Law as Merely Protector of the Market Mechanism 
Much of corporate legal scholarship regards corporate law as the protector of 
the freedom of contract and the alienability of property. It is thought that by simply 
protecting these fundamentals of market function, corporate law ensures that 
corporate management will be driven by competition to constantly strive for lower 
transaction costs and, as a result, greater efficiency within the corporation.168  
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained that unlike administrative 
law, in which the discretion of administrative officials needs to be tightly constrained, 
corporate law does not have to police corporate managers in the same way.169 The 
reason is that there is already an enforcement mechanism in place—the market.170 If 
corporate managers do not do their jobs, then corporate profits decrease, which 
affects share price and results in ex ante contractual penalties for the managers.171 
These penalties potentially include a decrease in the value of stock options, 
termination of employment, damage to reputation, and acquisition.172  
                                                      
168 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 141 at 35. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid at 2-3, 35. 
171 Ibid at 6. 
172 Ibid. 
 
 
 267 
For the market mechanism to enforce efficient internal order within corporate 
governance, corporate law need only address the issues related to agency between 
shareholders and management—to be clear, corporate law need only ensure that 
corporate managers have one “master:” shareholders.173 The market mechanism will 
do the rest. Otherwise, if corporate law directs corporate managers to have loyalties to 
both the investor and the community, the law would free managers from the 
discipline of the market, opening up the opportunity for them to serve neither.174  
An idea that accompanies this thinking is that, for regulators to police 
corporate behavior, they need only harness the market. For instance, if a regulator 
imposes a large enough fine for a violation of a regulation, the regulator will have 
made effective use of the firm’s strength. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the 
firm’s strength is its ability to calculate risks and rewards, and thus, imposing such a 
fine will effectively prevent violation of the said regulation.175  
Of course, this regulatory solution is not nuanced, effectively enforcing large 
fines against corporations, but it does provide an adequate rationality to protect the 
operation of the market mechanism within corporate governance, which is what is 
really at stake for corporate legal scholars like Easterbrook and Fischel—economic 
accountability not social responsibility. With this solution to regulatory challenges, 
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the status quo corporate structure remains. In theory, the corporation is still 
encouraged to “maximize wealth” creation,176 while regulators have an effective 
mechanism to alter behavior without reforming corporate law.177 This arrangement 
leaves “managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants [shareholders] 
subject to the social constraints.”178  
Upon reflection, Easterbrook and Fischel clearly established the public/private 
distinction within corporate law, constructing precisely where the iron gates against 
government intervention within corporate law ought to be constructed—at its very 
border. Most corporate legal scholars agree with Easterbrook and Fischel that 
corporate law best serves society as an economizing device, which facilitates wealth 
creation and encourages corporate management to keep transaction costs low and 
profits high.179 
C. Corporate Law as the Product of the Market Mechanism 
In 1974, William Cary argued that states were competing to attract 
incorporations to increase state revenues.180 He thought that this was creating a 
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dangerous “race-to-the-bottom” for corporate governance standards.181 He suggested 
that Delaware, in particular, created corporate governance standards that favored 
managerial interests, because corporate managers tended to be the incorporators, and 
the state’s budget was dependent upon revenues from incorporations. 182  As a 
consequence, state competition for incorporations was resulting in managers enjoying 
broad and unchecked authority, resulting in less-than-optimal corporate 
performance.183  
In 1977, Ralph Winter wrote a reply to Cary, rejecting his position by arguing 
that state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the shareholders’ 
relationship to the corporation is concerned” and, thus, corporate governance 
standards, like those of Delaware, “are optimal legal arrangements.”184 He agreed 
with Cary that corporate management ultimately had the consumer power over 
incorporation, but argued that managers would select corporate law that reduce 
transaction costs and led to more profitable business organizations.185 Thus, this state 
                                                      
181 Ibid at 666. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Ibid at 668-69. 
184 Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation” (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 251 at 254. 
185 Ibid at 255. 
 
 
 270 
competition produced an optimal corporate law regime.186  Put differently, what Cary 
regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter regarded as a “race-to-the-top.”187 
This debate has had a number of reincarnations,188 and Winter’s position has 
consistently won the debate, creating the impression that corporate law is not a 
product of politics, but the product of market forces.189 Even though recent empirical 
evidence suggests that there is no competition at all and that other states simply do 
not compete with Delaware for its primacy over incorporations for publicly held 
corporations in America,190 the perception that US corporate law is the product of 
market demands and competition between states still persists.191 
When combined with the other normative messages address above, one can 
appreciate that many corporate legal thinkers are convinced that a corporate law 
shaped by market forces would lead to an optimal corporate law regime, and that any 
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political meddling, such as an attempt to publicize corporate governance, would be 
rejected out of hand as, at best, suboptimal, and as, at worst, radical, unworkable, and 
blindly naïve. 
D. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts 
As regards corporate legal theory, it is important to stress from the outset that 
the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory192 
always inform the legal understanding of the corporation,193 because the modern 
corporation has always been 194  a group of aggregate constituents 195  connected 
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through contract, 196  while at the same time the corporation is an entity with 
personhood that only exists because of a concession made by the state.197 Today, in 
the American legal context, the corporation is generally thought of in terms of a 
version of a theory overbalanced 198  with a contractarian understanding of the 
corporation, which is captured by the nexus-of-contracts theory.199 This chapter calls 
this the aggregate contractarian theory. 
This imbalance within American corporate theory 200  conveys an 
understanding of the corporation as a set of consensual and efficient contracts that 
bind corporate constituents.201 This version of corporate theory suggests that a high 
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level of efficiency occurs between corporate constituents because relaxed legal 
requirements allow market forces to inspire them to optimally negotiate contracts to 
satisfy their own interests.202 Since this arrangement is regarded as the best option for 
the corporation as an economizing device,203 it follows that corporate law must 
remain permissive, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally suboptimal.204  
Upon closer inspection of corporate governance, this theory suggests that 
large sophisticated investors play a central role in making corporate governance work 
within this legal-market framework.205 In theory, professional investors and their 
consultants provide analysis of corporate management, governance structures, 
debt/equity ratios, and relative prowess when compared to competitors,206 which 
supplies the price mechanism with enough information for debt and equity markets to 
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reward good corporate practice and punish poor performance. 207  Thus, just as 
Easterbrook and Fischel suggested, what emerges is a corporate law that allows 
markets to function competently, encouraging “what is optimal for the firm and 
investors.”208  
Within this aggregate contractarian theory, fair treatment of corporate 
constituents is rationalized as follows. If a corporate constituent does not like the 
terms upon which it is about to contract with a corporation, it can negotiate for new 
terms, demand a higher price for contracting, or choose not to enter into a contract 
with the corporation in question.209 It is a consensual relationship.210 If a constituent 
(shareholder) is unhappy and there are highly liquid markets, the constituent can 
“exit” the relationship. If enough shareholders exit, this will decrease share value and 
trigger a reason for management to prevent further exits, 211  thereby policing 
managerial opportunism.  
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Furthermore, the cost of contracting will encourage corporate managers to 
make choices that balance the transaction costs of making a decision between all of 
the constituents affected.212 In this way, contract enforces a balance of power between 
constituents, for although corporate managers have much of the ex ante authority,213 
the contractual ex post consequences discipline such discretionary behavior.214 For 
instance, efficient, rational incorporators will select rules when incorporating that 
balance the transaction costs of deviating from the off-the-rack default rules of 
incorporation with the perceived benefit of doing so. 215  Such freedom of rule 
selection allows the corporate form to have greater flexibility to respond to market 
demands and opportunities.216  
That said, some mandatory obligations are imposed upon directors and 
management in an attempt to counter the inherent potential for power and/or 
information asymmetries between actors within corporate hierarchies. 217  But 
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generally speaking, such mandatory rules are discouraged, since most are deemed to 
be unnecessary, because the cost of electing to adopt choices that obviously 
disadvantage, for instance, shareholders or creditors is so high that these choices 
become de facto mandatory; the market disciplines, while still leaving discretion for 
dynamic, entrepreneurial decision-making options.218  
This aggregate contractarian perspective also discourages courts from 
attempting to compensate ex post facto for any ex ante errors in negotiating. If 
constituents of the corporation fail to negotiate for the risks involved in a particular 
contractual relationship, courts should just leave it to the market to police.219 Thus, 
from this perspective, the role of the courts ought to be as follows: “The courts may 
not rewrite [corporate contracts] under the guise of relieving one of the parties from 
the hardship of an improvident bargain. The Court cannot protect the parties from a 
bad bargain and it will not protect them from bad luck.”220 In this light, corporate law, 
and its judicial application, appears somewhat insensitive to the inequalities between 
contracting parties, because it is hesitant to impose a stricter standard than freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                          
that director. O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 215 at 277; see also Broz v Cellular 
Information Systems, Inc, 673 A 2d 148 at 154-56 (Del Sup Ct 1996). 
218 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 141 at 34-35. 
219 See Concord Auto Auction, Inc v Rustin, 627 F Supp 1526 at 1531–32 (Dist 
Mass 1986). 
220 Ibid.  
 
 
 277 
contract, since doing so might inadvertently undermine market discipline and, 
therefore, the corporation as an economizing device.221  
E. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Law  
In the classic corporate social responsibility of the Berle–Dodd debate of the 
1930s, the issue was whether corporate power ought to be in the hands of 
shareholders as public interest representatives or managers as stewards of society.222 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the shift from corporate social responsibility (direct social 
obligation) to corporate responsibility (indirect social obligation through wealth 
creation) is captured by Easterbrook and Fischel’s classic one master theory: if 
managers are only accountable to shareholders as investors, the market will force 
corporate responsibility (profitmaking).223 If managers are burdened by split loyalties, 
the door is open for managerial opportunism, and accordingly wealth production is 
compromised.224 It was claimed that such interference could easily jeopardize profits, 
which will have a net negative impact upon all constituents within these 
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organizations, because the capacity to generate wealth is sacrificed in a blind attempt 
to achieve fairness.225 From this perspective, by producing wealth, managers are most 
responsible to society.226 
The Easterbrook and Fischel position has been so important in shaping the 
American position that it deserves some further explanation. As mentioned, they 
suggested that using regulations, other than corporate law, to cultivate markets that 
better deal with price uncertainties227 would be the best way to circumscribe corporate 
for-profit activities without undermining the corporation as an economizing device.228 
For instance, if a regulator wants to prevent a corporation from releasing pollutants 
into a river, do not try to change corporate function through reforming corporate law, 
but create a regulatory mechanism within the Environmental Protection Act for 
monitoring and fining potential river polluters. If the enforcement mechanism is 
sound, then no rational market actor will attempt to violate this law, because the 
potential risk grossly outweighs the potential profit. In other words, if regulators 
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understand that corporate actors will violate the law if it is profitable to do so, then 
regulators can create the appropriate regulatory incentives to manipulate corporate 
behavior.   
This was a game changer in American corporate legal scholarship; corporate 
social responsibility of the Berle–Dodd debate shifted to a corporate responsibility 
debate in mainstream corporate legal scholarship. Shareholders were no longer 
characterized as proxies of the public interest, as Berle suggested, 229  but as 
investors.230 Directors were no longer characterized as stewards of society, as Dodd 
suggested,231 but as champions of investors as a class.232 As a result, the corporation 
is understood as a tool, which best serves society when it solely focuses upon profit 
making, creating the wealth necessary for other segments of society to cope with the 
world’s problems.  
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F. Conclusion 
From the corporate legal perspective today, corporations are not expected, nor 
encouraged, to be imbued with public spiritedness. They are profit-making 
organizations that are encouraged to act in a self-interested manner. There are a 
number of interconnected assumptions that legitimate this perspective. First, the 
corporation can best serve society by being an efficient wealth creation devise.233 
Second, direct legal intervention in corporate governance undermines the efficiency 
of corporate wealth creation.234 Third, if managers serve one master—shareholders—
then markets can police corporate managers and preserve the efficiency of corporate 
wealth creation.235 Fourth, corporate law must therefore enforce shareholder interests 
within corporate governance.236 Fifth, corporate law then must almost exclusively 
engage in agency issues between shareholders and management.237 Sixth, if regulators 
want to circumscribe the profit-making function of corporations, then areas of law 
other than corporate law must be employed to change the price of doing business that 
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corporations face.238 As a result, most corporate legal scholars view corporate law as 
legitimate when it serves as a conservative mechanism to avoid public interference 
and regulatory reform.  
This is the mindset that dominates American corporate legal culture. Although 
there are always dissenting opinions, this is the commonsense position in the business 
world. Regulators would face serious resistance if they attempted to experiment with 
corporate law in ways that might compromise the corporation as an economizing 
device.239  
So, what about new governance’s hope of “publicization of the private?” If 
the normative claims suggested above are accurate, then publicization might have 
traction as a marketing campaign if there is money in it; otherwise…well…it is a bit 
naïve. Publicization stands in the face of what is deemed to be the common sense 
position within corporate governance thinking.  
IV. THE NARRATIVE OF ENTRENCHED PRIVATIZATION    
From a different perspective than what was outlined in the last section, this 
section reconnects to the idea of technocratic narratives, which were mentioned 
earlier, suggesting that there is an additional quality that governance narratives 
possess, which tends to discourage publicization. This quality is a lack of humanistic 
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narratives, which can divorce decision-making from what is at stake, namely the 
violent consequences of that particular decision upon a segment of society.240 
To explain this quality, this chapter draws a distinction between two types of 
narrative: humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives. This chapter defines 
humanistic narratives as storylines with identifiable characters and a time sequence, 
which reveals the causes and consequences of characters’ actions. Humanistic 
narratives grant the readers/listeners a digestible message, which mirrors life 
experience. On the other side of the distinction are technocratic narratives, which this 
chapter defines as accounts used by technical experts and professionals, who are 
attempting to employ a spectrum of scientific methodologies, but most predominately 
economic ones, in order to attempt to resolve governance issues.  
Mae Kuykendall, in her article about the lack of strong narrative in corporate 
governance, chooses to label technocratic narrative as “discourses,” and humanistic 
narratives has just narrative.241 She argues that corporate law lacks the sort of 
narratives “that attract human interest,” even though the corporation is a significant 
site for “human activity.”242 Accordingly, although one might expect humanistic 
narratives, they are rarely present or employed within corporate governance. 
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Kuykendall further notes that technocratic narratives in corporate governance 
generally rely upon economic analysis of corporate interactions, which has the 
sanitizing effect of obscuring the social costs of particular choices. 243  David 
Westbrook agrees,244 adding that such lack of humanistic narrative also fails to 
provide corporate governance with heroes that inspire virtue.245 
One can clearly appreciate that this lack of humanistic narrative is damaging 
to the hope of publicization. Yet, the situation may be even more alarming when one 
takes into account the effects of technocratic narratives upon governance more 
broadly. For instance, Kerry Rittich suggests that the problems identified by corporate 
scholars, such as Kuykendall and Westbrook, might reach beyond corporate 
governance to impact public administrative agencies as well.246  
To digress for a moment, by the twentieth century, enlightened modern 
thinkers were painfully aware of the loss of normative certainty that accompanied 
accepting Nietzsche’s thesis that the understanding of good was historically 
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contingent.247 Without normative certainty, decision makers grasped for the scientific 
method, which promised to reveal the “real issues at stake” by providing social facts 
upon which sound regulatory frameworks could be constructed.248 This legitimated 
decision-making functions in a manner that mere power or politics could not. The 
employment of social sciences by administrative agencies to solve social problems in 
this manner has been called functionalism. 
Reflecting on the work of John Willis, Rittich argues that functionalism was 
successful in the New Deal Era, because it provided “a way to depoliticize the 
process of adjudication and diffuse the conflicts among the courts, the executive and 
the legislature.”249 During the interwar period in England, functionalists, such as 
Willis, defended the expansion of the modern administrative state, which was striving 
to meet the public's demands for greater state involvement in English society.250 As 
Martin Loughlin explains: 
The functionalist style offered an alternative way of addressing the 
issues that were presenting themselves for resolution as matters of 
public law. It was therefore a practical, reformist approach, offering 
solutions to a variety of legal challenges facing modern government 
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and spanning the range from institutional reforms to alternative modes 
of interpretation and methods of legal reasoning. This practical 
program of law reform was directly tied to the broader political 
movement encompassed under the broad heads of new liberalism, 
social democracy, progressivism, or democratic socialism.251 
The British functionalist movement paralleled that of American Legal Realists, 
embracing governance by teams of experts, who could use their mastery of science to 
determine what was best for society. 252  
John Dewey rejected this expert paternalism, which subsequently made his 
ideas unfashionable at the time, but he pressed on, insisting that if a “government by 
experts” did not earnestly consult citizens, then such government could amount to no 
more than “an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few.”253 He insisted “[T]he 
enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take 
account of the needs [of the masses].”254 But progressives, such as Willis, believed 
such administrative expertise could determine what was best for citizens, legitimating 
their authority in the modern world by paving the path to progress with their technical 
knowledge.  
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Today, the technocratic mindset of functionalism remains the same; however, 
as Rittich suggests, its use has changed, supporting the conservative interests it once 
rivaled.255 Rittich argues that regulators now measure the performance of their 
institutions “by the extent to which they further efficient transactions and encourage 
private-sector activity.”256 She continues, “[T[hese objectives, in turn, are typically 
understood to involve creating the legal infrastructure that furthers the interests of 
investors and capital holders through, inter alia, enhanced protection for property and 
contract rights.”257 Rittich describes an emerging power structure for governance in 
which “[c]adres of technocrats and professionals…set the terms and conditions under 
which states, markets, civil society groups, and individuals interact.”258 This has led 
some to agree, in retrospect, that Dewey’s rejection of expert paternalism259 may have 
deserved greater credence at the time. 
The dangers of technocratic narratives have been clearly echoed by other 
scholars. On the more radical end of the spectrum is David Harvey. Harvey regards 
this problem of technocratic narrative as reaching far beyond legal discourse. He 
views such narratives as part of a conscious campaign over communication to create a 
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“hegemonic discourse,” which is propagated through mass media, in particular the 
entertainment industry.260 In Harvey’s opinion, this hegemonic discourse has already 
corrupted “ways of thought and political economic practices to the point where it is 
now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world.”261 
Thus, from his Marxian perspective, such narratives are powerful examples of how 
Capitalists have adapted and reasserted their ideology so as to once again lure the 
Proletariats into undermining their own interests. Harvey believes this to be one of the 
central achievements of the neoliberal movement.262  
Like Harvey, Rittich suggests that ideology is corrupting governance, using a 
scientific and technical language, which appears depoliticized but in fact limits 
choices within the “regulatory calculus” to those that embrace “efficiency, expertise, 
and cost-containment.” 263  In this way, humanistic narratives are regarded as 
unsuitable, and are thus marginalized, within decision-making. Rittich’s argument 
demonstrates how technocratic narratives depoliticize, and dehumanize, social 
conflicts by divorcing them from the personal, and necessarily political humanistic 
narratives in the name of the scientific method. What is dangerous about this 
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dehumanization of narrative is that social conflicts can be abstractified, practically 
concealing the connection between particular choices and the violent consequences of 
that particular course of action upon a segment of society. Thomas Nagel brings home 
this last point when he wrote: “Once the door is opened to calculations of utility…, 
the usual speculations… can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those 
responsible for a certain number of charred babies.”264 
What the positions of Kuykendall, Harvey, and Rittich all have in common is 
the lament over the underlying ideology that has presently captured technocratic 
narratives. They each highlight, in different ways, how technocratic narratives guide 
their users to prioritize economic needs over social needs when it is necessary to 
choose between the two. As Harvey pointed out, the normative message that 
economic needs must always be the priority over all others presents itself as 
commonsense, radicalizing any suggestion to the contrary.265  
Kuykendall’s approach inspires meaningful discourse between ideological 
adversaries, since it allows for a critical reflection upon particular communication 
without heightening the distinction between such adversaries. One can imagine that 
approaching such a discourse like an embattled Proletariat would probably prove to 
be less than successful. Kuykendall approaches sensitive issues with tact, so as not to 
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alienate a corporate legal audience, which usually tends to be conservative. Consider 
Kuykendall’s tact in the following passage: 
The absence of [humanistic] narrative from corporate law is 
substantially explained by the nature of the undertaking of producing 
wealth and by the social formation of business. The absence of [such] 
narrative is not a nefarious scheme to undermine critique, although it 
tends to have that effect. Rather, the underlying project of generating 
wealth does not produce rich human stories.266  
Kuykendall’s approach does not point fingers at Capitalists and the cadres of 
technocrats, who Harvey would suggest are operating behind the scenes to control 
societies. As a result, the chance of constructive bipartisan debate, as well as the 
potential emancipation from a particular mindset, becomes more likely, since 
criticism can be deftly directed at a normative level rather than a more personal one. 
In fact, her article sparked broad debate in the corporate legal community, resulting in 
a symposium at Michigan State University College of Law entitled the Business Law 
and Narrative Symposium.267 
In conclusion, the problem of a lack of humanistic narrative appears not to be 
isolated to private governance (corporate governance), but also appears to seriously 
threaten public governance (administrative agencies) as well. Again publicization 
                                                      
266 Kuykendall, supra note 241 at 555.  
267 Michigan State University College of Law, News Release, “Michigan State 
Law Review to Host Business Law and Narrative Symposium” (10 Sep 2009) online: 
<http://www.law.msu.edu/news/2009/releases/business-narrative.html>. 
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suggests that there will be the “percolation”268 of values from public governance to 
private governance. So, if this percolation process transports values from public to 
private, what happens when there needs to be a publicization of the public as well? 
The above account suggests that this might be the case. And if this is the case, then 
the project of new governance might be even more dangerously optimistic than this 
chapter suggests. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to dash the hopes of those who quell their fear of 
privatization with the faith that the clouds shall part and corporate doves imbued with 
the twin virtues of benevolent kindness and efficiency shall save us all from the woes 
of modern governance. Based on the literatures reviewed, there is little merit in 
hoping that this will occur. The blurring of public and private in governance today 
will not lead to the publicization of corporations in some spontaneous way—to think 
otherwise amounts to magical thinking. 
That said, magical thinking has an important role in the cultivation of 
ideology. Those that champion privatization have the “foundation myth” of the 
medieval lex mericatoria269—the promise of a pure free market, which can shepherd 
                                                      
268 Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism”, supra note 7 at 4. 
269 For more on how such “foundation myths” function, see Nicholas HD Foster, 
“Foundation Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law Merchant and the New Lex 
Mercatoria” (2005) Forum Historiae Juris, online: 
 
 
 291 
a commoditized humanity through the wonders of the price mechanism.270 If this is 
so, then does the myth of publicization create an appropriate counterview of social 
order, adequately challenging the vision of a pure free market, and legitimating 
opposition to it? A better myth is possible. 
There needs to be more of a stress on social justice,271 equality,272 and the 
socioeconomic impacts of privatization. 273  Maybe there needs to be a louder 
campaign that stresses an understanding of privatization through the lens of human 
rights,274 which asserts that international customary law obliges275 governments to 
                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0503foster.htm>; see also Michaels, supra note 162 at 
264-65, 267. 
270 See e.g. Hayek, “Use of Knowledge”, supra note 99. 
271 See e.g. Demetrius S. Iatridis, “The Social Justice and Equality Contexts of 
Privatization” in Demetrius S Iatridis, ed, Social Justice and The Welfare State in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Privatization (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
2000) 3. 
272 See e.g. ibid. 
273  See e.g. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, “Water Privatisation and Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa” (2004) 8 Law, Democracy & Dev 181. 
274 See e.g. William W Felice, The Global New Deal: Economic and Social 
Human Rights in World Politics (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); 
Alana Klein, “Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the 
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights” (2008) 39 Colum HRL 
Rev 351. 
275 Although some argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “is not 
binding,” they argue that “most of its rights have been incorporated into the domestic 
legal systems of most countries…especially…the rights in the Declaration’s first 
‘column’ [namely civil and political rights].” Mary Ann Glendon, “The Rule of Law 
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ensure that each of their citizens has the rights to dignity, an adequate standard of 
living, housing, social services, and education.276 Maybe there also needs to be further 
declarations that these rights are binding upon all nations,277 and thus, are “not 
negotiable!”278 Of course, this is only one of many options, which could coordinate 
and galvanize the fragmentation of social reaction that Polanyi predicted in his theory 
of the double movement. 
                                                                                                                                                          
in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2004) 2 Nw U J Int'l Hum Rts 5. 
Hannum takes the broader view that, in principle, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights may be invoked as a source of customary international law and is, in 
its entirety, binding (again stressing in principle). Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law” (1995) 25 
Ga J Int'l & Comp L 287. In accordance with Hannum’s view, it can be argued that 
there is a legal and moral obligation upon all nations to enforce not only civil and 
political rights, but also social and economic rights. For more on the differences, 
compare the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171; Can TS 1976 No 47, 6 ILM 368, with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, GA Res 
2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316; 993 UNTS 3; 6 ILM 368 [ICESCR]. 
276 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 
71 (1948) articles 22, 25-26. 
277 See Hannum, supra note 275 at 289, 319, 323-25, 330-34.  
278  Irina Bokova (Director-General), Message from the Director-General of 
UNESCO, online: UNESCO 
<http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/2011/unesco.shtml> (“Whatever the 
circumstances or complexity of the challenges that we face, the observance of human 
rights is not negotiable.”); Titus Edjua & Antony Crockett, “Human Rights Not 
Negotiable” (2009) 28 Int'l Fin L Rev 50 at 50-51; John Ruggie, Stabilization Clauses 
and Human Rights (Geneva: International Finance Corporation, 2008) at 10, 39-43, 
online: 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesand
HumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf>.  
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That said, the human rights framing may also be inadequate. In the face of 
how countries observe human rights,279 the hope that states will meet these human 
rights obligations (in particular social, cultural, and economic rights280) is probably as 
close to becoming reality as a reincarnation of the medieval lex mericatoria.281 Yet, 
this human rights framing of the privatization issue provides a stronger “foundation 
myth” than publicization, providing a better counter to the present spin of the free-
marketeers. Either way, there is more work to be done in Nietzsche’s Dark 
Workshop. 
                                                      
279 To better appreciate human rights conditions on a country-by-country basis, 
see Human Rights Watch’s Regional Reports. Human Rights Watch, Regions, online: 
Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/regions>.  
280 ICESCR, supra note 275.  
281 See e.g. Emily Kadens, “The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant” (2012) 
90 Tex L Rev 1153 at 1159-60, 1181-96, 1205-06 (questioning the validity of claims 
concerning the existence of custom in the form of lex mericatoria). 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
The frame of reference for this book has been the intermingling of 
potentialities and circumstances, which over time has led to today’s American 
corporation and its corporate governance. As the chapters demonstrate, this path to 
the present has not been a straightforward progression towards an ideal.  
Before the hangover from the heady 1990s, many believed that the global 
economy and its central unit of organization—the publically traded corporation—
were back on the heroic track to a pure capitalism,1 and society was finally making 
forward progress toward the liberal ideal.2 However a succession of scandals and 
crises in the years that followed shook this confidence.3 That said, although most 
today acknowledge that there is still work to be done, most American corporate legal 
scholars remain steadfast in their belief in the fundamentals of this liberal dream.  
This resilient confidence has done much to preserve contractarianism as the 
central ideology that drives much of American corporate governance practice.4 This is 
                                                      
1 See e.g. Jeffrey D Sachs, “Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief 
History of Global Capitalism” (1999) 15 Oxford Rev of Econ Pol 90. 
2 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free 
Press, 1992); see also Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1993). 
3 See Nancy B Rapoport, Jeffrey D Van Niel & Bala G Dharan, eds, Enron and 
Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader, 2d ed (New York: 
Foundation Press, 2009). 
4 Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 55-57. 
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good in the sense that the routines and rituals, which follow this contractarian 
perspective, are now hardwired into governance processes. This creates a high degree 
of predictability within market transactions, which in turn provides opportunities for 
more precise determinations of the risks associated with profitmaking over the short 
term. It is also bad because this embedding of routines and rituals retards the potential 
for responsiveness to the needs of markets and society when either, or both, demands 
an evolution in business practices. In other words, the resilience of contractarianism 
helps corporations sustain profitability for now, but also creates a kind of 
shortsightedness, and possibly social blindness, over the long term. 
At the beginning of this research project, I assumed that corporate governance 
might be the site to initiate the sort of social reforms necessary to alleviate this 
shortsightedness. But as my research and study of American corporate governance 
progressed, this assumption no longer appeared as self-evident as I once assumed. 
The present American capitalist culture creates a highly incentivized, profit-
driven rationality, which fuels a decentered functional capacity. Such decentered 
functional capacity, in turn, allows for complex social interactions in centers, such as 
New York City, to occur with a relative degree of ease. The secret is the promise of 
wealth, which incentivizes market actors to aggressively identify demands in society 
and then devise cost-effective strategies to satisfy these demands in a manner that is 
competitive and profitable. And thus, it is hard to refute that Hayek was correct in the 
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sense that complex social coordination could not exist as it does without the price 
mechanism.5  
This capitalist culture provides the context within which the corporation 
flourishes. The publically traded corporation is like a steroid for markets, allowing 
business to attract massive amounts of capital, while dispersing risk, in order to 
organize complex distributions of resources—not only in highly populated areas, but 
also transnationally, even in spaces international law cannot tame.  
The market for control holds American corporate governance together.6 Key 
to the market for control is that directors and managers are tied to shareholder 
expectations. If such bonds between ownership and control are not strong, the market 
for control within American corporate governance does not work.7 If the market for 
control does not function, the permissive nature of American corporate law cannot 
ensure that there will be the control mechanism available to police managerial 
opportunism. Thus, directors and managers must be tied to shareholder interests.8 It 
follows from this that in order to institute an alternative would require dramatic 
                                                      
5 Friedrich A Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945) 35 Am Econ 
Rev 519 at 528-529. 
6 See generally, Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” 
(1965) 73 J Pol Econ 110. 
7 Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 2-3. 
8 See generally AA Berle, Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 
Harv L Rev 1049. 
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reform—American corporate law would need a complete overhaul. This will not 
happen in the foreseeable future.  
There are very real dangers in not accepting this pessimism as factual. For 
instance, with the blurring of public and private,9 corporate managers are being asked 
to take on more public roles.10 From a corporate governance perspective, if taken 
seriously, this is highly problematic. If corporate managers were permitted by 
corporate law to split their loyalties between shareholders and the wider polity, this 
would create opportunities that could undermine the American system of corporate 
governance.11 If it is not taken seriously, and the new governance agenda is pushed 
forward and corporate actors continue to assume more public roles without real 
accountability to the broader polity, the survival of public spaces, as historically 
conceived, will be jeopardized.12 This creates a Catch-22, which plays out so that 
when corporate managers are used as quasi-public servants, the result is that either 
corporate governance suffers or society suffers.  
                                                      
9  See generally Jason M Solomon, “New Governance, Preemptive Self-
Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice” 
(2010) 2010 Wis L Rev 591. 
10  See generally Jody Freeman, “Extending Public Law Norms Through 
Privatization” (2003) 116 Harv L Rev 1285; John Braithwaite, “Strategic Socialism, 
Strategic Privatization and Crises” (2013) [unpublished, archived at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249544]. 
11 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7. 
12 See Morton J Horwitz, “The History of the Public/Private Distinction” (1982) 
130 U Pa L Rev 1423. 
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 If one looks to this book for an answer to this dilemma, one finds contestation. 
The first three chapters, which focus upon the potentialities for change within 
corporate legal discourses, appear to indicate that change in corporate governance is 
possible and needed. However, the final substantive chapter of this book reflects 
pessimism toward publicization, and also the potential for meaningful reform within 
American corporate governance in the foreseeable future.  
In fact, I even flirt with the idea of whether the American status quo is not the 
best outcome presently. If one accepts the corporation as an economizing device, it 
should always respond effectively to whatever incentives, understood as prices, it 
confronts.13 If this is correct, then the corporation, as a highly responsive mechanism 
to price signals, might be a very effective measure of regulatory performance without 
reform. In other words, if new governance can calibrate markets to properly price the 
social cost of production within society, then the corporation, in theory, will 
effectively adjust its function to the new price signals without reform. 
However, this hypothesis, although attractive to some, is problematic. If one 
uncritically accepts the corporation as an economizing device, corporate governance 
can remain in the almost exclusive domain of economic thought. That is not to say 
that scholars from the fields of economics and finance ought not to have a strong 
voice, just that more voices need to be heard from the fields of behavioral 
                                                      
13 Bainbridge, supra note 4 at 55-57. 
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psychology, sociology, anthropology, and others, which are presently 
underrepresented. Without reintroducing the whole argument here, this point 
dovetails nicely with the arguments made about the dangers of the lack of humanistic 
narratives within corporate governance mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Either way, corporate governance study needs to branch into a whole new 
area. Traditional corporate governance scholars will continue to do what they do—
ensuring that the regulatory mechanisms, which are internal to corporate governance 
function, are facilitating efficient low-cost transactions between contractual actors. 
However, a new study of corporate governance must also emerge that observes the 
impact of the incentive structures created by regulatory mechanisms, which are 
external to corporate governance, but which still impact upon its function. By 
observing how corporate governance reacts to these new conditions, the broader 
governance of society, and the corporation’s roles within that governance, can be 
measured.  
In the end, research on this project has deconstructed much of my pre-existing 
biases about markets and society, while adding layers of complexity and nuance to 
my understanding of the tensions between them. It appears to have generated more 
questions, and fewer answers. Accordingly, this modest conclusion no more than 
suggests a programme of study moving forward. 
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